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PAULINE THEOLOGY

A STUDY OF THE

ORIGIN AND CORRELATION

OF

THE DOCTRINAL TEACHINGS OF THE APOSTLE PAUL

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BELLEVUE-STRATFORD COLLEGE LIBRARY
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TO

THE THEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF JENA

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

IN GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY CONFERRED BY THEM
AND AS A TOKEN OF CORDIAL
PERSONAL REGARD

PREFACE

THE Apostolic Age must always possess a peculiar interest for the student of Christian history and theology. In the study of that period we come into contact with the men who, filled with love for Christ and with zeal for his truth and kingdom, so largely shaped the life of the early Church, and left their impress upon Christianity for subsequent ages. The most noteworthy example of such a moulding influence, in both its immediate and its remote effects, is found in the apostle Paul. The native qualities of the man, the remarkable transformation by which he was changed from a persecutor into a champion of the gospel, and his great achievements as a preacher and writer, — all unite to invest his career with exceptional interest and importance.

The constantly increasing literature which treats of the apostle's life and theology, or of special problems connected with his teaching, attests the unfailing interest with which the modern world regards the man and his work. Whether his teaching is thought to have been grossly perverted in the Church, as by Mr. Matthew Arnold; or is held to

have been unduly influential, especially among Protestants, as by M. Renan, — he still continues to be studied with the closest attention by exegetes, historians, theologians, and literati of all shades of opinion, as the master-mind of his age and the pioneer *par éminence* in Christian thought.

The aim which I have set before me in this volume has been to inquire into the genesis of Paul's leading thoughts, so far as their origin may be the subject of historical inquiry, to define critically their content and relation to each other, and thus to present a systematic account of his teaching upon the great themes which he considers. Not every topic which finds place in his epistles has been made the subject of discussion. I trust, however, that no important topic, none which is essential in the organism of his thoughts, has been overlooked. The study, it is hoped, will afford the reader some aid in determining how far that set of convictions which he so firmly cherished and defended may be regarded as furnishing the materials for a theological system. The effort has been made to discriminate between that which Paul may be shown by strict exegesis to have taught and those inferences which may be thought to be involved in his affirmations.

The references to the literature of the subject which are given throughout the volume may serve to indicate, in a general way, my obligations to other writers on the Pauline Theology. Apart from critical helps

in the study of the epistles of Paul, I am most largely indebted to four authors, — Neander, whose work on *The Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, although not in all points abreast of recent criticism, has been of the greatest service in opening to me the spiritual depths of the apostle's thoughts; Weiss, whose *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*,[1] with its severe exegetical method, I have always found useful, especially in regard to intricate questions of interpretation ; Pfleiderer, whose treatise *Der Paulinismus* (as also his later work entitled, *Das Urchristenthum*) I have studied with the keenest interest. *Der Paulinismus* is the most stimulating treatise which I have ever read on the subject; and none has given me more assistance, although, as will be seen, I have differed often and widely from its conclusions. It gives me pleasure thus to acknowledge my continued obligation to the distinguished scholars, Professors Weiss and Pfleiderer, whose instruction I enjoyed in former years. It remains to mention the treatise of Professor Lipsius, of Jena, *Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre*, *u. s. w.*, which I have carefully read and should have more frequently quoted had I not been informed that the author has modified, in important respects, the views therein expressed. Whether one concurs with the positions taken by him in this volume or not, it cannot but

[1] *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des Neuen Testaments.* 5 Auflage. Berlin, 1888.

be profitable to read so skilful a piece of exegesis and so discriminating an analysis of Paul's religious conceptions.

In quoting Neander's *Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, I have referred to both the English (Bohn) and the American editions of Ryland's translation. The American edition by Dr. E. G. Robinson (which is a careful revision of the English edition) is decidedly preferable. The references to Weiss's *Biblical Theology* are to the fifth German edition, and I refer to sections and subdivisions, rather than to pages, for the convenience of those who may wish to consult the translation (made from the third edition). Where the notation is not the same in the original and in the translation, I have added references to the volume and page of the latter. Pfleiderer's *Der Paulinismus* is cited from the revised (second) edition, unless it is otherwise indicated, and corresponding references to the English translation (made from the first edition) are added.

I have appended to this volume a select bibliography — omitting the familiar works on the Life of Paul — which, while making no claim to completeness, will guide the student to the literature which he will be likely to find most directly useful in the study of Paul's thoughts.

I wish to express my obligation to my colleagues Professors George P. Fisher and Frank C. Porter, who have given me many useful suggestions respect-

ing the subjects which I have discussed, and have kindly assisted me in the correction of the proof-sheets.

I offer this work to the public in the hope that it may contribute to a clearer understanding, and to a more cordial reception, of the truths to the defence and propagation of which the great apostle devoted his life.

G. B. S.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
Dec. 1, 1891.

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THE PAULINE THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE CONVERSION OF PAUL AND ITS RELATION TO HIS MISSION AND THEOLOGY

No man exercised so powerful an influence upon the thought and life of the early Church as the apostle Paul. This fact is, no doubt, due in large part to his native enthusiasm and energy. Throwing his whole soul into any cause which he espoused, he proved as vigorous and efficient in the character of a champion as he had formerly been in that of a persecutor of Christianity. The intellectual gifts of the apostle were also highly favorable to his influence. He took a clear and strong hold upon principles. He defined his convictions sharply, cherished them intensely, and carried them out consistently in action. His mind, by nature and education conscientious and religious, was especially adapted to define the characteristic truths of Christianity, defend them from the errors which threatened to corrupt them, and give them currency and prevalence in the Christian world.

But neither the apostle's dialectic power nor his native executive abilities suffice to explain his unexampled influence and services. His own language expressly refutes such an explanation. His work is not a mere achievement of human powers, the triumph of genius, or the sweeping success of fiery enthusiasm. There lies at the basis of his conception of his mission and of his entire religious consciousness an intense conviction of a divine call to his work and of a divine equipment for it. He is a *called* apostle (Rom. i. 1), set apart to the work of winning the Gentiles to faith in Christ; his commission is from above (Gal. i. 12); he describes himself as apprehended by Christ (Phil. iii. 12). His native endowments were elevated and directed by a revelation of Christ which contained for him at once the call to his mission and the perpetual inspiration for its accomplishment.

We must therefore penetrate beneath these more obvious sources of power in the apostle Paul, and seek the explanation of his thought and work in the sphere of religious conviction and experience. To attribute his spiritual history to the play within himself of religious emotion and conscientious scruples is either to misunderstand him, or is equivalent to charging him with wholly misunderstanding himself. It has in modern times become common to explain the conversion of Paul as a psychological process, treating the threefold narrative of it in the Acts of the Apostles as the objective form which the experience as-

sumed in his mind, or as the development of Christian tradition. Baur and Strauss sought to explain his conversion as a change which was gradually brought about in his mind by reflection upon the arguments by which the Christians endeavored to prove the Messiahship of Jesus, and by the moral impres sions produced by the language and temper of the dying Stephen.[1] With this explanation Baur did not, however, remain satisfied, and he later confessed that no psychological or dialectic analysis can unfold the secret of Paul's conversion.[2] Later writers, such as Holsten and Pfleiderer,[3] following, in general, the lines marked out by Baur, present a more detailed account of the process through which Paul passed, and make the starting-point of the change not so much a moral impression as a slowly maturing intellectual conviction that the Christian way of attaining righteousness was after all the true one. This conviction was developed, according to Pfleiderer, by reflection upon the Pharisaic expectation of the near advent of the Messiah, upon the fact that his coming presupposed a righteous people which

[1] Baur, *Paulus*, i. 68 *sq.* Strauss, *Leben Jesu für d. deutsche Volk*, p. 33.

[2] *Kirchengeschichte d. drei ersten Jahrhunderte*, p. 45.

[3] See, for example, Holsten, *Die Christusvision des Paulus u. s. w.*, in *Zum Evangelium des Paulus u. des Petrus*, p. 65 *sq.*; Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 7 *sq.* (Eng. tr. i. 11 *sq.*). For a detailed analysis and acute critique of Pfleiderer's theory, see an article by Prof. A. B. Bruce on *Paul's Conversion and the Pauline Gospel*, in the *Presbyterian Review* for October, 1880, p. 652 *sq.*

the law-system seemed powerless to secure, and upon the confident assertion by the Christians of the objective resurrection of Jesus. These ideas combined to suggest a new solution of the problem of religion which accorded in a remarkable manner with the Christian teaching. It needed but the ecstasy which Paul calls his revelation, and which he regarded as an objective manifestation to him of the risen Jesus, to confirm his mind in this new view of the way of salvation by divine grace through trust in the Crucified and Risen One. The method of this reflection is thus sketched: "What if perhaps the Messianic righteousness, which the Pharisee postulated as the condition of the Messiah's kingdom, were not to be understood at all in the ordinary sense of a human fulfilling of the law, but consisted in a gift of God which could be procured in no other way than through the new means of salvation which was offered by the Messiah's atoning death?"[1]

This type of theory finds in the process of Paul's conversion the germs of his whole doctrine. The crisis is reached in the very midst of his persecuting activity, during which, however, he was affected by scruples as to the correctness of his course, and on this account strove the harder to stifle the growing conviction of the truth of Christianity by intensifying his outward opposition to it. On this view there must have been a considerable period during which he was halting and doubting. Whatever the nature

[1] *Paulinismus*, p. 12 (Eng. tr. i. 12).

of the event that happened on the way to Damascus, or whether there really was any such objective occurrence as is related, the turning-point in his career merely marks the logical result of increasing dissatisfaction with himself and his course as a Pharisee, and of deepening impressions concerning the truth of Christianity.

It is obvious that if this explanation is correct, we must suppose that when the crisis was reached, Saul had already formed an opinion, more or less clearly defined, that faith in Jesus, and not the performance of deeds of obedience to the law, was the true way of attaining salvation. His most characteristic tenet, — the germ-truth which enfolded his whole system, — that faith and not works is the principle of salvation, was wrought out by him in reflection upon the facts concerning the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, the truth of which the Christians alleged, and upon the Old Testament proofs by which they were wont to support these claims. Thus Paul's conversion is regarded not as an abrupt beginning, but as marking a gradual inward transformation of opinion and feeling. If this is true, then we may find already present in this event, awaiting but development and application to life, those characteristic convictions and forces which suffice to explain the apostle's career.

It is certainly an interesting and commendable feature of this mode of explanation that it seeks to find some inner connection between Paul's conver-

sion and his life before and after it. It is a psychological impossibility that his conversion should have been due to external causes alone, and should have had no internal point of contact with the course of his previous life up to the moment of its occurrence. It is inconceivable that an external miracle alone should have transformed a man of Saul's fiery temper and firmness of conviction from a Pharisee into a Christian, if indeed such a miracle can in any case be conceived of as by itself effecting an inner spiritual revolution.[1] The problem is to detect and define this point of connection. It will first be proper to inquire whether the subtle and ingenious psychological theories which have been referred to can be successfully applied.

We possess in the Acts of the Apostles three detailed narratives of the conversion of Paul, — one by the writer, Luke (chap. ix.), and two by Paul himself (chaps. xxii., xxvi.). These chapters, together with certain allusions to the subject and to his spiritual history in Paul's epistles, constitute our only documentary evidence for determining the nature of the event and its relation to the development of his inner life. The picture which these narratives present to our view is not obscured by the minor differences which exist among the three accounts, but is a clear and vivid one.[2] The zealous persecutor and

[1] *Cf.* Neander, *Planting and Training*, Bohn ed. i. 89; Am. ed. p. 91.

[2] In Acts xxvi. the interview with Ananias is omitted; in chapter xxii. it is narrated, but the occasion of Ananias's going to

his companions, equipped with a commission from the Sanhedrîn, are arrested in their journey across the desert toward Damascus by a supernatural appearance to them of the glorified Christ. This revelation was accompanied by external phenomena which dazzled the senses and profoundly impressed the mind of Saul. To this experience, and to no other cause or occasion, he uniformly refers his conversion. It marked the crisis of his life. This fact is not altered even on the view that his experience was really a vision, — a clear and convincing inner view of the exalted Messiah. Upon this hypothesis, as well as upon the ordinary view, the revelation of Christ to the soul of the persecutor remains the efficient cause of the transformation.[1] Whether he was converted

Saul is not stated; in chapter ix. the Lord is represented as speaking to him and bidding him go, and it is affirmed that at the same time Saul had a vision of his coming. In chap. xxii. the address is considerably more extended than in chap. ix. Minor points of difference have been noted; for example, in ix. 7 we are told that Saul's companions heard the voice, but saw no man, while in xxii. 9, it is said that they saw the light, but heard not the voice of him who spake. The discrepancy is sometimes resolved by translating ἤκουσαν (xxii. 9) "understood," — an admissible rendering. The constant factors in all accounts are, the light from heaven, the voice of Jesus, Saul's answer, and the solemn charge commissioning Paul to bear the name of Christ to the Gentiles. Even if the differences be regarded as irreconcilable, it is an unwarranted procedure in criticism to reject the common matter of the various narratives and deny their historical character, upon the ground of such incidental variations in the traditions in which a great and mysterious experience has been preserved.

[1] *Cf.* Weiss, *The Life of Christ*, iii. 410, 411.

by an inward vision of Christ, a manifestation in the spiritual sphere only, or by a revelation accompanied by supernatural light and voices, is a question which, while it affects the historical character of the narratives in Acts, does not essentially concern the problem of the relation of the experience on the way to Damascus to his spiritual history. Whatever importance may attach to external phenomena in the case, it is certain that chief emphasis must be laid upon that disclosure of Christ as the enthroned King which, whatever its method, was made to his spirit. It was the manifestation of the risen Lord in this aspect of it upon which Paul, no doubt, laid chief emphasis,— the *ἀποκάλυψις ἐν ἐμοί* (Gal. i. 16) to which he referred back as the decisive cause of his conversion and the effective inspiration of his mission as a preacher.[1]

Does Paul, in his allusions to his conversion, contemplate this revelation of Christ to him as the initial point of his change of life? There can be no doubt that the three narratives assume this to be the case. Up to this moment he is depicted as a persecutor,

[1] It should be added that the expression *ἐν ἐμοί* gives no warrant for discrediting the testimony of the narratives in Acts to the occurrence of external events upon the occasion in question. The only proper inference from this expression is that in thinking of his conversion as a divinely effected transformation Paul lays chief stress on the inward revelation of Christ to him. But this he would do in any case, since his conversion, by whatever events attended, would be primarily connected with his new view of the person of Christ, and not with any outward circumstances.

bent upon the extermination of the Christians. No hint is anywhere given that he had any scruple or hesitation as to the justification of his course. The only expression which can be adduced as indicating such scruple on his part is that of the heavenly voice: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? it is hard for thee to kick against the goad" (Acts xxvi. 14). These words are thought by some to imply that Saul was engaged in a conflict with his conscience, which, like a goad, was urging him toward an opposite course of action.[1] But the figure of the goad, both in itself and in its use, more appropriately refers to forces outside oneself, as to the will or efforts of another, than to the subjective state of hesitancy from scruple. Most interpreters accordingly agree that the meaning here is: It is vain and ineffectual for you to resist my will and purpose regarding the progress of my Church. This interpretation alone harmonizes with the statement in the same account of his conversion: "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts xxvi. 9). He avows before the Jewish council that he had lived in all good conscience until that day (Acts xxiii. 1). It is true that he blames himself severely for his career as a persecutor (1 Cor. xv. 9); the memory of it gives him a sense of unworthiness to bear the name of an apostle, and he counts the conversion of such a persecutor

[1] So Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum*, p. 36. Also: *The Influence of the Apostle Paul on the Development of Christianity*, p. 29.

a miracle of grace. But that career appeared so hateful to him only after he became a Christian; he does not intimate that it had appeared so in the least previous to his becoming a Christian. His ignorance during his persecution is regarded as affording a certain mitigation of his guilt, and as a reason for his obtaining mercy; but he expressly couples it with the unbelief in the blindness of which his work of persecution was carried on (1 Tim. i. 13).[1]

There is thus no hint of any hesitation in his course, or of any gradually changing convictions regarding the claims of Jesus; all the testimony which bears upon the subject implies the contrary. He was, to the end of his course as a persecutor, firm, persevering, and conscientious in his efforts to exterminate Christianity. His statements in Galatians (chap. i.), which give the fullest account of the origin and authentication of his apostolic office, confirm indirectly, though not less clearly, the same conclusion. He did not receive his gospel — whose central principle was salvation by faith in Christ — from any human source, but "through revelation of Jesus Christ" (i. 12). He then alludes to his persecutions of the Christians in the zeal and intensity of which he had surpassed others (verses 13, 14). He implies that during this time he was inaccessible to

[1] I am here assuming the genuineness of 1 Timothy. This disputed subject receives brief consideration in a subsequent chapter.

the action of any human agencies which could have resulted in his acceptance of the gospel; "but," he adds, "when it was the good pleasure of God . . . to reveal his Son in me that I might preach him among the Gentiles, I conferred not," etc. (verses 15, 16). As a persecutor his life was closed to human influences; it was only when God made a signal revelation of his Son in him that his course was changed.[1] That by the "revelation" here spoken of is meant that unveiling of Christ to his inner eye which occurred in the experience on the road to Damascus, is rendered probable by his mentioning it in connection with other definite events. After that revelation, he says, he did not go up to Jerusalem, but went into Arabia and returned to Damascus. Additional probability is lent to this conclusion by the definite way in which he speaks of the appearance of Christ to him, classing it among those to the original apostles (1 Cor. xv. 8), and by the way in which he connects his apostleship with his having seen the Lord (1 Cor. ix. 1). This appearance and this sight of Christ can only refer to the event which happened near Damascus. Therefore to this event the apostle definitely refers back as the initial point of his apostleship, the occasion on which a special disclosure of Christ to him accomplished what no human force could have done, — his transformation from an ardent persecutor to an equally zealous Christian apostle.

[1] *Cf.* Weiss, *Introduction to the New Testament*, i. 153 (§ 13, 2).

If, then, no place can be vindicated in Paul's history for a gradual change of opinion regarding the Messiahship of Jesus, the question arises, what is that point of connection between the revelation made to him and his own inner spiritual life which it seems necessary to find in order to relieve the change of its otherwise magical appearance, and without which it seems impossible that any external manifestation to him should have been at the same time an inward revelation of truth to his spirit?

In Rom. vii. 7–25 the apostle describes a certain inner conflict of principles under the first person. It can hardly be doubted that this description refers, either directly or indirectly, to his own life. The description is of one who under the operation of the Old Testament law has been awakened to a sense of his sin and of his need of forgiveness and renewal. The picture is drawn in order to obviate the objection to the previous argument that since the law cannot justify, but only intensifies the consciousness of sin, it must itself be sinful. To this the apostle replies by a concrete representation of the service which the law renders in disclosing their sinfulness to men and thereby preparing them to accept the way of salvation offered through Christ. When the law comes and lays upon them its demands, men become aware of their failure to meet the divine requirements, and their real sinfulness, of which they had before been unconscious, is disclosed to them. Thus

arises a conflict in the soul between the moral purpose to keep the law and the hindering power of sin, which is now seen to exert itself with fearful energy. Two opposing laws seek to control the life, — the "law of the mind" (*ὁ νόμος τοῦ νοός*, verse 23), the right moral intention and purpose, and "the law of sin which is in the members" (*ὁ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ ὢν ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*), the natural impulses and passions. The latter triumphs, and the soul cries out, "Who shall deliver me?" (verse 24), when the joyous answer comes, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (verse 25).

This narrative reflects Paul's own moral history. He had passed through this moral struggle, and experienced this sense of defeat in his best aspirations. It was only the manifestation of Christ in his true character as the Saviour from overmastering sin that terminated the conflict and brought harmony and peace into his life. I believe that it is in the experience thus depicted that we are to find the point of contact between his sudden conversion and his previous career. This inner conflict, with its resulting sense of failure and sin, was, in an important sense, a preparation for his conversion, and made the revelation of Christ to him productive of a radical change in his disposition and conduct. The anxiety and unrest which sprang from his unavailing efforts to find a sense of security and peace through deeds of legal obedience deepened the yearnings of his spiritual nature, intensified the sense of his own ill-desert

before God, and thus negatively, at least, prepared his mind to welcome, if not to seek, some new ground of hope. The passage in no way intimates that the course of his thought during this unhappy experience went so far as to lead him to turn to Christ for a possible solution of his difficulty. To suppose that this was the case would be contrary to the true interpretation of the passage previously considered, and without warrant in the chapter under review. Christ appears on the scene only when the struggle has ended in Saul's defeat and despair. The law holds its devotee, throughout the whole conflict and at the end, with an unrelaxed hand. There is an increasingly intense realization of its binding force and of the necessity of obeying it in order to be saved; but the more this is felt, the more clearly is the failure felt, and the more unconquerable does the power of sin appear. No doubt is entertained that obedience to the law is necessary; no other way of terminating the conflict is discerned. It rages on until the soul is full of misery and despair, when Christ is seen in his glorified character. As soon as he is known as the true Messiah and Deliverer, a new way of life at once opens to the soul. The conflict in the field of law has been found to be a hopeless one; it must be given up. A new principle, that of faith, must supplant that of legal obedience. Sin renders impossible the perfect obedience which the law requires, and thus the door of human merit through works of righteousness is shut;

that of self-surrender to be saved by God's grace — that is, the way of faith — alone remains.[1]

It should be borne distinctly in mind that this inner conflict was not between efforts to be saved by the law, and doubts stimulated by Christian teaching as to the correctness of this method, but between these efforts and the power of sin which doomed them to failure. It implies, therefore, no scruple regarding obedience to the law as the true and only way of salvation, much less any hesitation regarding his conduct as a persecutor, but only anxiety, fear, and

[1] No writer has urged more forcibly than has Neander the objections to the naturalistic explanation of Saul's conversion, on the one side, and the necessity of connecting it with his mental and spiritual history, on the other. He has not, however, discussed the bearing of Rom. vii. on the subject. His allusion to it leaves little doubt that his view of it is similar to that here presented. He says that we should view his conversion as "an inward transaction in Paul's mind, a spiritual revelation of Christ to his higher self-consciousness; and in this light we may view the experiences which he had in his conflict with himself while a Pharisee . . . as forming a preparation by which his heart was rendered capable of receiving those internal revelations of the Redeemer." — *Planting and Training*, Bohn ed. i. 86; Am. ed. p. 87.

The same significance is attached by Weiss to the conflict described in Rom. vii. In speaking of his conscientious efforts to fulfil the law according to a zealous Pharisee's conception of his duty, Weiss says: "Nevertheless all his efforts to gain favor with God by this means did not satisfy him. In constant strife with his own opposing nature, he only became more and more deeply entangled in the unhappy struggle between the desire to do better and the impotence of the natural man, which led him utterly to despair of his own salvation (Rom. vii. 11–24)." — *Introduction to the New Testament*, i. 151 (§ 13, 2).

despondency on Saul's part because of his inability to pursue that way successfully.[1]

Zeller appeals to Rom. vii. 7–25 as an evidence that Saul "cannot have assumed the part of a persecutor without hesitation and scruples of conscience."[2] This view derives its plausibility from a misplaced emphasis in dealing with the passage. It assumes that the conflict described was stimulated by the force and attractiveness of Christianity for Saul's mind, instead of by his deepening consciousness of the ideals and obligations of the law. It is fatal to Zeller's interpretation that the passage is expressly devoted to proving the moral usefulness of the law (verse 7) in making men deeply conscious of sin, and that during the conflict which the law awakens between the desire for obedience and the hindering power of evil, the perfect fulfilment of the law remains as the ideal. No rivalry between the legal method of salvation and any other method is hinted at. The whole conflict is occasioned and pursued to its end in consequence of the intense and persistent desire to fulfil the law's requirements. The struggle is, from first to last, between the better forces within the awakened conscience which aspire to obedience, and the more potent forces of sin which render the effort futile

[1] On the difference between Saul's consciousness of personal failure to obey the law and the idea of the absolute impossibility of salvation by it, *vide* Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, pp. 4, 5 (Eng. tr. i. pp. 4, 5).

[2] *Acts of the Apostles*, i. 294.

and hopeless. The sight of Christ as the gracious Saviour who receives the sinner upon faith, is the termination of the conflict, — the event which solves the problem of conscience of whose solution Saul is despairing, and not the occasion and exciting cause of the conflict, as Zeller assumes. The error of this view is the error of making the peacemaker, who at last settles an apparently hopeless quarrel, an instigator and chief party in the contest.

The further reason given by Zeller for Paul's scruples as a persecutor, that he was a "pure character," is much weakened by the history of conscientious persecutions, and in Paul's case is wholly overthrown by his own testimony that it was just in consequence of his conscientious and zealous devotion to his religion that he deemed it his duty to exterminate Christianity. His purity of character previous to his conversion in the only sense in which it can be maintained — that is, his conscientious religious devotion, animated by misdirected zeal — was the very cause of his extraordinary hostility to the Christian religion. "I verily thought with myself," he says, — it was my deliberate and conscientious conviction, — "that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth" (Acts xxvi. 9).

We agree, then, with those writers who hold that the conversion of Paul was connected with a process of reflection, but maintain that this process was one which was leading him rather to despair than to the joyous acceptance of the gospel. The revelation

of Christ to him terminated the conflict of mind which he had experienced, not because that conflict had forced his heart to faith in the Messiah, but because it had forced him into anxiety and unrest of soul regarding himself, which the manifestation of Christ to him at length met and satisfied. It convinced him of the fact of the exaltation and heavenly glory of Jesus, — a fact to which no scruples regarding his spiritual state such as he describes in Rom. vii. could ever have conducted him; a fact which took away the "stumbling-block" occasioned by the sufferings and death of Christ. Here was the turning-point in his life. He was convinced, as a Pharisee, only of this, — that an earnest and conscientious soul becomes the scene of a severe conflict when it really sees what the law demands, and measures its own insufficient strength to obey. The principle of faith was familiar in the teaching of the Christians. When, now, Christ becomes disclosed to Saul, and the fact of his Messiahship becomes thereby established, a new solution of the problems of conscience is offered. It only remains for Saul to apply it to the struggles which had so long raged in his life and deprived him of security and peace. He now sees that the soul does not climb into acceptance with God, but rests in the assurance of his mercy. When the fact of Christ's Messiahship is revealed to Saul, — the fact which alone can give a new direction to his life, — the application of the faith-principle to the efforts of the will and to the as-

pirations of the heart after peace with God can be quickly made by one who has been so often baffled in his strivings after that peace through deeds of obedience to the law.

It is in this consciousness of failure to find rest in legal works that we discover the inner point of contact between the Christian life of Paul and his experience as a Pharisee. His Christian view of the futility of legal works is doubtless grounded in the conflicts and failures which are pictured in Rom. vii. But these conflicts could never have produced his theology of justification had it not been for the convincing revelation of the fact that Jesus was the Messiah, who was risen and reigning in the glory of the heavenly world. But given this fact, the principles of his teaching spring at once into relation to his former efforts and experiences, and transform the bitter cry, "O wretched man that I am!" into the joyous exclamation, "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. vii. 24, 25).

We must concur in the opinion of Pfleiderer that psychological theories concerning Paul's conversion are useful in proportion as they help to give us an insight into his religious experiences and conceptions,[1] but would add that they are likely to be correct in proportion as they harmonize with Paul's own testimony and with natural inferences from it. So far as we can connect his theology with his conversion and its antecedents, we may find in them two

[1] *Paulinismus* p. 4 (Eng. tr. i. 4).

fruitful germs of his subsequent teaching: one is his own consciousness of failure in legal obedience; the other his unshaken conviction, based upon a distinct personal experience, of the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus as Messiah. The former might be called the negative, the latter the positive pole of the Pauline system. We regard all efforts to explain his conversion as a process of thought starting from the first of these presuppositions alone, as both historically and psychologically untenable. They can neither adequately explain how he could have become convinced of the Messiahship of Jesus, nor can they account for his own clear distinction between his pre-Christian reflections and his conversion, or for his evident belief that the revelation of Christ to him was an objective fact.[1]

[1] The untenableness of the arguments by which the vision-hypothesis is supported has been frequently exposed. If it was in a vision that Paul saw the exalted Christ, then the vision was one which revealed to him a *fact*. It must in that case have been a divinely effected vision and have corresponded to reality (*cf.* Weiss, *The Life of Christ*, iii. 412; Fisher, *Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, p. 468). The capital fact which bears against this mode of explanation is, that while Paul has commented freely on his visions (see, for example, 2 Cor. xii. 1–7), he never alludes to his conversion in terms kindred to those applied to visions, nor affords the slightest suggestion that the experience of his conversion was of the nature of an ecstatic state. It is obviously unwarranted to refer to 2 Cor. xii. 2, "Whether in the body, I know not," etc., as even Pfleiderer does (*Paulinismus*, p. 15; Eng. tr. i. 14), since that ecstasy occurred at least six years after his conversion and cannot be appealed to as descriptive of it. On the vision-hypothe-

The conversion of the apostle sustains an important relation to his mission as the bearer of the gospel to the Gentiles, and to the whole development of his subsequent theology. He associates his conversion and his mission to the heathen closely together (Gal. i. 15, 16), and contemplates the revelation of Christ to him as having this mission for its end. In the same way in Acts xxvi. 16–18 the Lord is represented as commissioning him for this work in connection with the experience of his conversion. In the narrative in Acts xxii. 21 this charge is given when Paul was at Jerusalem long subsequent to his conversion (*cf.* Gal. i. 17, 18), while in ix. 15 it is Ananias to whom the appointment of Paul as an apostle to the Gentiles is communicated. The fact that he spent three years in Arabia and Damascus (Gal. i. 17), and later not less than five years in Syria and Cilicia (Gal. i. 21; *cf.* Acts ix. 30), as well as the circumstance that during these years his preaching was almost, if not quite, exclusively to Jews and Hellenists (Acts ix. 20–22; ix. 29; xi. 19; xiii. 5, 14; Rom. i. 16), would indicate that Paul had not yet come to the full consciousness of his distinctive mission, but that it was made increasingly manifest to him in the course of his missionary labors. So far as the Acts enable us to trace the beginning of Paul's special mission on behalf of the

sis as most ingeniously elaborated by Holsten, there are clear and just criticisms by Sabatier (*L'Apôtre Paul*, pp. 43–49; Eng. tr. pp. 64–67).

Gentiles, it was at Pisidian Antioch during the first missionary journey that he and Barnabas turned to the Gentiles when they saw their eagerness to hear the word of God, and observed the envy of the Jews on this account (Acts xiii. 42–46; *cf.* Rom. ix. 30 *sq.*). The Jewish synagogue had, on account of its free and popular character, furnished the Gentiles an opportunity to manifest their interest; while the Jews, with envious contempt for the heathen, turned the tide of the missionaries' labors, and became the occasion of opening a new epoch in the progress of the gospel.

Such seems to have been the actual unfolding in history of the idea of Paul's apostolate to the nations. But it was natural that, reflecting on this providential opening of great opportunities for labor and success, he should have conceived of it as involved in the very revelation by which he had been made a Christian; and indeed, in a true and proper sense, it was so. Whether Paul was directly conscious, from the time of his conversion, of the character of his peculiar life-work, is a question which depends upon the critical view taken of the narratives of his conversion in their relation to the actual history of the comparatively slow and late development of the idea under definite and favoring conditions. That he possessed this consciousness from the first is by no means so evident as is commonly assumed.

That his conversion, considering all that it in-

volved, did most naturally and inevitably look toward this result is clear. Paul was pre-eminently the man for the Gentile work, both in point of natural qualification and by reason of his experience, which had so sharpened his sense of the futility of seeking salvation in Jewish methods. The very meaning with which his conversion must have invested the Messiahship of Jesus would tend powerfully to this result. As soon as he was convinced that it was trust in Jesus that secured salvation, his reaction of mind from the legal efforts by which he had vainly sought for peace would drive him beyond all Jewish particularism in his conception and propagation of the gospel. His mission to the outlying and despised nations finds therefore its logical ground in the revelation of Christ as the Risen and Exalted One who saves all on equal terms.

Closely connected with his personal mission is his whole view of the nature and destination of the gospel. This too is grounded in his conversion, and was defined and sharpened in his consciousness by his previous experience as a Pharisee. No one who had not had some experience of moral struggle under the law analogous to Paul's, could have so sharply defined the gospel principles of salvation in contrast to the legal. The law had once shut up his own soul in prison until he learned that faith could set him free (Gal. iii. 23). It was not only what Paul was by nature and what he became by conversion, but what he had been as a Pharisee, which enabled him

to develop his system of doctrine. Especially would the experiences of dissatisfaction and struggle under the law, which had given the objective revelation of Christ a point of contact with his inner life, contribute powerfully to his conviction of the inadequacy of all human efforts to attain salvation, and of the absolute necessity of receiving it as a gift of grace on condition of faith. Thus the call of the apostle to his work as a preacher of the gospel of grace is most closely related to his conversion, and to all the reflections and experiences which are connected with it.

As soon as he knew Jesus to be the Christ it would at once follow that the way of life which he had proclaimed, rather than that advocated by the Pharisees, was the true one. The Mosaic law as alone pointing the way to salvation would be replaced by the Messiah himself. Legal obedience would speedily give place to personal trust as the true principle of religion. It would therefore be obvious that the way of salvation was open, not to Jews alone, but to the whole world; that one condition of acceptance with God — faith in Christ — was required alike of all. A larger thought of the nature and scope of religion would speedily supplant Jewish particularism, and Christianity would be seen to be universal in its design and adaptation.

The same religious zeal which had before been employed against Christianity is now directed to its extension. The same resolute will and honest con-

science which had treated the gospel as a dangerous heresy are now enlisted to herald its truths and promote its sacred ends. This whole change, psychologically considered, turns on Saul's new conviction of the Messiahship of Jesus. Given that truth, with his bitter experiences of struggle under law, he cannot but see Christianity as universal in its very nature, and faith as its characteristic and central truth. This statement is not meant to imply that his appointment to his mission was not also received by direct divine call, but to point out the logical connection between his conversion and his teaching. However direct his appointment to his peculiar work, it was not without a rational connection with his spiritual history, and especially with the revelation of Christ to him.

The mission and theology of Paul are involved in each other, and cannot be separated. His theology — his "gospel" (Rom. ii. 16; xvi. 25; Gal. i. 6 *sq.*) — was simply an exposition and justification of those truths which were involved in the Messiahship of Jesus, and which it was his work to proclaim to the Gentile world. His epistles, in their original intention, were but a means of enlarging his work and influence as a preacher to the nations; they were written to assist and supplement his missionary labors. In them we happily possess a full elaboration of those principles and truths which were the staple of the apostle's teaching. Those principles were deeply rooted in his life-experience. They were evolved,

under divine guidance and enlightenment, through reflection and experience, from certain elementary facts which center in his conversion. They are divine truths; and just because they are divine we should believe that they are in closest connection with the whole inner movement of the life that was so effective in teaching them. It is just because they are divine that they are genetically unfolded in harmony with man's spiritual constitution and in connection with the special spiritual experiences of their great champion.

CHAPTER II

PAUL'S STYLE AND MODES OF THOUGHT[1]

BEING a Hellenist Paul learned Greek as his native language, and could employ it with facility and power; but his knowledge of Hebrew, acquired in the schools, and his familiarity with Old Testament language and thought, imparted a Hebraistic tinge to his writings. The rugged and broken style in which he often writes is due, however, chiefly to his carelessness of form and to the impetuous rush of his thought. He could, no doubt, have constructed his epistles in as elegant a Greek style as that in which Luke has reported his discourses in the later chapters of Acts, or have rivalled in his rhetoric and diction the mellifluous style of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The apostle has, however, bestowed little pains upon form, in his eager desire to convince his readers of the truth and importance of his ideas and convictions. Even when he sets out to write in a methodical manner, he fails to carry out his intention by forgetting his mode of beginning; as, for example, in Rom. i. 8, and iii. 2, where

[1] The substance of this chapter was published in the *Andover Review* for July, 1890.

he begins with "firstly," but never resumes the enumeration by adding "secondly." His letters abound in examples of what is sometimes called "going off at a word," — the addition of accessory ideas to every principal term, so as to combine many thoughts which lie outside his primary purpose with the matter immediately in hand. The salutation in Rom. i. 1–7 furnishes good illustrations. At the mention of "the gospel" (verse 1), he appends a brief historic description of it (verse 2); to the title "Son" he adds an account of him with respect to the two sides of his being (verses 3, 4). Occasionally a concrete point in his argument suggests to the apostle a universal truth, to which his thoughts, borne aloft by its greatness and power, suddenly mount up, and in the expression of which we find examples of sublime eloquence. A striking instance is found where, in discussing the Corinthian parties, he urges that those who enlist under the banner of Apollos, Cephas, or any other teacher exclusively are, by so doing, depriving themselves of the benefits which they might derive from other Christian teachers; whereas the disciple should make all sources of help his own; all are his right. Then the idea of the Christian's possession takes hold upon his mind, and his thought suddenly expands: Yes, all things are yours; not only Paul, Apollos, and Cephas, but the world and life and death, things present and things to come, all are yours, if ye are Christ's, for Christ is God's (1 Cor. iii. 21–23).

There is no mark of style which is more characteristic of Paul's epistles than the anacoluthon, — the carrying out of a sentence or paragraph in a different way from that which the beginning contemplated (see Rom. ii. 17, 21). Sometimes his sentences are left quite unfinished (see Rom. ix. 22–24). Frequently the progress of thought is interrupted with long explanatory parentheses, as in Rom. v. 12 *sq.*, where, after stating one side of an intended comparison (verse 12), he pauses to explain the language concerning the relation of death and sin, with which he had started (verses 13, 14), and then resumes the comparison, but in a new form (verses 15–17). Instead of stating the point of similarity between the entrance of sin into the world by Adam and that of righteousness by Christ, which he had begun to state in verse 12, he takes up the constrast between the two, and shows how they are unlike. Three times he affirms and characterizes this unlikeness in verses 15–17; and only in verse 18 does he resume the comparison and positively assert the point of likeness which exists between Adam and Christ.

There are numerous examples of play upon words, whose force is lost in translation, but which serve to illustrate the apostle's skill in the employment of language. We may note, as instances, Rom. i. 20, *τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ θεοῦ καθορᾶται*, "The *unseen* things of God are clearly *seen*" (by the use of the reason, *νοῦς*); i. 28, *καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν — παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν*, "Since they did not *approve* to retain

God, etc., he gave them over to an *unapproved* mind." He does not scorn even the playful use of the pun in a personal letter, as may be seen in Philemon 20, where, in allusion to the name Onesimus (meaning *profitable*), he says, *ναὶ, ἀδελφέ, ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην ἐν κυρίῳ*, "Let me be *profited* by thee in the Lord," — I have returned to you, Philemon, your servant Onesimus, who is now truly *profitable;* do you now in turn prove *profitable* (be my Onesimus) by receiving him as a Christian brother. A similar touch of humor is seen in verses 10, 11, where Paul says, after mentioning the name Onesimus, "who was aforetime *unprofitable* [*ἄχρηστον*] to thee, but now is *profitable* [*εὔχρηστον*]," etc.; that is, this servant of Philemon had formerly belied the meaning of his name, but now will prove to be what his name imports. Paul can also, upon occasion, make his apt use of kindred words serve the ends of bitter satire, as in Gal. v. 12, "Would that those who insist upon circumcision had it to the point of mutilation [*ἀποκόψονται*]." With this passage may be compared the use of *κατατομή* and *περιτομή* in Phil. iii. 2, 3.

The vivacity and power of Paul's letters are well described by Weiss in the following just and forcible language: —

"It is certain that we never find the cold objectivity of the author, because the living warmth of the letter-writer throbs in all his epistles. Hence the frequent addresses, the ever-recurring questions, with which he draws out his details. Paul is able powerfully to move,

but also to lift up and comfort; high moral earnestness is always associated in him with depth of religious feeling, which often finds vent in inspired utterance. He is not without passion; he lashes the weaknesses and errors of his readers without pity; he is able mortally to wound his opponents, and does not even despise the weapons of irony and satire. But the softest tones of the mind are likewise at his disposal; the ebullition of righteous anger softens down to the most touching expression of heartfelt love; he can speak the language of deeply wounded love as well as of most ardent longing, of exulting gratitude as well as of suppressed pain." [1]

Of greater importance for our present purpose than the consideration of Paul's style is the study of the characteristics of his thinking and his favorite modes of presenting his thoughts, in order to gain a just conception of his teaching upon special subjects. By this study is meant something more than an examination of style; it includes the thought-forms which lie behind style,— the moulds into which ideas are run.

This subject has never received sufficient attention. Interpreters have too often taken up the Pauline letters without reference to the environment in which they were produced, the peculiarities of the writer, or the special ends contemplated in his writings. Upon his words have been put meanings which belong to opinions and speculations which he never entertained, and around his teaching have been

[1] *Introduction to the New Testament*, i. 212 (§ 16, 5).

thrown associations wholly foreign to his own type of thought. Paul has been read as if he had written in the nineteenth century (or more commonly as if he had written in the fifth or seventeenth), and as if his writings had no peculiarities arising from his own time, education, and mental constitution.

The task of defining these peculiarities is indeed a difficult one. We are so remote from the apostle's time, we have so inadequate a knowledge of the religious conceptions under whose influence his Christian belief was matured, that we need to proceed with great caution and reserve in the treatment of the subject; but that it is necessary to define as carefully as possible the Pauline modes of thought is a conviction which will be forced upon the mind of every intelligent student who seeks to ascertain precisely the apostle's meaning.

One prominent characteristic of Paul's thought may be designated, for want of a better term, as mystical realism. This quality is most clearly illustrated in his conception of the close relation between unregenerate humanity and the natural head of the race, Adam, on the one hand, and between man as the subject of redemption and the head of spiritual humanity, Christ, on the other. It is characteristic of Paul's mind to conceive religious truth under forms which are determined by personal relationship. These relations, especially the two just specified, may be termed *mystical* in the sense of being unique, vital, and inscrutable; they are *real* in the sense

that sinful humanity is conceived of as being actually present and participant in Adam's sin, and redeemed humanity as being similarly present and participant in Christ's death, burial, and resurrection. The precise meaning of the apostle in affirming the reality of these relations and in thus identifying man with Adam in his sin, and with Christ in his saving acts, can be determined only by a close study of the origin and purpose of this method of thought.

The most prominent use made of this realistic conception is in defining the believer's relation to Christ. He is in Christ; he is one with him; his life is hid with him in God. This realism takes the peculiar form of identifying the believer with Christ in the characteristic experiences which the latter underwent for man's salvation. The believer died with Christ upon the cross, was buried with him in the tomb, and was raised to newness of life when Christ rose from the dead.[1] The origin of these forms of thought is found in the relation of the death and resurrection of Christ to the moral renewal of the individual.

[1] 2 Cor. v. 14: "One died for all, therefore all died;" that is, all died when Christ died. The ethical death to sin is accomplished for all in and with the death of Christ upon the cross (see Meyer *in loco*). Col. iii. 3: "For ye died [ἀπεθάνετε]," — not, "for ye are dead," as the A. V. rendered, obscuring the peculiarity of the idea, — "and your life is hid with Christ in God." Ye died when Christ died in the sense that your cessation from the old life was accomplished by the death of Christ. They are so bound together as to be capable of a mystical identification. *Cf.* Gal. ii. 19; Col. ii. 20; Rom. vi. 8.

Their strict relation is that of cause and effect. Now, under the power of Paul's sense of the close union between the believer and his Saviour they are identified in thought and expression so that the believer is said to have died in an ethical sense when Christ died upon the cross, and to have risen with him to a new spiritual life when he rose from the grave. "If, then, ye were raised with Christ," — not "if ye be risen," as the A. V. renders, — "seek the things that are above" (Col. iii. 1). "If ye rose to new life when Christ rose from the dead," is the form of the thought.

This mystical identification of the believer's moral renewal with the procuring causes of it in Christ's death and resurrection is less plainly made in respect to the burial than in respect to the death and resurrection of Jesus. The reason of this is that the representation is complicated at that point by references to water-baptism. Death to sin is identified with Christ's death, as being accomplished in and with it; resurrection to new moral life is associated with Christ's resurrection from the tomb in precisely the same way, though less frequently; but the intermediate step of burial is not treated under the same form, but is associated with baptism. The figure in this case represents baptism as a burial of the believer into the moral death to sin which must take place before the new life can ensue. Then, in this representation, the entrance upon spiritual life is compared with Christ's resurrection, not strictly

identified with it. "We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4). Very similar forms of expression occur in Colossians (ii. 12): "Having been buried with him in baptism, wherein ye were also raised with him," etc. Here, it will be noticed, the experience of being raised to new life with Christ is conceived as occurring when the believer emerges from the waters of baptism, — an element of the representation which is only implied in the corresponding passage in Romans.

The peculiarity which meets us in these passages is the imperfect identification of result and cause which we have observed in the passages previously noticed. It is a most natural peculiarity on account of the appropriateness with which the conceptions of burial and resurrection suggest the idea of baptism, for this is undoubtedly the logical order of the thoughts in the apostle's mind. In this whole class of representations he has taken the terms which describe the crowning acts of Christ's redemptive work — death, burial, and resurrection — to express in a moral or figurative sense the renewal which has its procuring cause in those events. Where this identification of effect with cause is fully made, we have such conceptions as that in 2 Cor. v. 14, where the ethical death of man is carried back in thought to Christ's death on the cross; but where the identifica-

tion is less completely made, the relation is stated by a comparison, as in Rom. vi. 4: "Like as Christ was raised, . . . so we also." Here the believer's ethical death occurs in his own personal experience, and is associated with baptism. The latter form of thought is merely a figurative use of the terms of baptism which symbolizes those moral changes which may be fitly called death to sin and resurrection to new life. But it is the idea of the mystical union of the believer with Christ in death and resurrection which underlies the apostle's language concerning baptism, and creates the peculiar phraseology by which it is spoken of as "baptism into death." The expression "to baptize into death" would be unintelligible if we were not made familiar by other passages with the figurative meaning of "death" as expressing the moral change which has its ground in Christ's death. While, therefore, the two passages concerning baptism do not so fully express this mystical identification of the believer with Christ, they imply it as a fixed form of thought with Paul, and are inexplicable without it.

The counterpart of this mystical identification of believing humanity with Christ in his sacrificial and saving work is found in a similar identification of unregenerate humanity with Adam in his transgression. This conception is developed only in a single passage (Rom. v. 12–21), but is alluded to also in 1 Cor. xv. 22. Adam and Christ represent and embody the race. The former is the head of the race

in respect to its sinfulness; the latter the head of the race in respect to its redemption. They thus stand in analogous relations to the race; and it is the aim of the apostle to show that grace in Christ is mightier than sin in Adam. He accordingly institutes a parallel between the two for this purpose. The peculiar mystical realism of Paul lies behind the whole representation. Sinful man is identified with Adam in precisely the same way as redeemed man is so often identified with Christ. The transgression of Adam and the saving death of Christ are the terms of the comparison. With the former, the sinfulness of man is identified; with the latter, the salvation of man from sin is identified. As the moral renewal of man is represented as taking place in and with Christ's death and resurrection, so the moral defilement of man is represented as contracted in and with the sin of Adam. The aorist tenses, which are used in both classes of passages (*οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*, 2 Cor. v. 15; *ἀπεθάνετε*, Col. iii. 3; *εἰ ἀπεθάνετε σὺν Χριστῷ*, Col. ii. 20; *εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ*, Rom. vi. 8; and *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, Rom. v. 12), can be naturally explained only by referring the "dying" spoken of in the first class back to the time of Christ's death, and the sinning of Rom. v. 12 to the time of Adam's transgression. The meaning of the latter passage is that all sinned when Adam sinned. The whole parallel between Adam and Christ is accordant with Paul's modes of thought, the only peculiarity being that the mystical relation between sinful humanity

and its head, Adam, is developed in this passage alone, while the contrasted relation of humanity as redeemed in Christ is abundantly illustrated in other passages. It is only from a study of this class of passages that we obtain the right point of view from which to interpret the much-disputed expression, — ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον (Rom. v. 12).

It does not belong to the present inquiry to discuss the meaning of the passage in detail. We may, however, remark in passing that those explanations which seek to avoid Paul's obvious reference in ἥμαρτον to the time when Adam sinned are exegetically as untenable as the elaborate theories of Augustinian realism and federal headship are remote from the apostle's modes of thought. It is a curious fact that while theology has taken the phrase, "because all sinned," in the strictest literalness, and has built whole theories of sin and philosophies of history upon it, the parallel representation of the race in its union with Christ in his death has rarely received any similar treatment. Yet the former finds expression but once, while the latter is a frequent form of representation. It has been common for those who take the most literal view of the less plain and prominent member of the comparison to explain the other in exegesis as merely figurative, and in theological speculation to neglect it altogether. But if the phrases, "in Adam all die," and "all sinned" (when he sinned), are adequate ground for elaborate theories of the origin and nature of sin, their counterpart,

"in Christ shall all be made alive," and "all died" (when he died) may well be made the basis of some theory of the relation of humanity to the Redeemer and of the philosophy of redemption.

Both members of the parallel equally illustrate the peculiar mysticism of Paul. It is fair exegesis to interpret both alike in their natural grammatical meaning and force. It would be a just procedure in theology to explain the more obscure and occasional member of the comparison by the plainer and oft-repeated analogy. It is an utter perversion of exegetical results to say that the sinning of each member of the race in Adam's sin is a literal fact, and the occurrence of the ethical death of the believer when Christ died upon the cross a mere figure of speech. The terms of these analogous statements are to be interpreted in the same way.

We have already seen that the peculiar identification in time which Paul makes between the believer's renewal and Christ's death has its ground in the causal connection between that death and the believer's salvation. The identification of the sins of individuals with Adam's sin can have no other ground. All sinners sinned when Adam sinned, just as all believers died to sin (that is, became regenerate) when Christ died upon the cross. Paul's thought is: "Mankind as redeemed was saved in and with the death of Christ, the head of the new humanity; mankind as sinful transgressed in and with the sin of Adam, the head of the old humanity." That

the former was the more prominent conception in his mind is shown by his frequent reference to it, and by the fact that he introduces the other thought of the sinning of all men in Adam only in order to set its analogous truth in stronger light. Which representation had logical precedence in his mind we cannot know; but the thought of Christ as the second Adam (*ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ; ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47) would lead most naturally to the development of such a parallel as that in Rom. v. 12 *sq.*, especially since the idea of mystical union with Christ in his death was a fixed and favorite form of thought with Paul.

Another quality of the apostle's thought appears in the way in which he objectifies, and sometimes almost personifies, the great truths with which his religious teaching deals. A case in point is his conception of righteousness. It is to him not merely a subjective quality, an attribute of character; it is a status or relation which God constitutes. He calls it *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, — a righteousness which comes from God (Rom. i. 17; iii. 21, 22). It is something which God reveals or bestows.[1] Its revelation to

[1] "God's righteousness is, in this connection, the righteousness which proceeds from God as the cause, or is wrought out by him; that is, the way and manner in which God places man in an adequate relation to himself, the way which God has opened to the attainment of this relation, or just the new theory of justification which God has set forth" (Baur, *Neutest. Theol.* p. 134). The *content* of this conception is not now under consideration. We are here concerned only with its objective *form*.

man in the gospel (Rom. i. 17) is contrasted with the revelation of wrath against "all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. i. 18). God's personal attribute cannot be primarily meant in these passages, since righteousness is represented as becoming man's possession by faith, and also as being designed to produce faith (Rom. i. 17: "by faith unto faith"). The believer is spoken of as being the recipient of this endowment or gift from God (Rom. iii. 22: "unto all them that believe"), and again as having this righteousness set to his account upon the exercise of faith (Rom. iv. 6: "unto whom God reckoneth righteousness," *cf.* iv. 11).

This formal conception of righteousness is the one in accordance with which Paul's definitions of justification are chiefly developed. It is by no means the exclusive conception of righteousness which is found in the Pauline writings, but it is a prominent one, whose shaping power in the apostle's doctrine should be fully recognized. Whatever may be the moral and spiritual truths which theology finds involved in these conceptions, it is the first task of candid exegesis to describe the forms of the biblical thought as exactly as the study of language permits us to define them.

The dominant conception of sin with Paul is that of a world-ruling power to which action almost personal is ascribed. It enters the world (Rom. v. 12), and establishes dominion over men (Rom. iii. 9; v. 21); it rules them as a master (Rom. vi. 6); it is

roused into action by the advent of law (Rom. vii. 9); it makes the body its special theatre of manifestation (Rom. vii. 23–25). It may be thought that these are but figures of speech which have always been common. But it appears to us that they attach a positiveness and power to the principle of sin which is somewhat peculiar, and which is not without influence upon Paul's doctrine of justification. His intense conviction of sin led him to define it in terms which were fitted to express the thraldom of man under it, and the energy with which the law pronounced its sentence upon him. All these forms of thought are employed in the most realistic manner. Sin was working in the world from its beginning in Adam; death was reigning; but men were only feebly aware of sin's power; the law came and roused sin into unwonted energy; men might make whatever efforts they would to keep the law, sin overpowered them; their situation was hopeless. Then God revealed a new way of righteousness; upon the exercise of faith in Christ the condemnation was removed and a new relation was constituted. The standing of one who comes into this new relation to God is called righteousness. It is from God in the sense that he by his grace places the man in this relation.

The subject of justification is anticipated here only so far as seems necessary in order to illustrate this peculiar objectivity or realism of the apostle's thought. It should be borne in mind that I am

speaking here only of the form, and not of the matter or ethical content, of these conceptions. What are the moral and spiritual realities which they involve is indeed the important question for theology, and should receive the full measure of attention which has generally been bestowed upon it; but it is important as a preparation for that inquiry to define the shape which these truths took in the apostle's mind. Without doing this, a correct conception of his teaching cannot be gained. From lack of careful investigation into the peculiarities of Paul's modes of thought two opposite errors have resulted: on the one hand, the formal element in his teaching has been ignored, and on the other, the form has been held so essential and so identical with the truths of the spiritual life that it has been made to give the law to all religious thought on the subject. The former is as unjustifiable in exegesis as the latter is unnecessary in theology.

It is a peculiarity of Paul's thinking that in the handling of certain themes it moves predominantly in the sphere of legal relations. This fact may be due in some degree to acquaintance with Roman law, but is chiefly accounted for by his Old Testament training. In harmony with this mode of thought he represents the believer's cessation from his former relation to the Mosaic law as a death to the law, and illustrates it by the termination of the marriage contract by the death of one of the parties (Rom. vii. 1–6). The condition of those who are

under the bondage of the law is likened to the relation of the heir during his childhood when he has no greater authority than a bond-servant; while those who have been liberated by faith in Christ from this legal servitude are like heirs who have actually entered upon the inheritance which was destined for them and who enjoy the full freedom of sons (Gal. iv. 1–7).

The figure of adoption to express the entrance upon the Christian life is mingled with the description of heirship just referred to, and is a favorite form of thought with the apostle. It pictures the alienation of the soul from God in the old life by its sins, and the joyful entering upon a new filial relation. It is based upon a legal analogy, and forms the contrast to the "bondage" with which the law enslaves men. In the most striking passage in Romans where the figure is employed (viii. 15–17) it is blended with that of heirship.

But the most elaborate use of legal analogy in Paul's writings is found in his development of his doctrine of righteousness and justification. This has been to some extent illustrated in the remarks upon the objectivity of these forms of thought as they appear in his doctrinal epistles. It remains to seek the ground of these conceptions in the sphere of Jewish thought. They are distinctively Old Testament conceptions. Righteousness in the prevailing Old Testament meaning is the condition of one who stands in a right relation to God, that relation being measured

and determined by the requirements of some norm or law. The corresponding term, "to justify," denotes a forensic act by which one is declared to stand or to be placed in this relation. When predicated of God, it denotes an act of the divine judgment, a proclamation of the relation of favor and acceptance.[1]

We are not here concerned with the theological conflicts which have been waged over these words. What is of importance for our present purpose is that the whole subject of justification is treated prevailingly from a legal point of view, and that no exegesis of Paul's language can be correct which ignores this fact. It is for this reason that it is necessary to recur to these fundamental peculiarities of Paul's modes of thought, in order that his language may be interpreted in accord with his own peculiar genius and not be forced to yield meanings foreign to his

[1] *Cf.* Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.*, 293, 294. "Sobald der Begriff der Gerechtigkeit an einem göttlichen oder menschlichen Urtheil orientirt wird, heisst 'gerecht machen' durchaus immer 'den Menschen durch den Urtheilsspruch als unschuldig, im Rechte befindlich erklären,' — niemals ihm eine sittliche Erneuerung zum Guten bringen. . . . Bei dieser Bedeutung des Wortes 'gerecht' begreift sich leicht, dass Gerechtigkeit und Sündlosigkeit, im strengen Sinne des Wortes, nichts mit einander zu thun haben."

Schultz maintains the "purely forensic significance" of the Old Testament equivalent of δικαιοῦν (הִצְדִּיק) in all cases except Is. liii. 11 (as well as of its counterpart הַרְשִׁיעַ). To this exception Cheyne, following Gesenius, adds Dan. xii. 3. See *Prophecies of Isaiah*, *in loco*. Is. liii. 11.

type of thinking, or conformed to moulds which belong to the theological interpreter. The application of the forensic type of thought to the phenomena of spiritual life is not agreeable to many minds, but it was so to Paul's. It is proper for those who are little attracted and edified by this mode of thought to urge that it supplies, at most, but the moulds into which his ideas of the spiritual life are run, and to appeal to those more mystical expressions of its truths which find place outside the formal development of his teaching concerning justification. But when the interpreter permits his distaste for legal analogy to lead him to deny its predominance in Paul's doctrine, and to explain away the natural force of his words in accordance with that denial, he is but conforming his interpretation to theological prepossession, and making impossible a sound and impartial exegesis of the apostle's writings.[1] I say nothing of the theology of those who neglect or deny this legal quality and form of Pauline thought, but it is no presumption to pronounce their exegesis incorrect.

The use of parallel is a noticeable quality of Paul's thinking. In the Epistle to the Romans, be-

[1] I may refer in illustration to Sabatier's depreciation of the forensic character of Paul's doctrine of justification (*L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 276; Eng. tr. p. 299). The minimizing of this element in the supposed interests of a more spiritual theology detracts from the exegetical value of Dr. Lyman Abbott's *Commentary on Romans*, — a work of merit in other respects. See especially pp. 36, 52–60.

fore he enters upon the exposition of the doctrine of justification by faith, he prepares the way for the discussion by proving that men cannot be justified by works. This he does in a twofold manner: first, by drawing a picture of the depravity of the Gentile world (Rom. i. 18–32) which would, without special argument, be sufficient to exclude the idea of their justification by merit; then, as the counterpart of this, he enters upon an arraignment of the Jew, charging him with the commission of the same sins (ii. 1), and denying to him any advantage over the heathen with reference to justification, by reason of his possession of the law (ii. 1–iii. 20).

These parallels are employed for the more forcible exhibition of some single truth which it is important to hold clearly in mind in their interpretation. The primary object in the instance referred to is, no doubt, to humble the pretensions of the Jew by proving that he stands upon the same moral plane with the heathen and must accept salvation on the same terms. In order to do this, it is necessary to bring out several points of comparison. It must be shown that both alike have sinned, and equally against light. It is involved in this fact that the Gentiles, who had no written law like the Mosaic system, had nevertheless a certain moral guide in conscience, which rendered their lives blameworthy. This analogue of the Old Testament law was sufficient to condemn their conduct; how much more, then, would

the law condemn the conduct of the Jew! Moreover, it offered to the Gentile the same opportunity to gain justification by obedience as the written law afforded to the Jew. A perfect obedience to such law as the heathen had would avail as much as perfect obedience to his law on the part of the Jew. Thus both stood upon precisely the same plane; to both the same requirement came; the same principles apply to both (ii. 12 *sq.*).

When, now, the single purpose of the apostle in this argument is lost sight of, and it is sought to determine whether he supposed that some Gentiles were saved, and if so, in what way, the effort is made to apply the language to questions which were not in the writer's mind, and leads to forced interpretations of his words. He simply teaches that both Gentiles and Jews are great sinners and cannot *merit* salvation. Both alike, if they obtain it, must do so on the principle of grace, not of desert. His language involves the view that all who are saved from either class are saved by grace upon condition of faith. How many of each are saved, or what degree of light was necessary in each case, or exactly what was the object of their faith, are interesting questions of theological speculation; but Paul has not considered them or said anything relating to them in this whole discussion. He is developing a principle, — no salvation by works, — in order to pave the way for the establishment of another, — salvation by grace through faith, — and is not treating those

concrete and historical questions for which it is often sought to find an answer in his words.

The most famous instance of this mode of Paul's thought is found in the parallel between Adam and Christ in Rom. v. 12–21. Here the primary object is to exhibit the greatness of the grace of God in Christ by setting it in contrast with the reign of sin and death in natural humanity. The passage has been ordinarily treated in theology as if its purpose had been to define a doctrine of original sin. The sway of sin and death is used but as a background in order to paint in more glowing colors the reign of righteousness in Christ. The superior greatness of the power of grace as against that of sin and death is emphasized not less than three times in the course of the parallel. The primary object of the passage is thus to exhibit the *contrast* between the two opposing principles of sin and grace, and to show the superior power of the latter. The key-note of the whole is: "Where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly" (verse 20). But the Adam side of the parallel has been so exclusively emphasized in theology that a passage which was to Paul an exultant pæan of joy and triumph has been made a message of condemnation and sentence of doom to mankind, because its thoughts have been thrown out of adjustment, and a wholly misplaced emphasis laid upon the words in consequence of neglecting the essential point on which the whole comparison turns. Such interpretation is like that which builds doctrines upon the

incidents of parables, and which, consistently carried out, finds Christ commending shameless impertinence in the parable of the Unjust Judge, and praising trickery and deceit in that of the Unjust Steward.

Another example of parallelism is found in the analogy which is traced between the natural and spiritual in 1 Cor. xv. 35–49, and upon which the doctrine of the spiritual body is based. The parallel is traced through various steps. There is (*a*) The relation between the seed-grain and its product, and the analogy between this relation and that of the present to the future body (verses 35–38). (*b*) He illustrates the variety of embodiments which have been provided for God's creatures in the natural world, from which fact the inference is that there will be embodiments for souls fitted to their celestial state (verses 39–44). (*c*) Next the contrast between Adam and Christ as heads of humanity is briefly mentioned (verse 45); and (*d*) the natural order as preceding and preparing for the spiritual order suggests that there is a spiritual corporeity to follow and consummate that in which we now dwell (verses 46–49).

Other examples of undeveloped parallelism exist, but need not be considered here. The point of chief importance is that the apostle's language is to be interpreted in accordance with his characteristic forms of thought and modes of argument. To overlook these is to neglect an essential condition of perceiv-

ing the natural force and relative emphasis of his ideas. It should be remembered that exegesis is a study of form as well as of matter. Its task is not merely to grasp the practical contents and bearing of the passages studied, but to see, as it were, with the author's eyes, to apprehend his thoughts in all the peculiarities of form and shades of emphasis in which he has himself presented them.

CHAPTER III

THE SHAPING FORCES OF PAUL'S TEACHING

PAUL belonged by birth and education to the "strictest sect" among the Jews (Acts xxvi. 5). The Pharisees were the popular and most influential party in the nation, and best represented the spirit of post-exilian Judaism. They were rigid adherents of tradition and sticklers for a strict interpretation and observance of the law. The natural consequence of this temper was that they encouraged an ostentatious piety and made the religious life to consist in a system of rules many of which rested upon the most superficial distinctions. But with all their formalities and follies, they were by no means wholly devoid of conscientiousness and real religious zeal. They had indeed carried the duties of religion almost exclusively into the external sphere; but they retained a certain consistency and devotion in their performance which when enlightened and directed would become essential elements of high religious character. They were proud and self-righteous, but, mingled with these qualities, was an abhorrence of the corruption of the heathen world, and a revulsion of feeling from what

they conceived to be the prevailing uncleanness of their own nation. Their name, Pharisees, meaning Separatists, was perhaps attached to them in blame for their exclusiveness, but it also represented characteristics which had their good side, and which were capable of being so ennobled as to become qualities of real moral worth.

There was indeed much to censure in the Pharisees. Their formality, hypocrisy, and bondage to tradition justly exposed them to the rebukes which they received from Jesus. But these faults were the faults of the nation as a whole. They were an index of the moral temper of the times. They exemplified the travesty of religion which springs from misdirected zeal; the sad perversion of man's highest capacities which arises when duty is removed from its true center, and the high qualities of conscientiousness and earnestness degraded by being directed toward false or trivial objects.

In spite of their marked faults, the Pharisees as a party still cherished certain beliefs of great religious value. They believed in a spiritual world and in the immortality of the soul (Acts xxiii. 8). In this respect they represented, as compared with the more aristocratic and worldly Sadducees, the higher religious standpoint of later Judaism. Their notion of the world of spirits was no doubt extravagant, but it formed a better basis for a spiritual religion than the theory which bounds the horizon of life by the limits of this world. The Pharisees, then, were a

distinctively *religious* sect. Their aim was to carry out the law strictly. They regarded all interests from a religious point of view, however inadequate by reason of misconception that point of view might be. However much they failed to realize the true idea of religion as a life of love and service, — and they certainly did grossly fail to do so, — they cherished certain truths and cultivated certain traits which under new conditions were fitted to become a useful starting-point for true religion and theology.[1]

It was under the influence of this sect and, indeed, under the direct instruction of one of its most honored representatives, Gamaliel, that Paul received his early education (Acts xxii. 3). That celebrated doctor was one of the most moderate and enlightened men of his class, and on one occasion warned his countrymen in an impartial and humane spirit against the fanatical zeal with which they opposed Christianity (Acts v. 34 *sq.*). He embodied the best elements of Phariseeism, and must have exercised a strong influence upon his pupil from Tarsus. The supposition that Gamaliel was a Christian, or that he was secretly inclined toward Christianity and afterward espoused it, are fictions of ecclesiastical tradition which rest upon no evidence, and are in themselves improbable. Although Paul was born and lived during his early boyhood in a city where Greek influences and culture predominated, his education was in the

[1] *Cf.* Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, Division II. vol. ii. pp. 10–28.

sacred city of his ancestral religion, and was conducted according to the methods, and limited to the range, which belonged to the best Jewish schools of the period. His parents were Roman citizens (Acts xvi. 37; xxii. 25–29), and the place of his birth made Greek his native language; but while these facts cannot have been without their influence upon his development, they furnish no ground for the common opinion that Paul was learned in the Roman law or in Greek literature. His training during his youth moved within the sphere of Old Testament and rabbinic thought, and formed the habits of his mind according to Jewish models. This statement is abundantly illustrated and confirmed by his characteristic conceptions and modes of argument in his epistles. The fact would be misconceived, however, by any who should suppose that his Jewish education operated as a permanent check or barrier to the independent application of his mind to new subjects and to its adjustment to new points of view. His extended and repeated journeys through various parts of the Roman Empire, combined with the native freshness and vigor of his mind, would preclude anything like imitation or routine thinking in his case. We accordingly find in his letters Jewish modes of thought and styles of argument applied with a striking freedom to new subjects, and wrought out in new combinations. While, therefore, it is certain that no explanation of the type of his theology can be adequate which neglects to take account of his rabbinic education, it is

equally certain that his teaching is marked by an individuality and independence which prove him to have been the master, and not the servant, of the ideas and arguments with which he had been indoctrinated in his youth.

In recent times elaborate attempts have been made to prove that Greek thought, especially as it was developed at Alexandria, exercised an important influence upon the apostle's teaching. Parallels have been traced between his ideas and those of Philo,[1] and coincidences of thought are pointed out between his epistles and certain apocryphal books. Many of these comparisons are interesting and instructive; but a candid effort to give to them their full weight in evidence leaves me far from convinced of the justice of the conclusions which are drawn from them. They do not appear to me to prove more than that systems which grow up under similar conditions and subject to the same general influences will present points of similarity. There are coincidences of idea and of interpretation between Paul and Philo; but they are too slight and superficial, when compared with the fundamental and radical differences of their respective systems, to warrant the conclusion that Paul's opinions had been in any important degree influenced by those of the Alexandrian philosopher. This fact is indeed fully recognized by Siegfried in treating of the relation of Philonic to New Testament thought in general. He says, —

[1] See, for example, Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, p. 303 *sq.*

"Common to both is the effort to bring about a higher union of Jew and Gentile. Both have the important idea of an intermediate being, connecting God and the world, God and man. They have similar views of the utter sinfulness of the human race, and of the ethical problem set before it; namely, how to become pure from sin. But by the side of these features of resemblance there exist deep and far-reaching differences. Philo's idea of God is more Gentile-philosophic than biblical; while in that of the New Testament appear the traits of the living God of Israel. The Logos-doctrine of Philo leans toward the pantheistic conception, while that of the New Testament abides throughout on the soil of theism. In respect to ethics, the view which places evil exclusively in the bodily nature is altogether alien to the New Testament."[1]

A representative example of the efforts to show that Paulinism is a composite of Jewish and Hellenic ideas may be found in Pfleiderer's work entitled, *Das Urchristenthum*.[2] It is the author's opinion that Paul was not directly acquainted with Philo's writings, but that he knew and largely used a writing which may be considered as a forerunner of the Philonic philosophy of religion, — the apocryphal Book of Wisdom. Some coincidences — none of which appear to me especially striking — are pointed out; but though one give to them the most favorable estimate, they appear to fall far short of establishing the derivation of one

[1] *Philo von Alexandria*, p. 304. An interesting and instructive essay on this subject, entitled *Saint Paul and Philo*, may be found appended to Jowett's *Commentary on Galatians*.

[2] *Quellen der paulinischen Theologie*, pp. 153–178.

series in the comparison from the other. We commend to the student of the subject a careful reading of the Book of Wisdom with close attention to its points of contact with Pauline teaching. We apprehend that few will discover in it a closer resemblance to Paul's epistles than would, in the nature of the case, exist between literary products growing, as it were, upon the same soil. That the book in question played any important part in shaping the apostle's theology, appears to my mind a proposition singularly destitute of proof. Until far more convincing evidence is adduced of a potent influence of Alexandrian speculation and kindred forms of thought upon Paul's mind, we shall still be required to seek the shaping forces of his thought, first, in the Old Testament and the later developments of Jewish thought, and, second, in his own vigorous and independent reflection upon the content of his newly received faith, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of truth.

The Old Testament was his chief text-book in the Jewish schools, and continued to be to him a great storehouse of facts and arguments for his work as a Christian teacher. He was trained, no doubt, in the methods of interpretation which were current among the rabbis of his time, in which the free use of type and allegory, often to the entire neglect of the primary and historical sense, was one of the most prominent characteristics. Rabbinic modes of exegesis had their influence upon his use of the Old Testament, and

have left clear traces in his epistles.[1] But to the student who considers his training, the matter of chief surprise is, not that his mind should have been influenced by rabbinic interpretation, but that he should have been so free from its extravagances, and should have employed its methods so sparingly and with so much reserve.

An instructive example of the allegorical method of applying Old Testament narratives is found in Gal. iv. 21–31, where the descendants of Hagar and Sarah are made to represent respectively the Old and the New Covenants. This application is the more fitting to the apostle's mind because Sinai — the symbol of the law — is situated in Arabia, the land of Hagar's descendants.[2] It cannot fairly be doubted that Paul considers the history connected with Hagar and Sarah in their relation to Abraham to have an allegorical meaning and to afford a typical parallel to the relation of the Old and New Testament systems. The

[1] *Cf.* Immer, *Das Jüdische in der Lehre des Paulus* in his *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, pp. 247–257.

[2] I here follow the reading of Tischendorf in verse 25, *cf.* marg. R. V. If the word Ἁγαρ is inserted in this verse (so Westcott and Hort), the sense then is that the name "Hagar" was applied as a designation to Mount Sinai, of which no satisfactory proof has been found. The word is attested by A B D E K L P, most cursives, and Chrysostom; omitted by ℵ C F G 17, It. Vulg. Æth. Arm. vss., and the Latin fathers generally. Some who insert the word here, understand the sense to be: This word "Hagar" (τὸ Ἁγαρ) represents Mount Sinai (because Mount Sinai is in Arabia, the land of Hagar). In this view the reading yields the same sense as the other. See Lightfoot, *Galatians*, p. 193 *sq.*

argument is thus determined in its form by current habits of rabbinic interpretation; but this form is not, in any case, essential to the appropriateness and validity of the analogy which the apostle is tracing. The essential point is that Abraham's two sons, from the circumstances of their birth, may be fitly contemplated as representing the two principles of bondage and freedom, which are the characteristics of the two covenants respectively. Ishmael, as the son of a bond-woman, is a child *κατὰ σάρκα*, and represents the system which engenders bondage; Isaac, as the son of Sarah, born in fulfilment of a divine promise, — *διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*, — fitly represents the covenant of promise and freedom. Whether Paul regarded the history in question as containing this allegorical significance, or merely as capable of such an application, his resort in this place to this form of rabbinic exegesis is certain. It is also to be borne in mind how infrequently he has recourse to it.

An instance in which the apostle departs more noticeably from the historical sense in the interest of a special application of Old Testament Scripture is found in 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10, where he interprets the Mosaic precept, "Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox when he treadeth out the corn," as applying, not to oxen, for God is not making oxen an object of solicitude, but to the care and support which are to be accorded to preachers of the gospel. That Paul here overlooks and counts of little importance the obvious historical sense in the case of this merciful

provision for the cattle when engaged in threshing, is beyond question. Whether he wholly denies the historical sense depends chiefly upon the meaning of πάντως (verse 10). If it means "wholly," "altogether" (A. V., R. V., Stanley, Meyer, De Wette, Weiss), — its usual meaning in the New Testament, — then the passage means that in the maxim in question God is not concerning himself about the needs or welfare of oxen, but gives the precept altogether for the sake of preachers, Paul and his associates, and the historical sense is excluded. If, on the other hand, πάντως means "certainly," "doubtless," the sense may be that the maxim has a reference and application to preachers, without asserting that it had no other. The emphasis would then be upon the certainty of its having such a reference, and not upon the exclusiveness of that application (so marg. R. V.).

Upon this meaning of πάντως, it is possible to maintain, with Godet and Neander, that Paul here merely subordinates the historical to the allegorical sense without rejecting the former. So far as the argument for this meaning of the word is concerned, it is proper to appeal to Luke iv. 23: "Doubtless [πάντως] ye will say to me this parable, etc.;" Acts xxi. 22, "They will certainly [πάντως] hear that thou art come;" and xxviii. 4, "No doubt [πάντως] this man is a murderer." Such is the meaning in the three instances in which Luke employs the word. Paul uses it five times, — once in Romans (iii. 9), and four times in 1 Corinthians (v. 10; ix. 10, 22; xvi. 12). In all these

cases, unless our passage be an exception, it has the meaning "wholly," "entirely," "altogether." Considerations from Pauline usage would therefore favor this meaning, but in themselves are not decisive. When, however, we consider how Paul puts the alternative, "Is it for the oxen that God careth, or saith he it [altogether] for our sake?" it seems plain that he considers the choice to lie between the application to oxen and that to Christian teachers. If the maxim is declared not to relate to oxen, the historical sense is set aside and the allegorical substituted. This use of the passage is also found in rabbinic writings (see Meyer *in loco*).[1]

Of the way in which an argument, in the methods of the Jewish schools, was made to turn on a word, we have an interesting example in Gal. iii. 16, where the Old Testament statement that the promises were made to Abraham and to his seed (Gen. xiii. 15; xvii. 8) is interpreted to mean that they relate to Christ, because the passage uses the singular "seed," and not the plural "seeds," referring therefore to one (Christ), and not to many. Here also we may distinguish the rabbinic form from the underlying idea, which is separable from the form and could have been brought out without the use of it. It was the apostle's profound and true conviction that the idea of the Mes-

[1] Luther's explanation escapes the natural meaning of the words with a native simplicity which is all its own: "God cares for all things, but he does not care that anything should be *written* for oxen, seeing they cannot read."

siah was veiled in the Abrahamic promise. That the promises given to Abraham and to his seed looked forward to Christ, and in the light of later revelation could be truly read as referring to him, is the point of chief importance. But the form in which he is led to express this view cannot be derived from the Old Testament passage, where the term "seed" is a collective noun, except by the application of those methods of finding occult meanings in words which were current in Paul's time, and in which he had in early life been instructed.

These examples will serve to show how characteristically and thoroughly Jewish was the apostle's education, and at the same time how little he was enslaved to his training. The presence of these instances of rabbinic exposition, in all of which the underlying thought could have been well established and enforced apart from the form employed for its presentation, serves but to tinge the epistles of Paul with rabbinic thought; but the coloring, slight though it is, bears unmistakable testimony to the character of that training whose influence time and change could never wholly destroy. It was usual for Paul as a Hellenistic Jew to quote from the Septuagint, following its language more or less closely, and to apply passages freely, if fitting in their substance, to different objects from those to which they relate in the Old Testament itself. A convenient example, which is in every way a fair representative, is found in Rom. ii. 24 (Is. lii. 5): "For the name of God is

blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you." Here the apostle follows the Septuagint, which has added to the original the phrases "among the Gentiles" and "because of you." The original passage is simply, "My name continually all the day is blasphemed," and the reference is to the blasphemy of Jehovah's name by the enemies of Israel, who claim that he is unable to save the nation. The apostle applies it to the contempt for God which the corruption of the professed people of God (the Jews) would occasion in the heathen. Thus the Septuagint additions — "because of you" and "among the Gentiles" — made the passage more pointed and fitting for the apostle's use than the briefer original could have been. The words which picture the action of Israel's enemies during the exile as fitly apply to the actions which Israel's sins will occasion in the Greek and Roman world of a later age.

One further example of Paul's freedom in citing the Old Testament, especially when influenced by the renderings of the Septuagint, will suffice. In 1 Cor. ii. 9, we read: "As it is written, Things which eye saw not, and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man, whatsoever things God prepared for them that love him." From the fact that only remote resemblances to this language are found in the Old Testament it has been thought by many (following Origen) that some extra-canonical or apocryphal book is here quoted. Meyer (*in loco*) says, —

"Since it is only passages from the *canonical* Scriptures that are ever cited by Paul with καθὼς γέγραπται, we must at the same time assume that he *intended* to do so here also, but by some confusion of memory took the apocryphal saying for a canonical passage, possibly from the prophecies, to which the passages of kindred sound in Isaiah might easily give occasion."

Weiss holds the same opinion.[1] Schürer thinks that the passage was taken from a lost Jewish Apocalypse of Elijah, to which Origen and others had assigned it, and appeals to the quotation of the Book of Enoch by Jude.[2]

It has been more commonly held — and we think this opinion preferable — that Paul has in mind the language of Is. lxiv. 4 (*cf.* lii. 15): "For from of old men have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye seen a God beside thee, which worketh for him that waiteth for him." The Septuagint gives a free translation by which the passage is rendered more general and indefinite, thus: "From of old we have not heard, nor have our eyes seen a God beside thee, and thy works which thou wilt do for those who wait for thy mercy." In the original, the prophet, amid the desolations of the exile, describes the help which Jehovah is capable of rendering his people who wait faithfully upon him. No deliverance *has ever been witnessed* which can equal that which Jehovah will accomplish if his

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 74 *b*, note 7.

[2] *Jewish People*, Division II. vol. iii. 130.

people remain true to him. The apostle seizes the thought of the greatness of God's spiritual mercies, and adapts this expression of it to his purpose by laying a new emphasis upon the statement that they are not perceived by *eye*, *ear*, and *heart*, but revealed to the human spirit by the Spirit of God. In the original it was said that eye had not seen, nor ear heard, the deliverance hoped for, because of its unparalleled greatness; in Paul's use of the words, eye and ear (and to these the apostle adds "the heart") do not perceive the heavenly wisdom revealed in the gospel because they are not adequate to do so; only the revealing Spirit can make them known. The common thought in both cases is the exceeding greatness of the blessings which God has in store for his people. In the original, the eye has not seen them because there are greater mercies yet to come. In Paul's application, it has not seen them because they surpass its power; God himself must reveal them in the life of the spirit.[1]

This example aptly illustrates the following points touching Paul's training in the Old Testament and his use of the same in argument and exposition of doctrine: (1) He bestows no pains upon citing the exact

[1] Other examples, presenting points of similarity with that which we have considered, are: 1 Cor. xv. 55 (*cf.* Hosea xiii. 14) and especially Eph. v. 14 (*cf.* Is. lx. 1), where, in the opinion of many, some lost writing is cited, but which, we think, can be more naturally explained as a free adaptation of Old Testament language. So Toy, *Quotations in the New Testament, in loco;* Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 74 *b*, note 7, *vs.* Meyer *in loco.*

words either of the original or of the Septuagint.[1] (2) He seizes the idea, often without reference to its immediate setting, and employs it freely for the purpose before him, making such adaptations in form, emphasis, and application as that purpose may require. (3) In this free use of scriptural language and its application to new subjects, there is a fidelity to the *idea* expressed in the original passage which insures a true point of contact even in those instances (like the foregoing) where the historical sense is most disregarded.[2] (4) The apostle's use of Scripture is dominated by the profound view that Israel's history is prophetic and Messianic throughout, so that the idea and hope of the Messiah are held to pervade the Old Testament history and literature. In this connection Weiss truly says,—

[1] It should be mentioned that his deviations may sometimes be due to his following current synagogue readings or popular Aramaic oral renderings. *Cf.* Toy, *Quotations*, Introduction, p. 15.

[2] The statement of Weiss on this point seems extreme: "In the use that he makes of the passages of Scripture, he pays no attention to their historical references or to their connection; it is only their language that he takes into account" (*Bib. Theol.* § 74 *c*). It is true that Paul often disregards the historical connection entirely; but in the use of Old Testament passages he certainly seeks to find a kinship of thought with the argument or exposition which he is conducting. The language cannot be to him the main thing, since he so frequently disregards its form; the underlying *idea*, which is kindred to the thought in hand, is the matter of importance. He changes the language freely; he adapts the idea to new situations; but his effort is always to preserve and enforce it.

"At the basis of this practice [that of following verbal resemblances], however, there lies the presupposition that, on the one side, the whole of Scripture prophesies of the Messiah and the events of the Messianic time; so that everything which simply admits of being applied to these circumstances is interpreted in this sense, and that too as a direct prophecy. Thus in Ps. lxix. 9, the Messiah himself is conceived of as speaking (Rom. xv. 3), and Joel ii. 32 is applied by him, as well as by Peter (Acts ii. 21), to the Messiah (Rom. x. 13). Even passages which, like these, are undoubtedly Messianic in the wider sense appear as having a reference to the person of Jesus which is originally foreign to them (Rom. ix. 33; *cf.* 1 Pet. ii. 6)."[1]

But that which is of chief importance in this connection is that the apostle's mind was penetrated with Old Testament thought and permeated by the Old Testament spirit in its highest Messianic import. He saw in Christ the realization of the ideals and hopes which had inspired the prophets of Israel; and it was one of the purposes of his letters to explain and trace this fulfilment. Exegetical science may indeed demur at his rendering and application of texts; but no such science can safely neglect the fundamental assumption on which he proceeds in dealing with the relation between the gospel and the Old Testament. They are related as the fruit to the blossom. The Old Covenant is a perpetual prophecy and guaranty of the New. It takes its place in subordina-

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 74 *c.*

tion to the system which is to succeed it, and has its true glory in that it ushers in the superior glory of that system (2 Cor. iii. 7–11). After his conversion new meanings must have glowed in the pages of the Old Testament as Paul read it. Not only were its contents now suffused with new light, but a wholly new view of its design is developed in his mind. He now sees the whole reason of its existence in the bringing of men to Christ. The positive and historic aims of deterring from wrong-doing and checking transgression, which had always been associated with the law, assume a secondary place in the light of its preparatory and Christological purpose, which is now seen. The origin and development of this new view of the subject will form the theme of a subsequent chapter. It is sufficient here to point out how great a revolution in Paul's view of the Old Testament must have been wrought by his Christian thinking, and what new and striking developments of Christian doctrine were now possible from Old Testament points of view. The Old Testament, in which he had been so carefully trained as a Jewish youth, seen in this new light and interpreted as a record of God's methods of conducting men to Christ, becomes to the apostle a storehouse of facts and truths whereby the gospel may be illustrated and confirmed; and thus Paul's knowledge of it, filled with the new light that had penetrated it from Christ, became one of the most potent forces which shaped his presentations of doctrine.

But while Paul thus carried into his teaching influences and impressions which he had received in his Jewish education, his system was, in an important sense, the product of independent reflection. At the time of his conversion the Christian community was just emerging into the consciousness of that freedom and independence which Jesus had defined in his parabolic saying that the new wine of his kingdom was not to be put into the old bottles of Judaism (Mark ii. 22), and in his teaching concerning fulfilment (Matt. v. 17 *sq.*). It appears from the charges which the Jews brought against the Hellenist Stephen (Acts vi. 13, 14) that he had expressed sentiments which implied the temporary character of the Levitical system and the completeness and sufficiency of the gospel. The problem of defining the relation of the gospel to the Old Testament would be at this juncture no easy one. How could the law be said to be divine and temporary at the same time? Could the New Testament system itself be saved if the Old was abandoned? Those who had grown up in Judaism and had experienced no special shock or revolution of feeling and opinion in passing into Christianity would have less sense of the difference between the two. To such, Christianity would seem but another form of Judaism, an appendix to it or an infusion of new life into its old forms. Hence they would be tenacious of its rites. Its ceremony of initiation into the community — circumcision — would in their judgment be a necessary condition for entering the Church

from the heathen world. The most excellent and enlightened men among the apostles at Jerusalem shared, to some extent, these convictions. They understood, indeed, that the gospel was to be offered to all men; but it was with difficulty that they consented to the view that all should receive it upon the same simple condition, — faith in Christ (*cf.* Acts x. 14; xv. 1; Gal. ii. 11–16). It was Paul who led the infant Church out of the mazes of this perplexing problem. It was he who sharply defined the true relation of the Christian community to the Old Covenant, clearly contrasted the law and faith as principles of salvation, and by rebuking all inconsistency with their professed trust in Christ on the part of other Christian teachers, and refuting the opinions of those who were fanatically opposed to his doctrine of freedom from the law (Gal. ii. 4; Acts xv. 24), both determined the doctrine and shaped the course of the early Church in reference to the subject.

The mode of Paul's conversion in connection with his previous course of life must have powerfully intensified his sense of the difference between the law dispensation and the gospel. What it was to live under the law, to feel its yoke without being able to do its requirements, he well knew from long and bitter experience. The revelation of Christ to him had been the message of release to his burdened spirit. In the gospel, with its principles of grace and faith, he had found freedom and peace. No wonder, then, that to him there was a world-wide difference

between the state of men under the law and that under the gospel. They assumed to his mind the relation of contraries, mutually excluding each other. It was not that this contrariety pertained to their relations in general, but only to them considered as means of salvation. It was in this sense that the gospel excluded the law; and it was from this point of regarding the subject that Paul resisted all resort to the law and all attempts to attain salvation by observance of it, even declaring, in his polemic against the Galatian Judaizers, that if they were circumcised they thereby forfeited all relation to Christ (Gal. v. 2). It was not because circumcision was in itself so contrary to Christianity that the apostle said this, but because in receiving this initiatory rite the Gentile convert espoused the legal system and based his hope of salvation upon obedience to it instead of placing it upon Christ alone. Being circumcised, he is bound to keep the whole law, and if he fails to do this (as he certainly will), his ground of hope in the law crumbles away, and he remains unforgiven and subject to condemnation. As there are not two ways of salvation, one by the law and one by the gospel, so are there not two conditions of salvation, circumcision and faith. Since the way of meritorious salvation is shut, and that by grace alone remains open, the conditions which the method of legal obedience might impose are excluded; that which the method of grace requires — namely, faith — alone remains.

But after the fullest possible analysis has been

made of the human conditions and influences which determined the forms and shaped the development of Paul's thought, his career remains inexplicable without assigning chief importance to that divine grace and providential leadership to which he himself ever ascribes his achievements in the work of the gospel. The human factors of his mission and work lie open to view, and deserve the most careful study. It is these which make his life a truly natural one far removed from that unearthly and inscrutable character with which it has been sometimes invested. His temperament, education, religious experience as a Pharisee, and peculiar conversion have an obvious and easily traceable effect upon his work and his theology. The grace that made him what he was did not work its results apart from these human conditions, but in and through them. While his gospel was divine in its origin and came to him by revelation, it was also subject to reflection and development in its definition and application. The core of this gospel was the truth of the Messiahship of Jesus. This was matter of revelation in the experience of his conversion; but this fact in no way involves the idea that his whole scheme of teaching was revealed to him ready-made. This was indeed the germ-truth out of which his view of the law and of the relations of the Old and New Covenants was developed. But the working-out of the bearings and applications of that new truth must have cost the apostle long and patient reflection. Moreover, the

circumstances of his churches and the exigencies of the time determined the ways in which he must, in the various cases, have reasoned out and applied his doctrines of grace and faith. It remains to us to pursue our studies upon the development of these doctrines in accord with the personal and historic conditions affecting them, while we recognize the divinely revealed truth by which Paul was set upon his great career, and the providence and grace by which he was continually enabled to win such great conquests for truth and righteousness.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOURCES OF PAULINE DOCTRINE

It does not fall within the scope of this volume to discuss the critical questions connected with the genuineness of the thirteen epistles which are commonly attributed to Paul. It seems desirable, however, to present a brief *résumé* of the status and results of criticism in this branch of biblical study. It is particularly important, for the purposes of our investigation, to appreciate the sources of Paul's teaching in their individuality, and to group them according to their leading characteristics.

We have in the first place, in the Book of Acts, a number of reports of Paul's discourses. In my judgment, criticism has not shaken the long-cherished opinion that the author of the Acts was Luke, who was a member of the apostle's company during a portion of his missionary activity. If this be correct, the writer must have been a frequent listener to the apostle's preaching, and would be able to report his discourses with substantial accuracy. Whatever difficulties, then, may attend the interpretation of details or the question of the sources and preservation of the

reports, there is no adequate reason to question the narratives of Acts in their testimony to the main truths which Paul emphasized in his missionary preaching. From these we learn that his chief assertion in speaking to the Jews was that of the Messiahship of Jesus (Acts ix. 20, 22; xvii. 3), and that in support of this truth he appealed chiefly to Christ's fulfilment of prophecy and to the fact of his resurrection (xvii. 2; xiii. 30). In addressing Gentile audiences he first sought some point of contact with their own religious ideas, by appeal to evidences of God's providence and goodness (xiv. 15–17; xvii. 22–31), and then led their minds onward to truths specifically Christian. On more than one occasion, when personally accused of sacrilege or sedition, he narrated the story of his conversion and divine call to his work, in justification of his course (Acts xxii. 3 *sq.*; xxvi. 2 *sq.*).

The Pauline epistles fall chronologically into four groups, and to each of these groups belong distinguishing characteristics. They may be classified as follows: (1) The Missionary Epistles,[1] — 1 and 2 Thessalonians, written at Corinth (*cf.* 1 Thess. i. 1 with Acts xviii. 5–11), in the year A. D. 52 or 53. (2) The Great Doctrinal Epistles, — Galatians, written during Paul's three years' residence at Ephesus (Acts xx. 31),

[1] I assign to them this title because they sustain, both in point of time and of substance, a close relation to the apostle's missionary preaching. They are commonly referred to as Paul's Earlier Epistles.

probably in A. D. 55 or 56; 1 and 2 Corinthians, written at Ephesus and in Macedonia respectively, A. D. 58; and Romans, written at Corinth during the winter of 58–59. (3) The Epistles of the Imprisonment, — Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians, and Philippians. These letters are generally believed to have been composed, in the order named, while the apostle was a prisoner at Rome during the years 61–63 (*cf.* Acts xxviii.). Many critics, however, assign the first three of this group to the imprisonment at Cæsarea (Acts xxiii., xxiv.) and the last only to that at Rome (so Meyer, Reuss, Weiss). (4) The Pastoral Epistles, — 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, commonly supposed to have been written after Paul had been released from the imprisonment at Rome, during which he had written the third group of letters. The supposition is that Paul was acquitted after his trial in A. D. 63, and during a period of freedom wrote 1 Timothy and Titus. Then, after several years of missionary labor, during which he perhaps visited Spain (see Rom. xv. 24), he was imprisoned a second time, and wrote during this imprisonment and shortly before his execution the second letter to Timothy, probably about A. D. 67 or 68.

The genuineness of each of these groups, except the second, has been denied by the Tübingen criticism. Recent critics, who follow in general the methods and principles of Baur, differ widely in their opinions regarding the epistles of the first, third, and fourth groups. The genuineness of the fourth is most con-

fidently and plausibly denied. The tendency of this criticism, however, is toward a recognition, more or less qualified, of the first and third groups as Pauline. The genuineness of 1 Thessalonians, Philemon, and Philippians is now widely admitted by disciples of the Tübingen school (for example, Schenkel, Reuss, Pfleiderer). The movement of criticism has been toward the recognition of the genuineness of 2 Thessalonians. De Wette, for example, retracted his unfavorable opinion regarding this epistle. Pfleiderer regards it (apart from the apocalyptic portion, ii. 1–12) as a reproduction, by another hand, of the First Epistle, and so as Pauline in its main content, though spurious in authorship. Reuss maintains its genuineness throughout.

The genuineness of Colossians and Ephesians, together with the problem of their relation, continues to be much disputed. On this latter point the most diverse views have been entertained. Now, Colossians has been made a reproduction of Ephesians (Mayerhoff), and again the converse has been supposed (De Wette). Others rejected both together (Baur and Schwegler). Later the view became current that Colossians was based upon a genuine Pauline letter which the writer of the spurious Epistle to the Ephesians had worked over into its present form by adding his own speculations (Holtzmann, Hausrath, Immer, von Soden). It will thus be seen that even with the results of what is called the negative or destructive criticism of the Pauline epistles, as represented, for

example, by Pfleiderer, we have as sources of Paul's teaching not only the four undisputed letters, but also 1 Thessalonians and Philippians, and as based upon Pauline teaching and representing it with more or less variation, 2 Thessalonians, Colossians, and Ephesians. The criticism most unfavorable to traditional opinion — at least such as has won any general acceptance — rules out from the sources only the Pastoral Epistles and certain elements in 2 Thessalonians, Colossians, and Ephesians.[1]

These examples of the varying results of a current type of criticism have been adduced partly to show how discordant are its conclusions. This fact alone throws just suspicion upon the validity of its premises, even apart from the consideration of countervailing arguments. But the reasons by which the negative views are supported are in many points notably deficient. The objection to 2 Thessalonians is, that the apocalyptic passage contradicts the First Epistle, which represents the parousia as imminent. It is also said that the writer betrays an obvious anxiety to have his epistle regarded as Pauline (iii. 17), and reveals himself through his guise by saying that the autograph salutation is the mark of genuineness

[1] The arguments by which Bruno Bauer sought to disprove the genuineness of the letters of the second group have been revived and further elaborated by some recent critics, especially by Loman and Steck. A clear summary and critique of their opinions may be found in Lipsius' "Introduction to Galatians," in the *Handkommentar* (Freiburg, 1891); also in Pfleiderer's *Der Paulinismus*, 2 Aufl., p. 33 *sq.*

in *every* epistle, whereas Paul had, at most, written but *one* letter before this. To these points it may properly be replied that while Paul clearly expressed the expectation in the First Epistle that the advent would occur during his lifetime, he nowhere presumed to fix its time or to say that it was in the immediate future. He was in middle life at the time of writing, and beyond question expected the developments described in 2 Thess. ii., which were to precede the advent, to occur within his lifetime. He declared that the "mystery of lawlessness" was already working; it needed but to come to its culmination in order to usher in the parousia. Objections connected with this passage derive their force largely from the assumption that by the "man of sin" some Roman Emperor is meant, — a supposition which is wholly improbable. Regarding the second point mentioned, it may be said that we do not know that Paul had written but *one* letter (1 Thessalonians) at the time when he is supposed to have written 2 Thessalonians,[1] and, further, that the expression, "Which is the token in *every* epistle," may look forward to the future, as well as backward to the past. The same authentication is found at the close of 1 Corinthians and Colossians, and it is probable that the salutation in all the epistles was added with Paul's own hand. Moreover, there would be special reason for this authentication in this case, because a letter had been circulated at

[1] *Vide* Jowett, "On the Probability that many of Saint Paul's Epistles have been lost," in his *St. Paul's Epistles*.

Thessalonica which falsely purported to be Paul's (see 2 Thess. ii. 2). It has been generally conceded that the second letter bears unmistakable marks of the Pauline style, — evidences so clear as to lead to the opinion that it was an imitation of the First Epistle, with the apocalypse (ii. 1–12) added. Ewald has justly observed that "none of the writings of the New Testament have so much of the living freshness of the first age of the gospel, or present so vivid a picture of the hopes of the first believers, as the Epistles to the Thessalonians." It will require more cogent arguments than have been presented, to shake the opinion, universal in ancient and modern times until the present century, that both these epistles are Pauline.

The objections which have been urged against the Epistles of the Imprisonment, especially Ephesians, are, in general, that they lack the vigor and power of Paul's genuine letters, and that they reflect in language and idea the gnostic speculations of the post-apostolic age. References are made to the numerous *hapaxlegomena*, to a supposed vagueness of thought and redundancy of style, and to the forms of later heresy which are antagonized (especially in Colossians), as proofs of the non-Pauline authorship; but these are largely matters of taste and subjective opinion. There is little agreement among critics who, in general, are unfavorable to the genuineness of these letters. It is certain that Ephesians and Colossians have some marked peculiarities. The problem is, whether they can be adequately explained by the

lapse of years, change of conditions, and the development of the apostle's own thought in its application to the subjects treated of in this group, especially the person of Christ and his relation to his kingdom. The question appeals chiefly to subjective tests. The difficulties will be variously estimated by different minds. Theological and historical presuppositions will also inevitably influence the judgment upon such points. I deem it safe to affirm that adverse criticism has not disproved the genuineness of any one of this group of letters. Philippians is now generally admitted by this criticism to be unconditionally genuine, while opinion wavers upon the question whether Colossians is not conditionally so. If this view is taken, it cannot then be denied that Ephesians, which so nearly resembles Colossians, is in substance Pauline in idea, if not the direct product of the apostle's own mind.

The burden of proof clearly lies upon the objectors. The epistles claim to be Pauline; tradition is abundant and distinct in its testimony to the validity of this claim; a general Pauline character is admitted by all to belong to them. Can the peculiarities be explained? I believe that they can. The objections proceed too much upon an assumption of the form and ideas of the doctrinal epistles as furnishing the standard and measure of the apostle's thought. It appears to me unwarranted, in the case of a writer of such vigor and independence as Paul, to make one group of his letters a fixed type to which all other alleged

epistles of his must closely conform. In respect to the validity of the Tübingen criticism of these letters, I therefore concur in the words of Meyer: —

"The grounds on which the hypothesis is based are far from adequate in the case of a letter-writer who stands so high and great in many-sided wealth, both of thought and diction, and in its free handling, as Paul, and who, according to the diversity of the given circumstances, and of his own tone of feeling, was capable of, and had mastery over, so ample and manifold variety in the presentation of his ideas and the structure of his sentences." [1]

The genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles has been for obvious reasons most widely doubted. One of them — 2 Timothy — purports to have been written while the apostle was a prisoner. 1 Timothy appears to have been written from Macedonia for the purpose of guiding Timothy in his work at Ephesus. The letter to Titus represents this apostolic assistant as in Crete, and has closest affinities to the First Epistle to Timothy. The order would seem to be: 1 Timothy, Titus, 2 Timothy.

The allusions which these epistles contain have led most critics to the opinion that they cannot be assigned to any period of Paul's life with which the New Testament makes us familiar. Until recent times, the universal opinion was, as we have already indicated, that the apostle had been acquitted and re-

[1] *Commentary on Colossians*, Introduction, Am. ed. p. 204.

leased from the imprisonment during which Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon, and Philippians were written, and after a period of freedom, was again imprisoned at Rome. During the period of release 1 Timothy and Titus were written, and after his imprisonment a second time the second letter to Timothy was composed; but this supposition is based upon references and allusions in the letters themselves, and their genuineness in turn rests upon the supposition in question. It is thus a case of reasoning in a circle.

Since the investigation of the question could not make progress upon the traditional view, the problem became one of internal evidence chiefly. Neither the genuineness nor the spuriousness of the epistles can be proven by historical testimony, since the closing years of Paul's life are lost in a maze of uncertain traditions. The question then is, whether the letters are Pauline in style and thought, and may be fairly presumed to emanate from Paul, to whom they claim to belong, and to whom uniform church tradition ascribes them.

The objections which, since Schleiermacher, have been urged against their genuineness are chiefly, that the errors which they combat belong to the post-apostolic age, and that the church-order which they reflect is of a more elaborate character than we find in the period to which they have commonly been referred. It is maintained, on the contrary, that no gnostic system of the second century with which we are

acquainted, corresponds to the allusions made to doctrinal errors in these epistles, and that the church-organization is the same as that which we meet elsewhere in Paul's writings; it is still the order of presbyter-bishops and deacons, with nothing of the hierarchical quality which we find in the second century. It is beyond my present purpose to discuss this vexed question. In the nature of the case it is one of peculiar difficulty, since indications and allusions such as constitute the evidence are liable to very different estimation and interpretation. It is admitted by candid critics who maintain their genuineness that these epistles present considerable peculiarities both in diction and matter; but it is maintained that these are adequately explained by their peculiar purposes, themes, and circumstances. It is claimed that the earlier epistles ought not to be made an absolute standard of method, style, and matter for a writer of such wealth and freedom of thought and expression as Paul.

It is obvious that the burden of proof lies upon the opponents of the Pauline authorship of these epistles. It is also to be noticed that there have not been wanting important variations of opinion among critics who, in general, were unfavorable to their genuineness. Some have found genuine passages in all three; more freely has a genuine nucleus for 2 Timothy been allowed, while others have supposed the letters to be based upon notes and recollections of the apostle's instructions. Those who reject the Pauline author-

ship commonly admit a large Pauline element, and would treat the subject-matter of the epistles as furnishing examples of a later developed and applied Paulinism which might be made a supplement or appendix to Pauline theology proper.

There is no present indication of harmony of opinion upon this question. Scholars of the greatest learning and candor remain divided, and the basis of division seems to be certain theological and historic views regarding the tendencies of thought in the Apostolic age, and the relation of the New Testament literature to them. Among those who reject the Pauline authorship are Hilgenfeld, Holtzmann, Hausrath, Pfleiderer, and Weizsäcker; among those who defend it, Wieseler, Wiesinger, Huther, Van Oosterzee, and Weiss. I am far from convinced by the arguments alleged against these epistles; but the limitations of the evidence and the peculiarities which they present render impossible to an impartial judgment the same degree of confidence respecting this group of letters which may be felt regarding the others.

It is easy to form an exaggerated impression of the bearing upon biblical theology of doubts regarding the genuineness of the epistles which are in dispute, if such doubts are considered to be well-grounded. The Thessalonian and Pastoral Epistles are so far practical and hortatory in character that their rejection as sources of Paulinism affects the representation of the apostle's teaching only in minor details. The question is more important if the method of tracing

the specific peculiarities of each stage of the apostle's teaching is chosen. Where, however, the effort is to trace the great outlines of the apostle's thought, and to grasp his type of Christian teaching as a whole, — the end which I have set before me in these pages, — the chief sources are, in any case, the four great undisputed epistles in which men of all views must find common ground.

Greater importance for biblical theology attaches to Colossians and Ephesians; and yet the great themes of the apostle's teaching would not be so much affected by their omission as might at first thought seem to be the case. They deal chiefly with Christ's exaltation and kingship over the Church and the world. These themes are treated in an elevated and striking style, and the thought moves in the region of the mysterious and transcendent. Adverse critics do not claim that the thoughts are contrary to Paul's. They represent in any event a phase of Pauline doctrine, even if cast into these forms by a later writer. But in case these two epistles were not used as sources, it would be certain applications of Pauline ideas that would be taken from us rather than the substance of those ideas themselves, especially so long as Philippians is held to be genuine.

I am far from admitting that the loss of these epistles as sources would not be a serious curtailment of the material which I believe we may confidently use; but it would be a loss in richness and fulness rather than of any fundamental or formative idea. The

elements of Paul's doctrine can be fully defined without recourse to these letters; but when this has been done, we turn to Colossians and Ephesians for matchless examples of his high conception and eloquent description of the dominion of Christ amid the powers of the world, and for vivid pictures of the scope of his redeeming work.

The first group of letters (1 and 2 Thessalonians) possess a special interest arising from their close connection with the apostle's missionary preaching. Written amid the labors of establishing the church at Corinth and with the memory of his teaching in the Thessalonian synagogue fresh in mind (Acts xvii. 1–4), they bring us into close contact with Paul's practical religious teaching, and enable us to feel the touch of his warm personal affection for the converts whom he had won and instructed. They contain no doctrinal teaching, however, in the strict sense, except certain references to the second advent. Paul had comforted them in his personal teaching with the hope of Christ's return, and in the First Epistle exhorts them to faith and patience amid their afflictions and persecutions, in view of this expectation. He had, however, sought to guard them against a fanatical spirit which should lead them to relinquish their employments on account of the anticipation of Christ's speedy return (iv. 11; v. 1). This result followed notwithstanding, and occasioned the writing of the Second Epistle, in which he seeks to draw away their minds, in a measure, from the expectation of the

parousia as immediately imminent, and to fix them upon certain events which are to be previously expected, — a development of opposition to the gospel, culminating in claims to divine honors on the part of a certain false Messiah, which was to occur in the sphere of Judaism. This apostasy must first reach its height of power and defiance before the advent will occur (2 Thess. ii. 3). By this means the apostle diverts their attention to other thoughts, and urges them to resume and pursue their customary occupations (iii. 10–12). It may be added that their excitement was no doubt due in large part to the influence of a letter which purported to have come from him (2 Thess. ii. 2), and which, contrary to his actual teaching, had represented him as saying that the day of the Lord was immediately at hand (*ἐνέστηκεν*); that is, on the very point of dawning (ii. 2).

The apostle had touched upon one other topic connected with the parousia-expectation. The Thessalonians had been troubled by the thought that those of their number who had died would fail to participate in the glory which would be revealed at the advent, and in which those who lived until that event should share (1 Thess. iv. 13 *sq.*). Paul assures them that those who survive the advent will have no advantage over those who shall have died before its occurrence, but that they will be raised from the dead before the living shall enter into the glory of Christ, and thus those who are alive "shall in no wise precede them that are fallen asleep" (iv. 15).

This brief *résumé* of the teaching of these letters, so far as they are doctrinal, is here given because the thoughts presented are not found elsewhere, and constitute a phase of the apostle's earlier teaching. The advent continues to be confidently expected by the apostle to occur during his lifetime, as is shown by the later letters (1 Cor. i. 7; xv. 23; xvi. 22; Rom. xiii. 12; Phil. iv. 5); but both the event itself and its attendant circumstances recede into the background of his thought, and are only incidentally emphasized. The engrossing cares of his ministry, and especially the conflict with various forms of error which threatened to pervert the pure doctrines of grace, absorbed the apostle's attention, and furnished the occasion for those definitions of his "gospel" (Gal. i. 11; Rom. ii. 16) which we find in Galatians and Romans; while the disorders and immoralities in the Corinthian Church occasioned the more practical application of its principles to the needs of that community. The way is thus paved for the writing of the second group of letters, in which must always be found the clearest outlines and the central principles of Paul's teaching. Since our subsequent discussions will be chiefly occupied with the subject-matter of these epistles, we need in this connection only to remark that their key-thought is that salvation is of divine grace alone, as opposed to human merit, and is received by humble acceptance, not achieved by human willing or striving. This principle is, as we have sought to show, logically involved in the experience of Paul's conversion, and

must have unfolded itself to him as he reflected upon his futile strivings after peace by deeds of legal obedience. He had himself experienced, in the revelation of Christ to him, the truth of this way of grace and faith. The formative principle of his theology must have been present to his mind from that experience onward; but there is no evidence that it was for a long time distinctly developed as a doctrine in his preaching. In his earlier teaching, so far as it is preserved to us in the Acts and in the Thessalonian Epistles, he does not enter into an exposition of this characteristic principle. The resurrection and Messiahship of Jesus and the hope of his speedy return formed the staple of his teaching, until the growth of error in the churches which he had founded gave him occasion to work out a defence of his gospel in the sphere of its principles. This he has done in Galatians and Romans, connecting his exposition in the former with his conversion and call to his mission, while in the latter he has more fully and systematically developed and applied the principles of grace and faith, and has traced them back into the Old Testament. The treatment of practical and delicate questions of conduct in the Corinthian Epistles invests them with special interest as manuals of Pauline ethics. They present a greater variety of subject than the other letters, many of which furnish the apostle his most inspiring themes and call forth some of his most striking expositions of Christian truth. In my judgment no epistle contains so many

passages of lofty eloquence as the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

The peculiarities of the third group of epistles have been briefly pointed out. With the exception of Philemon, which is a personal letter and has no doctrinal content, they are chiefly Christological in character, and have their main use for biblical theology in exhibiting the apostle's exalted conception of Christ's person and work. This development of thought was called out by special forms of error which threatened the doctrines of the incarnation of Christ and of redemption by him. The tone and language are adapted to these peculiar conditions. Many terms which do not occur elsewhere are employed in dealing with the errors under review. The errorists were in the churches, and their influence must be counteracted. Colossians is the most controversial of the three letters in question, and from it can be most clearly ascertained the outlines of the heresy against which Paul is contending. It appears to have been a species of Jewish eclecticism, and to have had in it some of the germs of later Gnosticism. It contained speculations concerning angels (Col. ii. 18), and laid stress upon ascetic rigors and observance of days (ii. 16–23). It clearly assigned to Christ an inferior position, placing him, perhaps, in a series of supernatural beings who together constituted, in this philosophy, the full revelation of God. Paul warns against these vain and foolish speculations, and asserts that Christ himself is the fulness of divine revelation, and that in him

alone can the believer find the complete truth and life which he needs (ii. 8–10).

These forms of error did not, like Jewish legalism, threaten the evangelical principle of faith, but they obscured the object of faith by departing from the truth of the sole sufficiency of Christ as the revealer of God. The notion of intermediate agencies of revelation removed God into a dim region of mystery, and made communion with him a vague and uncertain experience. This mysterious intercourse with the heavenly world was thought to be promoted by renouncing contact with present enjoyments and by self-imposed observances of days and seasons. In this way, from another point of departure, these theosophic speculations introduced again the *legal* conception of salvation; and thus Paul's defence of the pre-eminence of Christ and his rebuke of this ascetic mysticism may be still considered as a maintenance, in a new sphere, of the principles of salvation by grace alone and upon condition of faith, which constitute the fundamental peculiarity of his theology.

The Pastoral Epistles were addressed to trusted disciples of the apostle, and consequently have no occasion to deal with definitions or defences of the gospel. They urge upon the Christian teachers to whom they are addressed faithful adherence to "sound doctrine" and the avoidance of certain current speculations which only foster pride and folly. No refutation of these doctrinal tendencies is undertaken; Timothy and Titus are counselled wholly to avoid

them as unprofitable and presumptuous. They are characterized as "a different doctrine" (1 Tim. i. 3) from the apostle's own, and as dealing with Jewish fables, endless genealogies, and strivings about the law (Titus iii. 9; 1 Tim. i. 4). The utter valuelessness of these reasonings, which filled the air, is repeatedly pointed out (1 Tim. i. 6; vi. 20; Titus i. 10; 2 Tim. ii. 16), and their baneful consequences pictured. They are, — strife, contentions about words (1 Tim. vi. 4), and their inevitable result, divisions (Titus iii. 10). Such tendencies subvert the peace of families (Titus i. 11) and act as a hindrance to Christian faith (2 Tim. ii. 18). The motive of this false teaching, he declares, will be found to be greed of gain (1 Tim. vi. 5; Titus i. 11).

These speculations cannot be clearly identified with the tenets of any particular sect. They were probably tendencies of thought which were represented by no special party, but were common in one form or another in the communities where the evangelists Timothy and Titus were called to labor.

This group of epistles, then, presents little for the construction of Pauline doctrine. Where points of doctrine are touched upon, they are in accord with Paul's teaching as unfolded elsewhere. Examples are found in the allusions to the apostle's conversion and calling to his office (1 Tim. i. 12 *sq.*), God's gracious purpose of salvation (2 Tim. i. 9 *sq.*; Titus iii. 5), the references to dying with Christ (2 Tim. ii. 11) and to the expectation of his appearing (Titus ii. 13). While,

therefore, the peculiarities of this group of epistles should be allowed their full weight in evidence, it cannot be fairly affirmed that they are essentially un-Pauline in character, or that their tone and language preclude the view that they were written late in Paul's life under conditions which history does not enable us clearly to define, and for purposes which would, in the nature of the case which this theory supposes, prevent them from following the lines of exposition marked out in previous letters, as well as impart to them such peculiarities of diction and of argument as would easily give rise to critical difficulties.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

The apostle's conception of God is developed quite incidentally, and has commonly received no separate treatment by writers on biblical theology. But this conception is of first importance for Paul's doctrinal system, and is deserving of a careful elucidation; for it is in the thought of God that the plan of grace for sinners must arise, and it must be executed in accordance with his fixed purpose. It will be convenient to discuss the subject under three heads: (1) The doctrine of God's nature or essence; (2) The doctrine of divine revelation; and (3) The doctrine of God's sovereignty and providential superintendence.

In his address at Athens (Acts xvii. 22 *sq.*) when confronting representatives of those philosophical schools which had speculated most upon the nature of the Divine Being, Paul unfolds, in certain bearings of it, his idea of God most fully. He asserts the creatorship and spirituality of God,—that he is Lord of heaven and earth, and does not confine his manifestation to shrines or temples made by man. He declares that the course of history is subject to God's providence, and is so

ordered as to lead men to seek to know him, and that he is near to all men by virtue of their moral kinship to him. He further asserts that God has made allowance for the comparative ignorance concerning true religion in pre-Christian times, but that now he calls all men to repentance. The Acts contain, no doubt, but a sketch of Paul's argument; but the points touched upon are so fundamental as to form the elements of an entire philosophy concerning God. The truths of man's essential kinship to God, of God's spiritual omnipresence, and of his universal revelation are foundation-stones in the apostle's teaching. God is to him the self-revealing God, who makes himself known to the creatures who are akin to himself through the courses of human history. He is the living God of providence, who stands in close personal relation to mankind, and by successive and progressive revelations seeks to bring them into harmony with himself.

We should search in vain for any abstract definition of the ethical nature of God in the writings of Paul or for any enumeration or analysis of his attributes; but his attitude and action toward mankind considered as sinners or as the subjects of redemption furnish occasion for many incidental statements touching his nature. In assigning to love the pre-eminence among virtues (1 Cor. xiii. 13), and in designating love as moral perfection (xiii. 10), is involved the logical necessity of making love the essential glory of the divine perfectness. In the divine love is found the

motive of redemption through Christ: "God commendeth his own love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. v. 8; *cf.* Eph. ii. 16; 2 Thess. ii. 16). In a similar manner redemption is derived from mercy (ἔλεος), which is a name for the pitying disposition of God toward sinners, as love is a name for his disposition and effort to bless and save them. Those who are saved are "vessels of mercy" (Rom. ix. 23); and it was because God is "rich in mercy" (Eph. ii. 4) that men have been saved in Christ. Salvation is also repeatedly ascribed to grace (χάρις), which is a name for the energy of love as it goes out toward the undeserving. Salvation has its source in love as the essence of God's being; considered as a work on behalf of helpless and pitiable sinners, it may be ascribed to God's mercy; considered as a boon to the ill-deserving, it is attributed to grace (Rom. iii. 24; iv. 4; 2 Cor. viii. 9; Gal. i. 6).[1] These are but differing phases of the same thought, and alike illustrate the great idea that redemption springs from within the Divine Being, and is wholly gratuitous on God's part. God seeks to save men because it is according to his nature to do so. His pitying love initiates and carries forward the work in sovereign mercy independently of all human deserving. God's action in redemption is free and absolute, springing wholly from within himself.

[1] "Il [ἡ χάρις] désigne l'amour de Dieu en action, intervenant directement et positivement dans les destinées de l'humanité pour la relever" (Sabatier, *L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 300; Eng. tr. p. 322).

But there is a second set of expressions which give us another phase of the essential character of God, and which constitute the counterpart of those just enumerated. So long as men persist in sin, they are the objects of the divine wrath (*ὀργὴ θεοῦ*): "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. i. 18; *cf.* ii. 8). This term *ὀργή* describes the disposition and attitude of God toward sinful men; it is the holy energy of God's nature in repudiating and punishing sin. It is not antithetic to love in such a sense that the two exclude each other, since in that case the sinful world described by Paul in Rom. i. and ii., which was the object of the *ὀργὴ θεοῦ*, could never have been saved. It is the divine displeasure at sin, but it does not abate the energy of the divine love, which still makes the sinful world the object of its redemptive purpose. Closely allied to this expression is the phrase *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* where it is employed to designate a divine attribute. It denotes that self-respecting quality of holiness in God, that reaction of his nature against sin, which must find expression in condemnation of it. It clearly comes into view in this sense in Rom. iii. 25, 26, where the thought is that since God had so long shown indulgence to sinful men in past ages, it was necessary to reveal and vindicate his righteousness in the work of Christ. By accomplishing a work of reconciliation between God and men, Christ effected a revelation of God's righteousness (*ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*), which vindicates the

divine displeasure at sin, as well as shows God to be the gracious justifier of men. Without entering further upon the interpretation of this passage, which will be considered later, it is certain that the term δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ denotes that quality of God's being which might seem to have been in abeyance while he leniently treated the sinners of past generations (*cf.* Acts xvii. 30), which is, nevertheless, always operative in the treatment of sin, and in accordance with which all gracious treatment of sinners must be planned and executed. Righteousness, then, may be defined as that essential quality of the divine nature which makes God displeased at sin, and which must find expression in all treatment of sin. It is the self-preservative attribute of God, and expresses especially his feeling toward sin, which issues in the ὀργὴ θεοῦ.[1]

It is clear, however, that the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ cannot be thought of by the apostle as in any way inconsistent with his love or grace; God must manifest his righteousness in the very forgiveness of sins. If righteousness in the strictest penal sense were here meant, there would be a complete contradiction in the apostle's thought, since the setting-forth of Christ as a propitiation is the very opposite of an infliction of

[1] "Der apostel versteht, Rom. iii. 25 *sq.*, wie uns scheint, unter δικαιοσύνη, und zwar in Übereinstimmung mit dem A. T. Sprachgebrauch und Lehrgedanken zumal in Prophetismus, diejenige Eigenschaft Gottes, kraft welcher er die heilige Weltordnung aufrecht erhält und verwirklicht" (Lechler, *Das apos. Zeitalter*, p. 346).

punishment. If the necessity of exhibiting God's righteousness means the necessity of actually punishing sin, then that necessity has not been realized, since God has from the first been ready to forgive sin. The idea that δικαιοσύνη here means the necessity of punishing sin leads to the view that God punished Christ with the full penalty of the world's sin, — a view which annuls the very idea of punishment, since punishment for sin can be inflicted only upon those who commit it, and the notion of punishing an innocent person is the essence of injustice and a contradiction in terms.[1]

The object of the apostle is to show, not how God could effect the punishment of sin in order to forgive it, but how he could effect its forgiveness in a way which should at the same time express and satisfy his displeasure at sin. The divine δικαιοσύνη is no barrier to the divine grace, but is an element of the divine nature in accord with which the purposes of that grace must be effected. Righteousness is therefore antithetic to mercy and love only so far as it conditions and determines the method of their action, not as denoting a necessity of punishment in God which must be carried out in a penal infliction before the way is open to the operation of love. That God's love should go forth toward sinners is an axiomatic thought with Paul; he has always been gracious to them, and has been receiving and forgiving them upon

[1] *Cf.* Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 80 *c*, note 13; Eng. tr. i. 428, note 12.

faith, but his gracious treatment of sinful men must not be thought to indicate the quiescence of his righteousness. In Christ he has found a way to manifest that righteousness and to show that he has no toleration of sin, in the very execution of his purposes of mercy. Righteousness, therefore, is a quality which in no way antagonizes, but only so determines and limits, the action of love that in all such action the displeasure of God at sin must be fully revealed. It demands, not the infliction of punishment, which in God's mercy does not take place, but such a substitute for the infliction of punishment as shall express God's uprightness and condemnation of sin, while at the same time he forgives it without punishment. No analysis of the divine attributes which opposes God's righteousness to his love, or predicates the necessity of the punishment of sin before it can be forgiven, can be harmonized with Paul's thought of a gracious treatment of sin which shall at the same time manifest God's righteousness.[1]

[1] It would be aside from my present purpose to enter upon the theological question of the relation of the divine attribute of love (mercy, grace) to that of righteousness (justice), although the preceding remarks lead directly to it. A few definitions on this relation are subjoined, with the substance of which I agree: "La *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* est une vertu positive qui se communique, se donne, et se confond avec l'amour. On pourrait dire que la justice, en ce sens, est le contenu même de l'amour de Dieu, et l'amour, la forme essentielle de sa justice (Rom. iii. 21–26)" (Sabatier, *o. c.* p. 300; Eng. tr. p. 322). The above definition cannot of course apply to such passages as Rom. i. 17 and iii. 21, but only to those in which *δικαιοσύνη* designates an attribute of God, and here

Divine revelation is, in the apostle's view, universal in extent. Among the heathen God did not leave himself without a witness to his benevolence and providence, but in the succession of the seasons and the bounties of nature taught them of himself (Acts xiv. 17). The course of history also, especially the providential appointment of periods for the life of nations and of definite boundaries for their dwellings, is a method of divine revelation (Acts xvii. 26), by which God was seeking to lead the world to a knowledge of himself. Above all, is the moral nature, the conscience, a point of contact between God and man (Rom. ii. 14, 15). The idea of God's revelation to the nations in nature and in conscience is most fully developed by Paul. That which they were capable of knowing concerning God (*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ*, Rom. i. 19) was manifested to

with some modification. "We must recognize it to be a necessary and truly Christian effort, to trace all God's dealings with the world to *love* as their original source. Even God's wrath is in its ultimate essence love; love itself is 'a consuming fire' against all which is opposed to it, — the very essence of good. Love would not be true to itself if it did not repudiate its opposite" (Müller, *The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, i. 248).

"Dass sich die heilige Liebe allenthalben und dass nur sie sich an und in der Welt verwirklichen will, ist die ganz allgemeine Gerechtigkeit Gottes, *justitia universalis* von den Theologen genannt, nichts anders als die Treue seiner Liebe oder als seine Wahrhaftigkeit, folglich auch an ihrem Orte Gnade, Barmherzigkeit und Güte" (Nitzsch, *Syst. d. Christl. Lehre*, p. 180). I venture further to refer to what I have written on this subject in the *Baptist Review* (July, 1881, 312–319), and the *New Englander* (June, 1888, 422–431).

them through the creations of the visible world, which are so interpreted by the mind (*νοούμενα*) as to assure it of God's power and divineness (*δύναμις καὶ θειότης*). This revelation is sufficient to found responsibility and to leave the Gentile world inexcusable for its disobedience, immorality, and idolatry (*εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους*, i. 20). God has therefore revealed himself to all men in nature through the capacity of reason to discern and interpret the evidences of his power and divinity as thus manifested.

In the course of an argument to show that the Jews, as little as the sinful Gentiles, can be justified by deeds of legal obedience (Rom. ii. 1–iii. 20), Paul incidentally dwells upon the manifestation of God which is made directly to the conscience of the heathen man (ii. 14, 15). Although the Gentiles have no written law like the Mosaic, yet if they ever obey the ethical requirements of that written divine law, they are in that case a law unto themselves; that is, they thereby show that they have within themselves the capacity to recognize the obligations of the divine law, and that, so far as they obey, its essential principles are ruling their lives. So far as they thus obey, they prove that the law's requirements are written on their hearts, by the fact that their conscience approves the obedience, and convicts them of sin when disobedient. How far Paul may have conceived such actual obedience on the part of Gentiles possible, is not a question of importance for the point under consideration. Whether they ever actually obeyed the requirements

of divine law or not, it is certain that he credits them with the capacity for so doing, and so supposes, at least, the abstract possibility. Their moral nature was able to yield them such a knowledge of right and duty that it was conceivable that they should without further revelation conform, at least in some measure, to the essential contents of the Old Testament commandments (*τὰ τοῦ νόμου*); and even if in actual fact their moral lives were ever so base, the accusations of conscience proved the existence of a sense of ill-desert which itself presupposed a knowledge of the right.

That the constitution of man is religious is an axiom with Paul. No degree of actual sinfulness can cast doubt upon this fundamental truth. It is certain that the apostle holds it to be impossible for the Gentile to be saved by following the "light of nature;" but this is not because of the inadequacy of that light, but because he cannot perfectly follow it. It is equally true that the Ten Commandments cannot save the Jew, not because they are an insufficient epitome of human duty, but because man is morally powerless perfectly to obey them. There is the same abstract possibility of the Gentile's being saved by obeying the voice of God to him in nature and conscience as there is of the Jew's being saved by keeping the Mosaic law; but in point of fact, since men are universally sinful and weak, both are equally impossible (Rom. viii. 3).

But the very fact that the one case is as conceiv-

able as the other proves that to the apostle's mind the revelation of God to the Gentile was adequate to guide him who should have perfectly followed it to salvation. If it was adequate to make men "without excuse" for their disregard of it, it must have been adequate to have furnished them justification for perfect obedience. A law cannot condemn for disobedience farther than it can reward for obedience. It will be seen that the apostle's principles require a somewhat exalted view of this universal revelation of God. It performs the same function in the heathen world as the Old Testament law does in the Jewish; it is equally competent to ground moral responsibility, equally competent to pronounce men inexcusable for their sins, and, abstractly considered, would be as capable of showing the way of salvation as the Mosaic system would be (i. 19; ii. 12–15, 26; iii. 20–23). This point, however, receives no emphasis, because the sinfulness of men excludes both possibilities alike. Yet it is a point which is logically assumed in Paul's whole argument to prove that in respect to securing justification Jews and Gentiles stand upon the same plane, and that the former have no advantage over the latter in the mere possession of their law. They would have an advantage only in case they obeyed their law better than the Gentiles did theirs, which is not the case: "Thou [the Jew] dost practise *the same things*" (Rom. ii. 1); "There is *no distinction*" (iii. 22); "*Doers* of a law shall be justified" (ii. 13).

To the Jews God has given a special revelation

which, though not a means by which they can be justified, gives them a great advantage in the knowledge of right and duty and in assurances of the divine favor (Rom. iii. 1, 2). On the other hand, the possession of these superior advantages carries with it a heavier responsibility and a heavier condemnation for disobedience to God. As the principle, "To the Jew first, and also to the Greek," was applicable to religious privilege as showing that an economic precedence was accorded to the Jews in the historic order of salvation (Rom. i. 16), so the same principle was applicable to religious responsibility, as indicating that from those to whom more had been given the more would be required (Rom. ii. 9). The nature and ends of this special revelation will be considered in a later chapter.

It is clear, then, that in the apostle's view revelation is universal. Although he states the fact of a manifestation of God in the extra-Jewish world only incidentally and within the limits determined by courses of argument which bear directly upon other points, yet the fact is assumed as indubitable. Nor ought this fact to be obscured by the great emphasis which is laid upon the sinfulness and practical godlessness of the Gentile world which it came more immediately within his purpose to describe. Their degradation was in spite of the knowledge which they had possessed (Rom. i. 21–23); their idolatry was a perversion of that knowledge, resulting from sin and from dulled spiritual perceptions. Thus the dark

picture is distinctly set upon the background of a universal self-manifestation of God, and in the few brief references which have been preserved to us are contained the germs of all theistic philosophy. They may be briefly summarized thus: God reveals himself (1) in the world of nature (*τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν καθορᾶται*, Rom. i. 20); (2) in the providential course of history (Acts xvii. 26, 27); (3) in the constitution of man, which is morally kindred to the divine nature (*τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν*, Acts xvii. 28); and (4) this revelation is effected and appreciated through the action of man's rational powers upon the phenomena of nature, history, and moral consciousness (*τὰ ἀόρατα νοούμενα καθορᾶται*). In virtue of the rational and moral kinship of man to God he is capable of a truer and higher thought of God than had been developed in heathenism. Being God's offspring, man is not true to his own nature when he localizes, limits, and degrades the Deity by identifying him with images and creatures (*γένος οὖν ὑπάρχοντες τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ὀφείλομεν νομίζειν κ. τ. λ.*, Acts xvii. 29), but thinks normally and healthfully only when he interprets by his reason the facts of nature and conscience as evidence of a divine power and infinite wisdom pervading the universe.

The apostle's conception of the nature of God and of man's relations to him is such as to exhibit a logical ground in the being of God for revelation and redemption. It is in harmony with God's nature to graciously reveal himself. The presuppositions of

redemption are found, on the one side, in the love of God, which goes out in efforts to bless and save man, and, on the other, in man's native kinship to God and capacity to know and love him; but salvation is a work that has to do, not with man as such, or with him in his true and ideal character, but with man as a sinner. The motive which prompts his salvation and the means chosen to effect it must be so directed and controlled by the necessary recoil of the divine nature against sin as to express and vindicate that feeling in the very process of salvation itself. Paul's thought of God's nature is that the love of God in effecting man's salvation and in remitting punishment for sin, must affirm and maintain its inviolable holiness. This is done by affording in the work of Christ a substitute for punishment which at the same time meets the ends of punishment. Thus the work of divine love which God wrought in Christ meets at once the ends of the divine mercy or grace and of the divine righteousness, not because Christ accomplishes a reconciliation of them as if they had been until then in antagonism, but because, since they are in eternal harmony, the divine love could choose and pursue a mode of salvation which should adequately reveal, vindicate, and satisfy both. Paul knows nothing of the conflict within the Divine Being which speculative theology has presupposed. He does not betray any consciousness of inconsistency between God's character as righteous and as justifying men. God is both just and justifier with no suggestion of contra-

diction or inconsistency, because his eternally harmonious moral attributes are alike operative, and in their operation alike satisfied, in the saving work of Christ.

The thought of God's free and sovereign grace in initiating and carrying forward the work of human salvation is prominent in the writings of Paul. The redemption was wrought "according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved" (Eph. i. 5, 6). The plan of grace was eternally in the purpose and foreordination of God (Eph. i. 4, 5); a "wisdom in a mystery" which God foreordained before the worlds unto our glory (1 Cor. ii. 7). The fullest statement of God's sovereignty in salvation, according to which he hath mercy on whom he will and hardeneth whom he will, is found in chapters ix.–xi. of Romans, which treat of the fall and restoration of the Jewish people.

If we inquire for the practical religious motive of the apostle in these representations, we shall find it in his intense conviction of the sole efficiency of the divine grace in salvation. His aim is to exclude all appeal to human merit, and to ascribe salvation to the gracious purpose of God alone. His statements on this subject have as practical a purpose as do those relating to justification as a work of divine grace instead of human merit. In fact, his description of the divine foreordination of salvation is but the doctrine of God's free grace applied to the initiation of the work in the divine purpose.

This mode of thought was thoroughly germane to the Jewish mind. It harmonized with the intense sense of God and the deep conviction of his sole efficiency which pervaded the Old Testament. No philosophy which makes man the object of its study — which emphasizes his self-consciousness and freedom — had thrust upon the minds of the Jewish people the metaphysical problems which spring up in an attempt to define the relation of the divine to the human activity in salvation. Paul had no thought of discussing such a problem. When treating of the divine efficiency in redemption and of the divine origination of it, he spoke freely and unreservedly from the standpoint of God's good pleasure in the choice of men to salvation; when speaking of the human conditions of its appropriation, he speaks as unreservedly from that point of view, laying full, strong emphasis upon the capacity of men to receive or reject the offered grace, and upon their responsibility for their choice (for example, see Rom. ix. 32; x. 3, 9–13).

Since the purpose to save men is eternal in God's mind, each man is saved because it was God's purpose to save him. Considered from this point of view, and without reference to the conditions on man's part of appropriating to himself the proffered salvation, Christians are said to be "foreordained unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ" (Eph. i. 5). Election is the application of the preordaining purpose. The purpose of salvation, considered as ter-

minating upon an individual or a class of individuals, is the election of that individual or class to salvation. In Rom. ix. Paul carries the thought of God's agency one step further. He there develops the idea that there were two Israels, — a true and a false. "They are not all Israel which are of Israel; neither, because they are Abraham's seed, are they all children" (Rom. ix. 6, 7). On the contrary, there were limitations by which the true Israel was marked off from the nominal Israel; there was a select inner circle, distinguished from the rest, whom God had chosen out from the mass of the nation in accordance with the promises relating to the birth of Isaac and the choice of Jacob. God does not dispense his blessings according to claims founded upon natural descent from Abraham, but in accordance with his sovereign pleasure, quite independently of such claims. The apostle does not deny that he has the best of reasons for his action, but only denies that these can be fathomed by men, and that men are competent to criticise his action. The primary purpose of the apostle is to exclude meritorious claims as determining God's procedure, and to assert that the *ground* of his action is wholly within his own wisdom and freedom.

Can any complain of the divine choice, exclaims Paul, and he answers by appealing to the absoluteness of God's mercy as affirmed in the Old Testament, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy" (Ex. xxxiii. 19), and by quoting the Old Testament representation of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart so that

he should not let Israel go, in order to manifest his power in overcoming the monarch's determined but really feeble resistance (Ex. ix. 12, 16). The lesson which Paul draws from these examples is that man may not reply against God; the vessel which the potter has fashioned may not say to him that formed it, "Why didst thou make me thus?" (Rom. ix. 20.)

Whatever doctrinal or ethical difficulties may be raised in connection with this passage, it is the part of exegesis to interpret its terms in accord with their natural force, and in accord with Paul's modes of thought and methods of handling Old Testament passages. The Old Testament did represent God as hardening Pharaoh's heart (Ex. ix. 12), but did not fail to describe Pharaoh as sinfully hardening his own heart also (Ex. ix. 34, 35). The prophet represents God as saying, "I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated" (Mal. i. 2, 3), without, however, referring to those reasons for this attitude of God toward the two men which may be found in Genesis (xxv. 34; xxvii. 41). The apostle's argument accords with frequent forms of statement for the absoluteness of God's action in the Old Testament, according to which calamity and adversity ("evil," רַע) are ascribed directly to God's creative agency (Is. xlv. 7; Amos iii. 6). More analytical methods of thought are wont to apply distinctions here such as that between the efficient and permissive agency of God, and to make the effort to draw lines between that which God does without relation to human agency and those actions of God which in

the nature of the case are conditioned by human action, since they relate directly to the choices and character of men. These distinctions Jewish thought did not make in any philosophical manner. The freedom and responsibility of men were emphasized in appropriate connections; the efficiency of God was asserted in unqualified terms where the point of view was distinctively that of the divine agency and power. No effort was made to define or adjust these two truths; that is, the Jews had no metaphysical philosophy.

Paul's utterances touching these subjects are wholly in the vein of Jewish thought. Where the aim is to humble human pride and pretension before the sovereign might of God, he overleaps all human conditions, and without definition or qualification asserts the divine absoluteness, as though God dealt with men as the potter deals with passive clay, fashioning them into vessels of honor or of dishonor as he pleases. But when again the aim is to silence human excuses for neglect and disobedience, he brings into full prominence the free wrong choices and conduct of men as the reason for God's rejection and condemnation. If from the former point of view, chapter ix. pictures the unconditional right of God to deal with men as he will, the tenth chapter, where the Jews' self-justification comes into view, fully recognizes their own action as the reason for God's rejection of them (verses 3, 10–13, 21). His mode of thought may be approximately indicated thus: If men will *complain*

of God (ix. 14), let them remember that he is free and sovereign in all his acts; if they will *excuse themselves* (xi. 18 *sq.*), let them remember that they have merited by their neglect and sin the penalties which they have received at his hands. These two truths Paul asserts with equal energy and plainness. He adds no word of comment upon their relation to each other. His thought moved out in the two assertions from different points of starting; he betrays no consciousness of any conflict or contradiction between them, or even of the need or difficulty of harmonizing them.

In accordance with what has been said, it is to be remembered that the reasoning of chapter ix. is an *argumentum ad hominem* directed against the tendency of the Jewish people to complain against God's procedure because of their misfortunes. Paul rebukes this spirit by denying *a priori* the right of men to reply against God. Whatever God has done is right; man may not question it; this is an axiom with Paul. The comment of Weiss upon this point is a just one:

"If Paul [Rom. ix. 18], in a way which approaches a predestination from arbitrary will, maintains the unfettered will of God in his mercy, this is in opposition to the Jews, who supposed that through their acknowledged efforts after righteousness [ix. 31; x. 2] they had a claim on salvation above that of the heathen, in order to establish the truth that the mercy of God involved in election does not depend on the willing or the running of men [ix. 16]."[1]

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 88 *b.*

The aim of the apostle is to silence Jewish pride and querulousness.

It may thus be said that Paul's argument in ix. 15–29 is of the nature of a vindication *in abstracto* of God's right to act without reference to human conduct or agency, rather than an assertion that God does so. I cannot, however, agree with the author just cited in finding the transition from the consideration of the abstract right to the actual dealing of God with men clearly marked by a distinct turn in the thought at verse 22. The δέ which introduces that verse appears to me to be continuative rather than adversative. The interpretation of Weiss is stated thus: —

"The apostle vindicates for God the absolute right to do this (that is, to 'prepare one for salvation and the other for destruction'), just as the potter in the simile has the absolute right out of the same lump to form vessels to an honorable and a dishonorable use [verses 20, 21]. On the contrary, when he comes to speak of the actual attainment of salvation, by means of a δέ he puts the actual dealings of God at present in express contrast with the former right vindicated for God *in abstracto* [verse 22]." [1]

This interpretation, which is elaborately defended by Tholuck also, encounters the following objections: (*a*) It makes too much depend upon the particle δέ; if such a transition in thought as is supposed occurred at verse 22, it would need to have been more

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 88 *b*.

plainly marked, as by the strong adversative ἀλλά. (*b*) The contents of verse 22 do not accord with the supposition that the apostle has now entered upon a distinctly contrasted line of thought. The terms of the previous figure (σκεύη ὀργῆς κατηρτισμένα) are here preserved, and the forbearance implied in ἤνεγκεν is presented only as a delay of the punishment which is destined for the vessels which have been prepared for destruction, which intervenes in order that God may reveal his mercy upon the σκεύη ἐλέους. Verses 22 and 23 are thus the further development and application of the simile of the clay in the hands of the potter which in verses 19 and 20 is employed to silence human replies against God. They are a part of the proof that God's action must remain unchallenged alike in his exercise of mercy and in the act of hardening; in his delay of punishment for the "vessels of wrath," and in his exhibitions of grace to the "vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory." The consistent carrying out of the figure seems to require the sense given in Meyer's paraphrase (*in loco*):

"But if God, notwithstanding that his holy will disposes him not to leave unmanifested his wrath and his power, but practically to make them known, has nevertheless hitherto, full of long-suffering, endured such as are objects of his wrath, and spared them from destruction, to incur which they are nevertheless constituted and fitted like a vessel by the potter, — endured them and spared them, not merely as a proof of such great long-suffering towards them, but also with the purpose in view

of making known during the period of this forbearance the fulness of his glorious perfection in respect to such as are objects of his mercy, whom he, as the potter fashions a vessel, has prepared beforehand and put in order for eternal glory, — how in presence of that self-denying long-suffering of God towards vessels of wrath, and in presence of this gracious purpose, which he withal at the same time cherishes towards the vessels of mercy, must any desire to dispute with God completely depart from thee!"

The only contrast at verse 22, then, is that between his consummating the work of destruction at once and delaying it for the sake of showing favor meanwhile to the vessels of mercy, not the contrast between his right to deal with men as the potter with the clay, and his gracious renunciation of that mode of dealing with them in actual fact.

The interpreter cannot, in my judgment, evade Paul's strict doctrine of predestination in this chapter by any legitimate application of exegesis. Taken by itself, the passage — verses 19–23 — is a most rigid statement of God's absolute right to exercise mercy toward some and not toward others, whom he may harden if he will in order to make upon them an exhibition of his power and wrath. Theology is at liberty to make such use of this fact as it may deem fit and justifiable. It should, however, be remembered that this passage is not only an *argumentum ad hominem* directed against the Jews, but that it is only a single part or phase of Paul's treatment of

their fall. The motive of the passage is to assert the absolute freedom of God in dealing with men. It is always competent for philosophical theology to raise such questions as these: What will God, in the exercise of this freedom, be led by his inherent ethical nature actually to do in his treatment of mankind? When God is spoken of as fitting men for destruction, how is that process accomplished? How was it actually accomplished in the case of the Jews as shown by chapter x.? If the end of this hardening is the revelation of God's wrath, is that the only end? Is the manifestation of God's wrath in punishment an end in itself, or is there, inseparably associated with it, the vindication of the holy nature of God and of the moral order of the universe against sin? Can the right of God to do as he will, which is asserted, be without reference to the conditions which belong, in God's constitution of the universe, to the reward of well-doing and to the punishment of evil-doing, as well as independent of the efficient or determining agency of man? These and many kindred questions are not covered by the statements of chapter ix., and no exegesis of that passage can decide them, on any view that may be taken of the normative character of the apostle's arguments in such fields of thought.[1]

Similar remarks apply to Rom. viii. 29, 30, where the salvation of believers is traced from the foreknowledge of God onward, through foreordination,

[1] The general remarks of Meyer appended to his commentary on chapter ix. are especially commended.

calling, and justification to glorification. Here the practical motive of the apostle is to show that the whole plan and purpose of God are, as it were, pledged to the Christian. What believers are and shall be, they were in the eternal purpose of God. The thought moves throughout along the line of the divine efficiency in salvation. Human conditions for its reception, human consent and effort for the completion of its process, are, for the apostle's particular purpose here, as little recognized as they are in general excluded. God foreknows and predetermines those who are to be saved; that he also therewith foreknows and predetermines the conditions by which men become saved, and so comprises in the scope of his eternal purpose the free consent and action of men in accepting salvation, is in no way excluded by exegetical considerations, and is rendered an absolutely necessary supposition by Paul's teaching as a whole, as well as by any independent rational construction of Christian doctrine.

This class of statements aptly illustrates a noticeable characteristic of Paul's mind. He has none of that caution and timorousness which often lead writers perpetually to trim and qualify for fear of being misunderstood. He lays full stress upon the argument in hand in its bearing upon the idea to be maintained, without concerning himself about its adjustment with other truths, and without balancing over against it the statements which form its doctrinal or logical counterpart. The result is that

those who employ one-sided methods of handling his statements, and are dominated by some dogmatic prepossession, easily find their desired proof-texts in his epistles; while his critics as readily point out numerous contradictions in them. Both classes of interpreters work by the same methods, — the one emphasizing one class of statements only, the other emphasizing both in such a way as to draw from them opposing results. A just treatment of his language touching any given subject as a whole requires, not a paring down of one class of statements to fit them to another, but a consideration of his method of thought in general, and of his immediate point of view and special purpose in the passages under examination.

In the apostle's expressions concerning God, then, we find pre-eminent these ideas: God has revealed himself to all men in some method, — (*a*) in nature, (*b*) in providence and history, (*c*) in conscience, and with still greater fulness (*d*) in the history and life of the Jewish people, but now in the later ages (*e*) most perfectly in Christ. God is gracious and righteous in all his action. His gift of Christ for the world's salvation sprang from the divine love (Gal. ii. 20; Rom. v. 8; Eph. ii. 4), which is thus the motive of redemption; and the work is so effected as to completely vindicate the divine righteousness and disapproval of sin, while providing for its forgiveness. This gracious revelation and redemption God alone originates, carries forward, and completes. Man's part is the acceptance of its benefits. It lay in the

heart of God from eternity, and is effected by his sovereign mercy. With no word of boasting may man appear in the divine presence. Through no obedience or achievement of his, but through divine grace alone, humbly accepted in faith, does he enter into peace with God; but having been made the object of that love, and having entered into the forgiveness which it secures, he is an ally of God, and may defy opposing powers, confident that no force or creature can separate him from God's all-conquering love.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN

THE apostle's teaching centers in the doctrine of salvation; but as preparing the way for the exposition of it, he treats of the fact of human sinfulness. This is the order of thought in the Epistle to the Romans, and represents the logical relation of the two doctrines. A systematic exhibition of Paul's teaching regarding sin requires us to treat first of its origin, although that topic is presented in a subordinate way and quite incidentally by the apostle himself. It is introduced only as an illustration in Rom. v. 12–21, and not from set purpose to teach the method of sin's entrance into the world. The passage has, however, the greatest importance and interest, not only because it stands alone in its treatment of the origin of sin, but because it presents to us most strikingly some of Paul's characteristic modes of thought.

The purpose of the parallel which the passage draws between Adam and Christ is to emphasize the greatness of God's redeeming grace. The peculiarity of the construction is that after the illustrative member of the comparison — that is, Adam and his sin — is

introduced (verse 12), a digression whose purpose is to illustrate the universality of sin occurs (verses 13, 14); and only in verse 15 is the other and chief member of the comparison — that is, Christ and his grace — brought forward, where it is stated that as by the trespass of one the many died, so and in yet greater measure did God's grace through Christ abound unto the many. Here, then, is introduced the full comparison, but with the added element of a special emphasis (πολλῷ μᾶλλον) upon the exceeding greatness of the grace of God. In verse 19 the comparison, which has been deferred by a long parenthesis and complicated with an emphasizing of the grace side of the parallel, is simply stated: "For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous." This was what Paul began to say in verse 12 where he was diverted by parenthetic explanations. This verse is therefore the nerve of the passage taken as a whole, and clearly reveals its true purport and chief intention.

We are now required to fix attention upon the member of this comparison which is introduced in illustration; namely, the sin of Adam in its relation to the sin of the race. The argument which rests upon the causal relation of Adam's sin to sin in general has the following presuppositions: (1) Sin in general, sin as a principle or world-ruling power, had its origin in the transgression of Adam. This point the apostle assumes without argument. It was with

him a well-settled belief. It was beyond question the current opinion in the later Judaism, and was held by the apostle in common with the rabbinic theology. Tholuck adduces the following striking rabbinical parallels:[1]—

"The Targum on the passage, 'God made man upright' (Eccles. vii. 29), reads, 'But the serpent and the woman led him astray, and caused death to be inflicted upon him and upon all the inhabitants of earth.' The Targum on Ruth iv. 22 says: 'Jesse lived many days, until the counsel which the serpent gave Eve was called to mind before God; on account of this counsel all men became subject to death.'"

Other examples are:—

"If Adam and Eve had not sinned, their descendants would not have been infected with the disposition to sin, and their form would have remained perfect like that of angels, as the curses [upon them] show, and they would have continued eternally living and unchanged in the world. . . . Although all was created perfect, yet as soon as the first man sinned, everything became perverted and will no more return to order until the Messiah comes. . . . With the same sin with which Adam sinned, sinned the whole world, for he was the whole world. . . . As the first man was the one in [committing] sin, so shall the Messiah be the one in extinguishing sin. . . . Adam opened, through his fall, a source of impurity, so that impurity and poison spread themselves throughout the whole world."

[1] *Auslegung d. Briefes an die Römer, in loco.*

The view under consideration, in the form in which it is here expressed, could have been derived from the Old Testament only by inference. The transgression of Adam is there treated as a beginning of sin, but all other sin is not referred to it as its cause and ground.

(2) A second presupposition is that death is the consequence of sin. This is the teaching of the Old Testament; but the death of all is never there directly referred to the sin of Adam as its cause. It is rather the consequence of personal sin. The universal reign of death is, however, traced to the sin of the first parents in apocryphal writings, as in Wisdom ii. 24: "For God created man for immortality, and made him to be an image of his own being; but through envy of the Devil came death into the world and they that are of his part [οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος ὄντες] experience it," and more explicitly in Ecclus. xxv. 24: "Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die." Death to the Jewish mind was a descent to the gloomy shades of Sheol, and was one of the greatest of evils. From its associations it is therefore easy to see why it should have been uniformly represented as the penalty of sin.

(3) A third assumption of the argument is that Adam and Christ stand in analogous relations to the race, — the former to the race of men considered as sinners and in need of redemption, the latter to the race considered as subjects of that redemption. Christ is the second Adam (1 Cor. xv. 45, 47); that is, the

one who rescues man from the sinful course which was initiated by the fall of the first Adam. He is the head of spiritual humanity as Adam was the head of natural humanity. The first two presuppositions are found in verse 12; the third underlies the whole passage.

The unfinished protasis of verse 12, "As through one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," would naturally have been completed thus: "So through one man [Jesus Christ] did righteousness enter into the world, and life by righteousness" (*cf.* verses 15, 19). But at the mention of death as sin's consequence, the apostle pauses to emphasize the universality of death and sin. The word "so" (οὕτως) refers to the causal connection between death and sin which is assumed. The thought is, "And so" — that is, since death is sin's consequence — "death became universal, because sin was universal." The order of thought then is, (*a*) Sin entered the world by Adam's trespass; (*b*) death, sin's invariable penalty, followed; (*c*) in accordance with this connection between sin and death, death became universal, (*d*) because all sinned.

The last point is the one over whose meaning interpreters are most divided. Several prior considerations will furnish the right method of approach to its interpretation. These are, (*a*) the apostle's objective, semi-personal conception of sin and death. They are principles or powers to which peculiar actions or energies are ascribed. Sin *entered* (εἰσῆλθεν) the world,

and death *passed through* upon all men (*εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν*). During the period from Adam to Moses sin was in the world (*ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ*, verse 13) as an objective and conquering power, and death *was reigning* in triumph over men (*ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ θάνατος*, verse 14, *cf.* 17). (*b*) The whole passage deals in the abstract with the relation of Christ to salvation and with that of Adam to sin, and not in the concrete with personal acts. In the chief member of the comparison which is developed in verses 15–19, where the superior power and abundance of grace in Christ as compared with that of sin in Adam are repeatedly emphasized (see verses 15–17), no allusion is made to the personal acts by which believers appropriate the righteousness which God's grace in Christ provides. The relation of Christ to the fact of salvation is the single thought, and that one idea determines the treatment throughout. The view that in the correlative case Paul thinks only of Adam's relation to sin in general, without reference to the acts of individuals, would have the advantage of preserving the consistency of the comparison in an important particular, and of harmonizing both members of the comparison with the same fundamental point of view. (*c*) The practical religious motive for urging the universality of sin and death is to magnify the universal destination of the grace of God in salvation. As Christ's relation to that salvation is the only point under consideration in the chief member of the comparison, so the relation of Adam to human sin is the

only point of importance for the purposes of the illustration. It is the universality of sin and death as connected with Adam's transgression which serves to illustrate the universality of the purpose of grace in Christ.

In accordance with these suggestions regarding the form and scope of the passage as a whole, and especially in view of the peculiarities of Paul's modes of thought which were described in a former chapter, I hold that the much-disputed phrase, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, means: All sinned when Adam sinned; all sinned in and with his sin. My reasons, stated in detail, for this interpretation are as follows: (*a*) The point of the illustration drawn from Adam is found in referring all sin to his transgression as its source. With this thought the apostle begins his comparison, "As through one man sin entered," etc. (verse 12), and wherever he returns to the same idea, as he does in verses 15–19, the emphasis is in each case laid upon Adam's sin as the cause of sin in general and of the reign of death. If in ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον he means individual and personal sin, he then gives in this phrase a different reason for the universal reign of death from that given elsewhere throughout the passage, and a reason which the nature of his argument did not at all require. It is by the trespass of the one (Adam) that the many died, as it is by the act of righteousness of the one (Christ) that the many live. The introduction of personal sin as the cause of the universality of death is as little required as

the introduction of the personal faith of believers as a reason for the salvation of the many. Of the latter there is no hint in the whole section; the presumption is against the introduction of the former. Both are equally aside from the purpose of the argument.

(*b*) The force of the aorist *ἥμαρτον* most naturally favors this view. I grant that it is possible to lay too great weight upon the force of the tense in itself considered. The aorist denotes a definite past action, but in itself determines nothing as to the time of that action relatively to other events. It may therefore refer to a general or universal course of action in past time for the expression of which our idiom uses the perfect tense. Such appears to be its force in Rom. iii. 23: *πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ.* It is when the term *ἥμαρτον* is compared with a most characteristic use of the aorist in other passages to denote an act of individuals conceived of as contemporaneous with and included in the death and resurrection of Jesus, that the full force of this reason appears. These expressions have been cited for a general purpose; they should here be brought into comparison with the phrase under consideration. They are: 2 Cor. v. 15, *κρίναντας τοῦτο, ὅτι εἷς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν· ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον,* "Because we thus judge that one died for all, therefore all died;" that is, all died (ethically) to sin in and with the death of Christ upon the cross. The death of individuals in a figurative sense is distinctly

identified in time with the death of Christ.[1] Other passages containing the same form of thought are: Col. iii. 1, *εἰ οὖν συνηγέρθητε τῷ Χριστῷ, τὰ ἄνω ζητεῖτε*, "If ye were raised with Christ;" that is, were raised to new spiritual life when he rose, etc. Compare the aorists in the kindred expressions, Col. ii. 20; iii. 3; Rom. vi. 6. As in all these cases where the salvation (ethical death and resurrection) of believers is carried back in thought and mystically identified with its cause and ground in Christ's death and resurrection, so in this passage, which is the logical counterpart of the representations just quoted, is it most natural to refer the aorist *ἥμαρτον* back to the act of Adam in which the sinning of all had its root, and with which it is identified in the same way as the believer's death to sin is identified with Christ's death upon the cross. This analogy in the two representations pertains to the general form of the thought, and should not be pressed beyond the purposes for which Paul has used it. These considerations, then, appear to point strongly to the interpretation of Bengel: "*Non agitur de peccato singulorum proprio. Omnes peccarunt, Adamo peccante, sicut omnes mortui sunt, salutariter, moriente Christo* (2 Cor. v. 15)." In this connection I would refer the reader to what I

[1] *Cf.* Meyer *in loco*: "In this death of the one the death of all was accomplished, the ethical death, namely, in so far as in the case of all, the ceasing of the fleshly life, of the life in sin (which ethical dying sets in subjectively through fellowship of faith with the death of Christ), is objectively, as a matter of fact, contained in the death of the Lord."

have written in an earlier chapter (pp. 36–40) upon the peculiar mode of thought of which the sinning of all in the sin of Adam appears to be an illustration.

(*c*) The view that ἥμαρτον refers to the sin of the race in Adam harmonizes best with the apostle's conception of ἁμαρτία. It is an abstract term denoting sin as a whole, conceived as a principle or diffusive power which spreads itself abroad. When the apostle wrote ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν, he did not refer to the commission of individual and personal sins, but to the entrance of sin as a power or non-personal principle in which all partake. It is more accordant with this conception to suppose that in πάντες ἥμαρτον he introduces no new reason or different representation. All sinned when sin entered the world in the transgression of Adam. That this is the interpretation which speculative theology, with little regard to exegesis, has so long espoused, should not be regarded as an exegetical objection to it, as on the other hand philosophical difficulties with the idea thus derived should not be allowed a determining weight in overbearing the natural and characteristic force of the apostle's words.

(*d*) Πάντες ἥμαρτον gives the reason for the absolutely universal spread of death. If it means "personally sinned," the statement would not be true. It could not be said that all died because all consciously and individually sinned, because millions of infants have died who have not so sinned. It may be said in reply that the case of infants did not occur to Paul's

mind as constituting an exception to his statement. But could such an obvious and fatal exception escape his notice? He is accounting for the *universality* of death. The reason he gives is πάντες ἥμαρτον. The term πάντες here must be coextensive with πάντας of the previous clause, else πάντες ἥμαρτον gives no valid reason for εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν. But it is not coextensive if πάντες ἥμαρτον means "personally sinned;" and the argument breaks down. All sinned in Adam's sin, and therefore, apart from personal sin, all die.

Such is the interpretation to which we are led by exegetical considerations. It may not accord with current modes of thought; it accords with those of the apostle. It is an example of his mystical and objective handling of such conceptions as that of sin. With the dogmatic treatment of the passage we are not concerned beyond pointing out its relation to Paul's own scheme of doctrine. The peculiar and characteristically Pauline form of thought which the passage presents has been appropriated by a realism very different from Paul's, and thus the passage was made to do service as a philosophical theorem. This use of the passage was facilitated by the translation in the Vulgate version of ἐφ' ᾧ by *in quo*, so that the terms of the apostle furnished a most striking parallel to the proposition that all sinned in Adam. But even without this exegetical artifice the words easily lent themselves to this form of speculation. Their natural meaning was, All sinned when Adam sinned; and

that statement was the theorem to be proved on the principle that all individuals were seminally in Adam, and actually participated in his sin. This is very convincing so long as one assumes that the philosophical realism which emanated from Plato and was elaborately applied to theology by Augustine, is the same as the mystical realism of Paul; that is, so long as one does not go behind the form of the apostle's words. But when this is done, the resemblance turns out to be a merely formal one. With no attention to the peculiarities of Paul's thought, and assuming the identity of the two systems because one of his phrases has a sound which accords with one of its favorite maxims, philosophical realism has introduced its whole scheme into Christian theology under cover of this one formal resemblance, to the entire neglect of the same form of thought where it appears in several striking instances in another connection. It has filled this phrase with its own content, and turned it to use as a hard and fast theological formula asserting the actual presence of all men in Adam and their participation in his act; while kindred phrases — which rest upon precisely the same mode of thought, and identify believers with Christ in his death, just as this identifies sinners with Adam in his sin — are passed by, as mere figures of speech. It is a curious example of the formal coincidence of exegesis and dogma, — a coincidence, however, which biblical theology, by penetrating beneath the external resemblances to the wholly different underlying conceptions of Paul

and of philosophical realism, shows to be no real coincidence in idea.

It is worth while to point out so noteworthy an example of the association of speculative opinions with biblical phrases where there is no real kinship of idea between them, as a justification of the science of biblical theology, upon whose methods speculative theology so naturally looks with scanty favor. Until something more than verbal exegesis becomes widespread, and we have a careful and minute study of the thoughts of the biblical writers in their own light, — a study which penetrates to that which is characteristic in both form and matter, — we shall continue to see their words displayed as the mottoes of speculations and theories entirely foreign to their meaning, and applied to conceptions widely remote from their thoughts. The more obvious misuses of this kind — such as the employment of scriptural statements as definitions of scientific truth — are now, though only within recent years, widely discredited. It is now generally conceded that scientific conceptions are not to be expected in Scripture. A similar concession must at length be made in regard to philosophical speculations which grew up on a wholly different soil from that on which the conceptions of the apostles were matured, and which are not at all germane to their modes of thought.

In what sense, then, according to Paul's characteristic modes of thought, does he mean that all men sinned when Adam sinned? They sinned when Adam

sinned in the same sense in which believers were crucified to the world and died unto sin when Christ died upon the cross. The believer's renewal is conceived of as wrought in advance by those acts and experiences of Christ in which it has its ground. As the consequences of his vicarious sufferings are traced back to their cause, so are the consequences which flowed from the beginning of sin in Adam traced back to that original fount of evil and identified with it; but the latter statement should no more be treated as a rigid logical formula than the former, its counterpart. All that doctrinal theology derives from the one is the causal relation of Christ's work to salvation; it should by parity of reasoning derive from the other the thought of the sin of Adam as the initiation and cause of all sin. As righteousness flowed from Christ, so did sin from Adam. The former initiated the order of righteousness; the latter the disorder of sin. As all who by faith enter the spiritual order of Christ receive from him the gracious gift of reconciliation and life, so all by their race-connection have received from the natural head of the race a taint of nature, a bent or bias toward sin, so that in principle the sinfulness of all may be said to be included in the sin of Adam. It may even be said, in harmony with Pauline conceptions, that all human nature was in Adam and that he was the race, if it be meant in accord with the principles of heredity and not in the sense of realism, which makes human nature a certain *quantum* of being and treats

descent from Adam as a division of this mass of human nature into parts.[1]

It is sometimes said that Paul knows nothing of a *fall* of Adam from a state of purity, but rather treats his sin as the product of a germ of evil or the outcome of moral weakness within him.[2] Appeal on behalf of this view is made to 1 Cor. xv. 47, where Adam is referred to as ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός. But the subject of sin is not there under consideration, and χοϊκός only designates Adam as of earthly origin and mortal. This expression in no way involves sin or moral fault in Adam previous to the transgression to which Paul refers, but fairly taken, clearly implies a certain moral indeterminateness or weakness as opposed to tested and approved character, and also — contrary to the common assumption — mortality. Neither the Old Testament nor the New teaches that Adam was created immortal, but only that he might by obedience have attained to immortality. It is not asserted that Adam became mortal in consequence of his trespass, but only that he died; that is, failed of the possible goal of immortality. It cannot therefore be affirmed that had not Adam sinned he would have continued forever in his earthly life, but only that he would not have experienced death with the pain, anxiety, and decay which now attend human dissolution. To escape the bitter experience of death, and to be in some way transformed

[1] *Cf.* Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, ii. 77 *sq.*

[2] So Usteri, *Paulin. Lehrbegriff*, p. 28; Baur, *Paulus*, ii. 268.

into a higher life, was the reward of obedience which both Old and New Testaments assume to have been set before him. An experience corresponding to death, a change, a transformation, must have awaited him as an ἄνθρωπος χοϊκός, but not death in the meaning and associations with which long ages of sorrow and suffering have clothed that word.

That a fall of Adam is meant by ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν, is certain from the fact that ἁμαρτία denotes sin as a power or principle which on the assumption under review would have been already in the world before Adam's personal transgression.[1] It may be observed in passing that the interpretation of Paul's words which ascribes to him, not the idea of a fall, but that of a development of a germ of evil, present in him from the first, accords with certain philosophical presuppositions regarding sin as inherent in human nature. It will be necessary to refer to it again in considering Paul's teaching regarding the nature of sin. We are confident that Paul does not think so ill of human nature as to consider it essentially evil, nor so lightly of sin as they suppose who ascribe to him this doctrine, according to which sin is little more than man's native moral weakness, the necessary contrast to goodness and the indispensable condition of its development in all finite being.

We have seen that the origin of human sin is traced by the apostle to Adam, and that its universal

[1] *Cf.* Lechler, *Das apos. Zeitalter*, p. 300; Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 67 *b*.

sway is explained by the organic unity of the race with him. It remains to inquire into his teaching concerning the nature and operation of this despotic power in the individual and in society, — a problem for whose solution the apostle has furnished us far more abundant data than for the determination of his view of the origin of sin, but data which are by no means easy of interpretation.

Paul's doctrine of human sinfulness cannot be understood without determining the meaning of the term "flesh" (σάρξ), with which he constantly associates sin, and which he regards as sin's seat and sphere of manifestation. In the Old Testament the term "flesh" (בָּשָׂר) is frequently used to denote man's natural creature-life in its moral weakness and sinfulness, while "spirit" (רוּחַ) denotes that God-given element of his personality which is akin to the Divine Spirit. Thus the terms set in contrast two phases of human nature, — its merely natural impulses on the one side, and its affinities with God on the other. It has been commonly supposed that Paul founds his own doctrine upon this Old Testament basis. Recently, however, elaborate attempts have been made to show that at this point he deserts the Old Testament ethical dualism, and constructs his view in accord with the natural and essential dualism of Hellenic philosophy, in which the body was regarded as necessarily evil and as forming an antithesis to the higher element — the spirit — in human nature. Upon this explanation, σάρξ becomes substantially

equivalent to σῶμα or μέλη.[1] Upon this view an antinomy is found in Paul's account of the origin of sin, since its beginning, on the one hand, is ascribed to the sin of Adam, and on the other, is made to be inherent in the material element of the human personality. This view has been modified by Pfleiderer, in a work more recent than the first edition of *Paulinismus*,[2] and the ethical meaning of σάρξ in Paul's doctrine is distinctly admitted, although its physical meaning is still emphasized as the basis of this conception. In the view of this writer we have here, as so frequently in Paul's doctrines, a combination of Old Testament or rabbinic with Hellenic or Alexandrian thought. The conclusion is thus stated: "So far as the flesh is the seat and tool of this power of sin, it may be so identified with sin that the formulæ, 'to be in the flesh' and 'to walk after the flesh,' signify simply 'to live in sin, or according to the sinful principle.'"[3] This identification of the flesh with the sinful principle which dwells in it is explained by the influence of Hellenic dualism and the doctrine of the essential evil of matter.

There are here two separate questions to be considered: (*a*) How far the σάρξ is for Paul identical with the body; and (*b*) In what modes of thought his

[1] So Baur, *Neutest. Theol.* p. 143 *sq.*, and similarly Holsten, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im Lehrbegriffe des Paulus*, in *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, p. 365 *sq.*; Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 48 *sq.* 1 Aufl.; Eng. tr. i. 48 *sq.*

[2] *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 178 *sq.*

[3] *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 187.

conception of σάρξ has its root. The former is an exegetical, the latter an historical question.

There can be no doubt that the simple primary meaning of σάρξ as denoting the material of the human body is the logical starting-point of his doctrine. The question is whether his idea is so dominated by that original conception, and supplemented with Hellenic views, as to yield the doctrine that human nature, composed as it is in part of material elements, is essentially evil. This question can be answered only by a study of the apostle's language. The passages where σάρξ is associated with ἁμαρτία and contrasted with νοῦς, πνεῦμα, and kindred terms are of chief importance.

In Gal. v. 19–23, the apostle enumerates the works of the flesh (τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός), and sets them in contrast with the fruit of the spirit (ὁ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος). Among the former are found not only sensuous sins, such as unchastity and drunkenness, but (chiefly) such as have no direct connection with bodily impulses, — "enmities, strife, jealousies, wraths, factions, divisions, heresies, envyings." Similarly in Rom. xiii. 13, 14, the avoidance of making provision for the flesh (τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοια) includes the renunciation, not only of "chambering and wantonness," but also of "strife and jealousy" (ἔρις, ζῆλος). In addressing the Corinthians the apostle designates them as carnal (σαρκικοί), because "there is among them jealousy and strife [ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις]" (1 Cor. iii. 3). Moreover, he speaks (2 Cor. i. 12) of

a *σοφία σαρκική*; that is, a worldly and selfish policy as opposed to the "holiness and sincerity which come from God." These examples appear to me to be absolutely decisive against the view that Paul associates sin inseparably with the body, or makes its essence to consist in sensuousness. In these expressions at least, *σάρξ* is used in a sense at once more comprehensive and more distinctly ethical than that theory supposes which makes it a name for "the impulse of sensuousness." [1]

If we consider Paul's doctrine of the body (*σῶμα*), we shall find that he by no means regards it as essentially sinful, and that his conception of it is not equivalent to the idea denoted by *σάρξ*. It is true that "flesh and blood" (a designation of the corrupt and perishable material substance of the body; *cf.* *ἡ φθορά*, *in loco*) "cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Cor. xv. 50), — that is, that the "natural body" (*σῶμα ψυχικόν*, verse 44) cannot partake in the glorified life without transformation; but that is not because of its inherent sinfulness, but on account of its corruptibleness: "Corruption doth not inherit incorruption" (verse 50). Moreover, the fact that "the body is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body" (1 Cor. vi. 13), — that is, that it belongs to Christ, who has the intention to rule and use it, — and that it may become "the temple of the Holy Spirit" (verse 19), is conclusive proof that Paul did not

[1] Usteri, *Paulin. Lehrbegriff*, p. 41, "*ἡ σάρξ* ist der Reiz der Sinnlichkeit."

regard it as essentially sinful, and that he could not have charged upon it the character and works which he so often predicates of the *σάρξ*.

These passages furnish conclusive evidence that Paul's conceptions of *σάρξ* and of *σῶμα* are not strictly identical. It is equally plain that in other passages he uses them as nearly synonymous. In Rom. vii. 14–25, he gives a description in the first person, and reflecting his own experience as a Pharisee, of the conflict which ensues in the unregenerate man who has been awakened to a sense of his sinfulness under the law. This conflict is between sin (*ἁμαρτία*) and the inner man, denoted by *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* (verse 22), or between the *νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* and the *νόμος τοῦ νοός* (verse 23). The wish and desire (*θέλειν, συνήδομαι*, verses 18, 22) are on the side of the divine law, but the power of sin dwelling in the flesh (verse 18) thwarts the efforts made and renders them futile (verses 15, 19, 20, 23). The description begins with an explanation of the fact that the good and spiritual law (verse 14, *cf.* 16) works only this doleful result. It is because the man is carnal (*σαρκικός*), sold as a captive, and delivered over into the power of sin (verse 14, *cf.* 23). This reign of sin is described as *ἡ ἐνοικοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία*; and it occasions the negative statement that good does not dwell *ἐν ἐμοί*, and the phrase *ἐν ἐμοί* is explained by the phrase *ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου* (verse 18). Similarly the reign of the principle of sin is located in the members (*ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*, verse 23), and the final cry for deliverance

is, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death [*σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*]?" (Verse 24.) Finally, in the summing up, the mind, or reason (*νοῦς*), and the flesh are spoken of as the contending principles or powers.

It is clear that in these passages *σάρξ* is nearly equivalent to *σῶμα* and *μέλη*, and denotes the material substance of man as the seat of sin and the sphere of its manifestation. Sin and the flesh are not strictly identified, but are closely associated because related to each other as principle and instrument or as power and place of operation. Here, then, *σάρξ* is the body as actually subjugated and ruled by sin; but nothing is said which involves the view that the *σάρξ* is inherently and necessarily sinful, or that it cannot be delivered from the indwelling power of evil. The apostle is sketching a fact of experience and history, and not giving an explanation of the origin and nature of sin. We have in this important passage the fundamental conception which lies at the basis of all Paul's teaching on the subject. The flesh is primarily the material element considered as the seat of evil impulses and passions, and so as the special sphere of sin's manifestation. But how far Paul is from regarding the *σάρξ* as essentially sinful may be seen from his exhortation: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit" (2 Cor. vii. 1), — a passage which can have no proper meaning except upon the assumption that the flesh as well as the spirit is capable of purification from sin.

With this conception agree the allusions in Rom. vi. where the nature and requirements of the spiritual life are sketched. "Our old man" — that is, our former sinful self — "was crucified with Christ," says the apostle, "that the body of sin [*τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*] might be destroyed" (verse 6). Here the figure of crucifixion naturally required the term "*body* of sin" as an explanation of *ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος*. By it is meant the body, which, as a matter of fact, is ruled by sin, as is shown by verse 12: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey the lusts thereof." The exhortation implies that the dominion of sin in the body can be broken, as do those which urge that the members shall be made "instruments of righteousness" (*ὅπλα δικαιοσύνης*, verse 13).

From this primary notion of the *σάρξ*, which clearly rests upon an Old Testament basis, it is but a short and easy step to the idea that the flesh, which is so closely associated with sin as its seat, is itself, as a matter of fact, an anti-spiritual force. *Σάρξ* thus becomes a term to express the power of those natural sinful desires and impulses in unregenerate men. In such the flesh predominates, and not the spirit. They may thus be said to be in the flesh (Rom. vii. 5), to live or walk according to the flesh (Rom. viii. 4 *sq.*; 2 Cor. x. 2 *sq.*), and to possess the modes of thought and feeling which are dictated by sinful desire (*φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. viii. 6 *sq.*). By these terms a second phase of meaning is denoted, by which

σάρξ acquires a semi-ethical significance, and the way is paved for that usage which we first examined, where σάρξ is seen to be a general term to denote unrenewed human nature, the works of which, such as strife, wrath, and jealousy, are enumerated (page 141). In the light of these explanations, then, we may distinguish three shades of meaning in the Pauline use of the term: (1) the physical, in which σάρξ is the body or members considered as the dwelling-place of sin; (2) the semi-ethical, in which the flesh as the seat of evil impulses is treated as an anti-spiritual power; (3) the ethical, in which the flesh denotes unregenerate human nature.[1]

[1] I find distinctions closely like these in Pfleiderer's *Urchristenthum*, p. 186 *sq.*, with the difference that Pfleiderer finds the primary meaning of σάρξ in such expressions as "fleshly wisdom," "wise after the flesh" (2 Cor. i. 12; 1 Cor. i. 26), and "Are ye not carnal and walk as men?" (1 Cor. iii. 3), which he interprets as meaning that "to be carnal" and "to be men" are equivalent expressions. To me these passages seem rather to belong to the more developed ethical views where "to be carnal" signifies "to act according to the spirit that rules unregenerate human nature," as is shown by the charge that there is among them "envy and strife" (see page 141).

It would carry me too far beyond my present purpose and unduly extend the limits of this chapter to explain the different shades of opinion respecting this point of Paul's doctrine which have been current since Baur. One of the most elaborate examinations of the subject is that of Holsten, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ im Lehrbegriffe des Paulus*, reprinted in *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, in which he maintains that σάρξ is the body as animated by *life;* the material element of man is *formaliter σῶμα, materialiter σάρξ*. This σάρξ is necessarily σαρξ

This analysis illustrates the difficulty of framing a definition which shall include all the shades of meaning and degrees of force in which Paul employs the term. It may be serviceable to add a few examples of the efforts made by leading scholars to formulate the ethical meaning of the word. Thayer's *Lexicon* (4 *sub voce*): "Σάρξ . . . has an ethical sense, and denotes mere human nature, the earthly nature of man apart from divine influence, and therefore prone to sin and opposed to God; accordingly it includes whatever in the soul is weak, low, debased, tending to ungodliness and vice." Cremer (*Biblico-Theol. Lexicon*, *sub voce*): "In antithesis to πνεῦμα, σάρξ signifies the sinful condition of human nature in and according to its bodily manifestation." Weizsäcker (*Das apostolische Zeitalter*, p. 130): "The flesh is the expression for the power of sin in the natural life. It appears as the source of all sorts of sin, and its power consists not merely in the opposition of indifference to the demands and impulses of the Spirit, but in active opposition against the Spirit," etc. Dickson

ἁμαρτίας; that is, man is essentially evil in the sense that the σάρξ constitutes the nature-ground of all sin. Conscious transgression and the sense of guilt are due only to personal action. Hence the dualism of a determining evil power and a freedom that may resist, but cannot overcome it (as described in Rom. vii. 14 *sq.*). For an exposition of the views of Holsten and other recent critics, I refer to Professor Dickson's Baird Lecture for 1883 entitled, *Saint Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit;* and I especially commend his own summary and conclusions in chapter xi. of that volume (Glasgow, 1883).

(*Saint Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, p. 310 *sq.*) enumerates the following points in concluding his discussion: (*a*) Paul does not identify σάρξ and ἁμαρτία; (*b*) he does not identify σάρξ with the material body; (*c*) he does not identify matter, or the material side of man, with evil; (*d*) he does not associate sin exclusively with the body or with the sensuous nature of man; (*e*) his design is not to set forth the *origin* of sin *from* the σάρξ, but the *power* of sin *in* the σάρξ; (*f*) Paul means to explain the *historical* origin of sin (in Rom. v. 12 *sq.*), but not its *psychological* origin (in his doctrine of the *flesh*); (*g*) Paul's doctrine of the flesh is based, not upon speculation, but upon experience; (*h*) σάρξ is a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας in all cases save one, that of Jesus Christ.[1]

It has been maintained by many recent writers (for example, Holsten and Pfleiderer) that Paul in his doctrine of the flesh intends to give an account of the origin and nature of sin. In their view we have two explanations of sin's origin, — one which traces it back to Adam's sin, and one which places its roots in the carnal element of human nature. The first is an historical explanation, and is connected with Jewish rabbinic thought; the second is a psychological explanation, and is derived from Alexandrian

[1] It is noticeable that Paul is careful to speak of Christ as sent ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας (Rom. viii. 3), thus shunning to attribute to Christ the associations of sinfulness which σάρξ, as matter of experience, carries with it in human life. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, where the connection involved no such danger, it is affirmed of Christ, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.

speculation. In this peculiar combination of elements these writers find a good example of the syncretism of Paul. But if, as we have sought to show, the flesh is not conceived of by Paul after the manner of Græco-Alexandrian philosophy, if it is not in itself sinful, then Paul's teaching concerning it cannot be intended to explain the origin or nature of sin, but only its mode of operation. An impartial exegesis of the apostle's language makes it very difficult to bring his ideas into accord with the dualistic philosophy from which it is sought to derive them. It cannot be denied that there are certain suggestive points of similarity between some of Paul's thoughts and the views which were current in the later Greek philosophy with which he must have come more or less into contact; but the hypothesis of a derivation of his doctrine of sin from this philosophy, and especially the hypothesis of two incompatible sources of that doctrine, must be considered as unverified in its most essential point, until it is more convincingly shown that Paul's language can be squared with the idea that matter is inherently evil, and that consequently the body is the source of sin.[1] We deem it safe to affirm that the considerations which are adduced by recent scholars are entirely inadequate to show that

[1] *Cf.* Pfleiderer, *Urchristenthum*, pp. 190–192. *Per contra*, Dickson, *Saint Paul's Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit*, chap. x. For an elaborate exhibition of the parallels and differences between Philo and Paul, see Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des A. T.*, pp. 304–310.

Paul's doctrine of sin was materially influenced by Alexandrian thought. Its roots are rather to be sought in the soil of the Old Testament.

It is wholly improbable that the apostle ever set before himself the definite purpose of explaining the origin of sin. With the Old Testament narrative of the fall of Adam in mind, he declares that sin began in his transgression and extended its dominion over all mankind. In a mode of thought characteristic of him he contemplates that as the great race-sin in which all Adam's descendants sinned. No philosophy of the subject is given. It could never have been the apostle's intention to pronounce upon the psychological problems which later speculation has raised concerning the beginning of moral evil. Paul treats the subject chiefly from a practical standpoint and in the light of human experience.

Our next inquiry is, What is the relation of sin to the will? If we turn to those passages in which the object is not to assert the origin or depict the enslaving power of sin, but to enforce man's responsibility and guilt on account of it, we shall find abundant evidence that sin has its seat primarily in the will. Its roots lie deep in the past of the race, considered as a unity; it masters the body, inflaming its appetites and perverting its passions. But sin *is* man's voluntary and guilty act; and the responsibility for it belongs to him who commits it. Paul never represents men as subjects of guilt or as objects of moral judgment on account of any one's sins except their own. His most extended

portrayal of the development of sin in history is found in his arraignment of the Gentile and Jewish worlds in Rom. i. and ii. Throughout this passage the guilt of sin is charged to the evil choices of men. They wilfully sinned against the light which God had given them, and can plead no palliation or excuse (i. 18–20). The action of God in plunging them into deeper depths of sin (verses 24, 26) was but the infliction of the judicial consequences of their action. It was because "they refused [*οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν*] to have God in their knowledge" that "God gave them up to a reprobate [*ἀδόκιμον*] mind" (verse 28),—a statement which is rendered the more pointed by the evident play on the words *ἐδοκίμασαν* and *ἀδόκιμον*, which significantly emphasizes the connection of God's action with their own as its penal consequence.

And when the apostle's thought widens to take in the race, it is the same charge of guilt for evil choices and inexcusable deeds which he imputes to all mankind,—"Wherefore thou art without excuse, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest" (Rom. ii. 1). And what are the elements of the sin which he now lays at the door of the Jew? There is, first of all, the practice (*πράσσειν*) of such things as have already been charged upon the Gentiles (verses 2, 3); there is contempt for God's goodness, hardness and impenitence of heart (verses 4, 5), for which God will punish them according to their deeds (verse 6); and by clear intimations of their guilt, the catalogue of the Jews' sins is swelled by the crimes of theft, adultery, robbery of tem-

ples, and blasphemy (verses 21–24),—sins of choice and purpose for which they cannot escape the judgment of God. To whatever point, then, the origin of the sinful disposition may be traced back, it is obvious from such representations as this that the apostle regarded sin, considered as a matter of experience, as consisting of voluntary choices and acts, and that he held directly responsible for these choices and acts only those persons who committed them. The law of the divine judgment in relation to unforgiven sin is, "To every man according to his deeds [*τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*]," (Rom. ii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10). No doctrinal inferences from a more obscure reference of the general sinfulness of the race to the sin of primeval man is warranted by Paul's system, if they be contradictory of this maxim.

With this principle the common interpretation of Eph. ii. 3—"And [we] were by nature children of wrath," etc.—is inconsistent. It is generally understood to affirm that all men are the objects of God's wrath from their very birth by reason of original sin and native depravity. It should be noticed that the first person (*ἡμεῖς*) of verse 3 is the counterpart of the second person (*ὑμεῖς*) in verses 1 and 2. The first two verses picture the state of his Gentile readers previous to their conversion. They were "dead through trespasses and sins;" they "walked according to the course of this world," etc. But Paul will apply no terms to *their* former state which he will not also apply to himself and to his fellow Jewish Christians. Hence he frankly confesses: "Among

whom [that is, "the sons of disobedience," verse 2] we also all once lived in the lusts of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest" (verse 3). We Jewish Christians were "children of wrath" just as the Gentiles were "sons of disobedience," — is the apostle's affirmation.

The terms and context of the passage are unfavorable to the common dogmatic interpretation. The object is to affirm as much of the Jewish Christians, to which class the apostle belonged, as was asserted of the Gentiles. No allusion whatever has been made, in the case of the Gentiles, to original sin; none would have been natural or appropriate, since Paul's object in the whole passage is simply to show that the mercy of God did not stop at the most heinous offences. The terms in which the sinfulness of both classes is described have no suggestion of original or inherited sin, and create a strong presumption against interpretations which find this in the expression rendered "by nature children of wrath." The Gentiles are accused of trespasses and sins and of a certain course of conduct, and to the Jews are attributed the life of carnal lust and the conduct which the desires of the flesh and of the thoughts (*τῶν διανοιῶν*) inspire. Unless the phrase under review is to be wholly severed from its context and treated independently, it must be held to be practically synonymous with the terms descriptive of sinfulness with which it is co-ordinated.

It is further noticeable that the term "by nature" (*φύσει*) receives no special emphasis according to the order of the words in which both the *Textus Receptus* and the modern critical texts agree; namely, *καὶ ἤμεθα* [*ἦμεν*] *τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*. Had the apostle intended the emphasis which doctrinal theology has been wont to place upon these words, — namely, "By our very birth, by the innate depravity which we brought into the world, we are objects of God's wrath," — it is strange that he did not so much as throw *φύσει* into an emphatic position. As it is, however, *φύσει* becomes a defining term, without special emphasis, to the phrase *τέκνα ὀργῆς*, — "wrath-children by nature."

But what is this *φύσις*, in accordance with which sinful men appear as subject to divine wrath? In itself considered, the word can mean either "birth" or "growth;" that is, it may refer primarily to that which is inherited, and innate as such (so in Gal. ii. 15), or to that which is developed by practice and habit, — the unfolding of the native disposition in the voluntary life. When, for example, the Gentiles are spoken of (Rom. ii. 14) as doing *φύσει* the things of the law, it is certainly not meant that they are there thought of as doing them by their very inherited nature. If the meaning which is commonly claimed for *φύσει* in Eph. ii. 3 were applied to Rom. ii. 14, we should have in the latter a proof-text to show that even heathen *naturally* do the divine will. Thus a method of interpretation which derives certain re-

sults from the former passage would, if consistently applied to the second, elicit other doctrinal inferences not so easily adjusted to the system which they are designed to serve.

The precise sense of φύσει remains, then, to be determined by the context and by evidence to be derived from Paul's teaching elsewhere. We have considered the bearing of the context; let us inquire whether the proposition means that the Jews were by and from their very birth τέκνα ὀργῆς. It may well be doubted whether Paul could represent his people as the natural branches (οἱ κατὰ φύσιν κλάδοι, Rom. xi. 21) of the sacred olive-tree of the theocracy, and at the same time by birth children of wrath (φύσει [=κατὰ φύσιν] τέκνα ὀργῆς). In Rom. xi. 16 they are termed holy, as is the root from which they sprang. Again, in ix. 4, he declares that to them belongs the adoption (υἱοθεσία). How would this comport with the common interpretation of our passage? Finally, in Gal. ii. 15, the φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι are contrasted with ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί. That the Jews were as great sinners in fact as the Gentiles is indeed true; but that they are by birth and from the first, objects of God's wrath, is a proposition which cannot easily be reconciled with the apostle's language in other connections. I think it cannot be deemed an uncharitable judgment to affirm that a dogmatic view of original sin and inborn depravity has used the passage (Eph. ii. 3) in isolation from its connection and without critical comparison with other Pauline expressions until its natural force

has become fundamentally perverted.[1] It has, indeed, been common to characterize as "Pelagian" and "rationalistic" any dissent from this interpretation (see, for example, Olshausen *in loco*). But at length the day is drawing to a close when dogmatic and speculative opinion so dominates exegesis that its party-names can be applied even to the processes and results of interpretation, on the assumption that theological opinion should of course settle the meaning of texts. It cannot be said that Meyer is predisposed to "Pelagian" exegesis. No interpreter has more strenuously maintained the absolute predestinationism of Rom. ix., and the necessity of understanding Rom. v. 12 to mean, "All sinned when Adam sinned." But theological inferences — especially such as have no Pauline warrant — are not to be allowed to overbear the force of the context and the statements of the apostle upon the same subject in other connections. I conclude this brief survey of the passage with the paraphrase with which Weiss explains the force of the expression: "Yet the Jews really walk in the lusts of the flesh like the children of disobedience, and are *on that account*, like them, children of wrath (verse 3). But if φύσει is here added, *that involves just the opposite of what they have become* θέσει; that is, on the ground of the covenants of promise (verse 12)."[2]

[1] I especially commend to the reader the discussion of Meyer *in loco*, to which I am largely indebted.

[2] *Bib. Theol.* § 100 *b*.

We cannot, then, on the ground of this passage make sin in the strict sense an inheritance independent of any personal volition or choice ; for even if φύσει be rendered "by nature," it might denote the development by man's own acts of a native tendency or bias, as well as by birth *per se*. In any case, the term cannot be made to exclude the volitional element in sin and thus to afford a basis for the definition that "sin is a nature, and that nature is guilt." That Paul regarded all sin as having a connection with the first transgression, we consider certain. We have seen that in a single instance and for a special purpose in argument, this view led him to identify the sinning of all with that first sin. On this mystical or semi-figurative expression, and upon Eph. ii. 3, interpreted in accord with dogmatic presuppositions, chiefly depend the historic theories of original sin and total depravity, including the ideas of the real identity of all wills with that of Adam, imputed guilt in consequence of his sin, the condemnation of all from the moment of birth, the total natural aversion of mankind to all goodness and their inclination to all evil, the reprobation of men for their part in Adam's transgression, and the eternal punishment of infants. On the latter point human feeling has availed to soften dogmatic rigor, with fatal consequences to the consistency of the scheme as a whole. And all this is attributed to Paul!

The great pervading thought of the apostle concerning sin is that it is a wilful perversion, a wrong direc-

tion and wicked depravation of life. Considered as a principle, he holds that its roots lie deep in human nature. This idea underlies his treatment of human sinfulness; but he gives no theory in regard to the origin and spread of this taint or depravation of human nature, and his language affords no basis for a definition of its relation to conscious, personal transgression. That which stands in the foreground of his thought is the fact of sin as a matter of universal experience and of fatal consequences to mankind. Of this he has a deep and intense feeling, — a conviction which powerfully influences his whole view of redemption. But while the sinful principle dominates in all men, it is un-Pauline to say that no capacity for goodness, or aspiration after it, can exist in the natural man. He still has a certain knowledge of God (Rom. i. 19), a sense of obligation springing from conscience (Rom. i. 20; ii. 14), and under the awakening power of the law may even will to do the right and delight in the divine law after the inward man, — the better self, — though the hindering power of evil prevent the realization of the desire (Rom. vii. 16–23). All views of Paul's doctrine of sin are one-sided or exaggerated which exclude from human nature this possible discernment of the good and the capacity to desire and strive for it. Paul's doctrine of sin is not the whole of his doctrine of human nature. The dominion of sin over man is by no means equivalent to that identification of his will with sin which describes his nature as such to be sin and guilt, — a view

which would make all men as bad as they could be; in short, would describe all men as absolutely diabolical, and that from the very moment of birth.

This chapter may fitly close with the just statements of Neander respecting the Pauline anthropology:

"Paul certainly represents a corruption of human nature as the consequence of the first sin, and admits a supremacy of the sinful principle in the human race, but not in such a manner that the original nature of man as the offspring of God, and created in his image, has been thereby destroyed. Rather he admits the existence in man of two opposing principles, — the predominating sinful principle, and the divine principle, depressed and obscured by the former, yet still more or less manifesting its heavenly origin. Hence he deduces an undeniable consciousness of God and an equally undeniable moral self-consciousness as a radiation from the former. And as he recognizes an original and universal revelation of God to the human consciousness, so also he acknowledges in human nature a constitution adapted to receive it; as there is a self-testimony of God, in whom the spirit of man lives, moves, and exists, so also there is an original susceptibility in human nature corresponding to that testimony. The whole creation as a revelation of God, especially of his almightiness and goodness, is designed to arouse the spirit of man to a perception of this inward revelation of God." [1]

[1] *Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, Bohn ed. i. 428, 429; Am. ed. pp. 392, 393.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAW

By the term "the law" (ὁ νόμος) Paul generally means the Mosaic system. When νόμος has the article, the reference is to the Mosaic law specifically; where the article is omitted, he still refers to that law, but contemplates it more generically, as the expression of the divine will.[1] This distinction may be easily tested by reference to the second chapter of Romans. In that chapter the apostle is comparing the Jews, who have a system of positive enactments (νόμος), with the Gentiles, who have not. The use of νόμος is ordinarily generic. "As many as sinned in [the possession of] law [ἐν νόμῳ] shall be judged by law [διὰ νόμου]; for not hearers of law [νόμου] are just with God, but the doers of law [νόμου] shall

[1] "The article is usually wanting in places where stress is laid, not upon its historical impress and outward form, but upon the conception itself; not upon *the law* which God gave, but upon *law as given by God*, and as therefore the only one that is or can be. Νόμος, that which law is, — namely, God's ordainment, the expression of the will of God, — has but one historical embodiment; namely, ὁ νόμος; genus and species coincide" (Cremer, *Bib. Theol. Lex. of N. T. Greek, sub voce*).

be justified. For when Gentiles who do not have law [*μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα*] do by nature the requirements of the law [*τὰ τοῦ νόμου*], these not having law [*νόμον*], are a law [*νόμος*] unto themselves, who show the work of the law [*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*] written on their hearts" etc. (Rom. ii. 12–15). It will be noticed that in all cases where the Mosaic system is contemplated in a general way in contrast to the mere light of nature which the Gentiles have, *νόμος* is used without the article; where, however, that system is specifically referred to, as in speaking of the requirements or the work of the law, the ethical demands which the Mosaic law made, the article is used. It thus becomes evident that the view sometimes held, that *ὁ νόμος* denotes the Mosaic law, and *νόμος* moral or divine law in general, is not strictly correct.[1] Both terms refer to the Mosaic law in the apostle's ordinary usage, but with the difference between a specific and a generic reference. No difference in kind exists between *ὁ νόμος* and *νόμος*, but at most a difference in emphasis; a difference in form of thought, not in substance or content. The Mosaic law is for Paul the embodiment of the divine law in general; that by *νόμος* he should denote anything different from that law would be quite contrary to his view of its nature and purpose.

A few additional illustrations of the position here defined may be given: Gal. iii. 23, 24, "We were kept in ward under law [*ὑπὸ νόμον*]," — the Mosaic

[1] See, for example, Holsten, *Jahrbücher für prot. Theol.* 1879.

law certainly, but generically considered, — "shut up unto the faith which should be revealed. So that the law [ὁ νόμος] became our schoolmaster," etc. Of the substantial identity of νόμος and ὁ νόμος here there can be no reasonable question. In Rom. ii. 23–27 the two expressions constantly alternate: "Thou who gloriest in [the possession of] law [ἐν νόμῳ], dost thou dishonor God by the transgression of the law [τοῦ νόμου]?" Throughout the whole passage the distinction of emphasis which we have made is clearly traceable, νόμος being used with general, ὁ νόμος with specific terms, while the identity of content in the two expressions is unquestionable. It is noticeable in this connection that νόμος never has the article when the noun on which it is dependent in the genitive is without the article. Hence we always read ἔργα νόμου, "law-works." We do not find Paul saying that men cannot be justified ἐξ ἔργων τοῦ νόμου, — that is, by fulfilling the demands of the Mosaic system specifically, — but ἐξ ἔργων νόμου; that is, by deeds of legal obedience. The Mosaic law is as certainly meant as if he had written the former phrase, but it is thought of as the type and summation of divine law in general, and the principle, ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ (Rom. iii. 20), thus acquires a wider sweep and more universal significance.

Such is Paul's characteristic use of νόμος and ὁ νόμος in his discussion of the subject of justification and the handling of the relation of the Mosaic system

to Christianity. But these definitions by no means exhaust the Pauline usage of *νόμος*. Instances like *ὁ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ* (Rom. vii. 22, viii. 7) — a general expression for the content of the Mosaic law — and *ὁ νόμος*, in Gal. iv. 21 and 1 Cor. xiv. 24, where the term denotes the law considered as a book, the Thorah, are not so much exceptions to the general usage as variations in the formal conception. A real departure from ordinary usage is found, however, in those passages (Rom. iii. 19; 1 Cor. xiv. 21) where *ὁ νόμος* appears as a name for the Old Testament as a whole. This use of the term by synecdoche probably had its ground in the popular Jewish view of the law as the pre-eminent revelation of the divine will, and was no doubt sanctioned by the ordinary modes of speech. The paramount authority which the Pharisees assigned to the law would easily explain this form of expression, especially since the legal *spirit* in religion which was so characteristic of this sect would naturally invest the whole Old Testament literature with kindred associations.

The passages in which Paul considers that natural analogue to the Mosaic law which the Gentiles possess in their consciences, and where he speaks of their having the work of the law (*τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*) written on their hearts (Rom. ii. 14), and even supposes the case of their keeping the righteous requirements of the law (*τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου*, ii. 26), have sometimes been referred to as examples of a special usage. They are so considered by Grafe, who says that in these

instances "Paul applies the term [*νόμος*] in a wider signification to the natural moral consciousness of the heathen."[1] This view appears to me incorrect. In both these passages, *ὁ νόμος* is the Mosaic law and nothing else. The point of the apostle is that not outward possession of the law, but inward obedience avails with God. Now, if the Gentiles do that which corresponds to the moral requirements of the Mosaic system (*ὁ νόμος*), even though they do not possess that system, they would surpass the Jews themselves in the approval of God, since they (the Jews), though possessors and hearers of the law, are not doers of it. Paul does not apply the term "law" to the "natural moral consciousness of the heathen," but only supposes the case of their doing better than the Jews the requirements of the Mosaic law by the mere guidance of that natural moral consciousness.

A group of passages remains which forms an exception to the prevailing and characteristic usage which has been defined. Paul sometimes used the word "law" as a formal term denoting a principle, force, or order of working. The context and the defining clauses employed render clear his meaning in these passages, and prevent confusion. In Gal. vi. 2, where he exhorts his readers to bear one another's burdens and so to fulfil "the law of Christ" (*ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ*), his meaning evidently is that the principle which Christ commanded and illustrated in his life requires his disciples to share the cares and troubles of others.

[1] *Die paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz*, p. 3.

In Romans are found many similar examples: "Where, then, is boasting? It has been excluded. By what law [or principle]? Of works? No, but by a law of faith [διὰ νόμου πίστεως]" (Rom. iii. 27). In this general sense of the word there is a νόμος πίστεως, — a principle or order of faith, as opposed to that of works. The most striking example of this usage is found in the description of the conflict between the better self, the "inner man," and sin in Rom. vii. 7 *sq.*, especially in verse 23: "But I find another law [ἕτερον νόμον] in my members warring against the law of my mind [τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός] and making me captive to the law of sin [ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας] which is in my members." This "other law," or "law of sin," is the binding power of evil, the reign of sin which has established itself in the flesh, and which antagonizes the "law of God" (νόμῳ θεοῦ, verse 25) to which the desires consent, and with which the "law of the mind," the order and authority of reason and judgment, is in harmony.

With this general account of the apostle's use of the term "law," we may, for our present purpose, return to his prevailing application of it to the Mosaic system, and inquire more particularly into his view of its nature and purpose.

Paul designates by "the law" the whole Mosaic code. His teaching respecting the law, therefore, applies to the Mosaic legislation as a whole. The division of the law into moral and ceremonial portions is not made in Paul's writings, and is a modern

classification. The view which Holsten maintains, that the ritual portions of the system did not, according to Paul, belong to the substance of the law, is destitute of all evidence, and wholly improbable in itself. In sketching the Jewish mode of life, he refers, in Gal. iv. 10, to the observance of "months and seasons and years," and in Rom. ix. 4, ascribes to Israel as one of its distinguishing possessions the ceremonial cultus (ἡ λατρεία). It is almost inconceivable that if he had made this distinction in thinking of the law, he should not have used it in his controversy with the Judaizing Christians, against whose positions it could have been turned to good account. Hence he who insists upon continuing under the law rather than under the gracious system of the gospel (*cf.* Rom. vi. 14), thereby binds himself to obey the law as a whole (Gal. v. 3), since the distinctive principle of the law is, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law, to do them" (Gal. iii. 10).

The bearing of this point upon the fulfilment of the law in the gospel is important. It necessitates the view that upon the apostle's principles the law as a whole is done away in Christianity. The common opinion that the ritual portions of the system were abrogated and the ethical portions were left unaffected by the gospel cannot be harmonized with Paul's statements on the subject. All parts of the law were fulfilled in the same sense; their ideal and permanent

contents of truth were developed, applied, and enforced. All parts of it were done away in the same sense; their provisional and imperfect elements, whether ritual, ethical, or civil, fell into abeyance in that progressive course of divine revelation which culminated in the teaching and work of Christ. Paul's conception of the law as a unit did not, of course, preclude his emphasizing, according to his purpose, certain elements or phases of the law which we properly distinguish from others, as when, in Rom. ii. 14, 26, he supposes a doing of the law by heathen, or in Gal. v. 14, and Rom. xiii. 9, 10, he declares love to be the fulfilling of the law. In these cases he must have been thinking of the law in its ethical requirements,— perhaps, in the first instance, distinctively of the Decalogue.

Paul teaches that the law was divine in its origin, and in its nature "holy and righteous and good" (Rom. vii. 12). It was "ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator" (Gal. iii. 19), and is "spiritual" (πνευματικός, Rom. vii. 14). In his argument to show how the law quickens the consciousness of sin, he is careful to guard against the view that this fact is due to any moral defect in the law itself. "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid" (Rom. vii. 7). In urging the contrast between the principles and effects of the legal system and those of the gracious system of promise, he maintains that there is no conflict between them. "Is the law then against the promises of God? God forbid" (Gal.

iii. 21). The true relation of the law to the gospel is that of a subordinate position and preparatory office. The two come into collision only when this position and office of the law are misunderstood, and the law is regarded as a means of salvation, which in itself it never was and never can be. The underlying principles of the gospel — grace, faith, and promise (Gal. iii. 6–9; Rom. iv. 13–17) — antedate the law, and have from the first been operative in salvation. The law was a subsequent dispensation, coming in four hundred and thirty years after the gracious covenant with Abraham which he accepted in faith. This primitive gospel, which is identical in principle with the Christian gospel, the later and supplemental system can by no means "disannul, so as to make the promise of none effect" (Gal. iii. 17). It cannot itself become a means of reconciliation with God, but remains subordinate to that primal and unchanged order of salvation whose source is grace and whose condition is faith. The law was designed to emphasize the need of gracious forgiveness, and to impel men to seek it through Christ. Accordingly it was added (*προσετέθη*, Gal. iii. 19; *cf.* Rom. v. 20) to the dispensation of grace and promise as auxiliary to it, in the development of the kingdom of God.

A careful reading of Romans and Galatians discloses a considerable difference of tone in the references to the law in the two epistles. In the latter there is an apparent disparagement of the law which is wholly wanting in the former. Paul describes the

condition of the Jewish Christians before their conversion as a state of "bondage under the rudiments of the world" (*τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, Gal. iv. 3), and their present disposition to return to the observance of the law as a turning back again to "the weak and beggarly rudiments" (*τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα*, Gal. iv. 9). It cannot be denied that in these expressions he treats the law as representing an elementary stage of religion, and those who still adhered to it as holding to a system which was weak and poor in comparison with Christianity.

The difference to which we have alluded, however, finds a sufficient explanation in the differing occasion and purpose of the two letters. In the Galatian epistle Paul was compelled to defend the validity of his apostleship and the truth of his teaching against fanatical Judaizers who insisted that Christians must become Jews. The letter is therefore intensely polemic. He must argue against adherence to the law in the way in which it was advocated by these opponents. "If ye receive circumcision," he said, "Christ will profit you nothing" (Gal. v. 2),—an expression which seems to imply an absolute incompatibility between circumcision and Christianity. It must be remembered, however, that the opponents who urged the necessity of circumcision advocated it as an essential condition of salvation. It was not against circumcision *as such* that Paul waged his polemic, but against it when put forth as a rival or co-ordinate condition of salvation with faith in Christ. That he

made no objection to circumcision in itself is evident not only from the fact that he consented to the circumcision of Timothy (Acts xvi. 3), but from his language in other connections (Rom. ii. 25), and from the assertion in this epistle that "neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. vi. 15). There cannot be two ways of salvation. If faith in Christ is the true way, then circumcision and deeds of obedience to the law are excluded. Against those who insist upon this legal observance as necessary, the apostle must urge with all strenuousness that they, in so doing, fall down upon a lower plane and return to a comparatively rudimentary stage of revelation, making its requirements equal or superior to those which have been revealed in God's fullest manifestation of his will in Christ. Among the Romans, on the contrary, these extreme Judaizing tendencies did not exist. They were indeed liable to misapprehend the relation of the law to the gospel; and the apostle in his epistle to them entered at length into the discussion of the subject, but rather for the purpose of edification and instruction than for the refutation of zealous and dangerous fanatics who from mistaken reverence for the law were perverting the central principles of the gospel. In discussing this different tone of the two epistles in the treatment of the law, Grafe justly remarks: —

"We can understand such differences only when we recognize and appreciate the fact that Paul is not, as he

is often so urgently asserted to be, the abstract logician and severe systemizer who develops all his statements with strict consequence out of a ready-made and fixed theory. No! In all his action, thinking, and writing, Paul, like every forcible religious personality, is, first of all, intensely interested in the matter which he presents. His heart wishes to win the opponent, to bring him over to his own position by every means at his command." [1]

Paul's doctrine of the law is developed from a purely Christological point of view. His aim is to show how it prepared the way for Christ by deepening the sense of sin and sharpening the desire for salvation. The historic purpose of the law, to check transgressions and secure an upright life, he nowhere dwells upon. It cannot, however, be said that he does not incidentally recognize it. For example, in Rom. vii. 10, he refers to "the commandment which was unto life" (*ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωήν*); that is, which was ordained unto or aimed at securing life. In Rom. viii. 3, 4, he shows that what the law could not do, God accomplished by sending his Son, in order that "the ordinance of the law [*τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*] might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit." The ordinance, or righteous requirement of the law, is that just action which the law contemplates and seeks to secure, although, for reasons to be separately considered, it was not able to secure it. The law, then, in the apostle's view, had as one of its aims to enforce upon

[1] *Die paul. Lehre vom Gesetz*, pp. 22, 23.

human life the righteous demands which it proclaimed. This is further recognized in 1 Tim. i. 9: "Knowing this, that law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and unruly, for the ungodly and sinners," etc. Here the statement is general, *νόμος* not having the article; but the Mosaic system is, most probably, the typical case in mind, and is certainly included in the statement made regarding the purpose of law to restrain from evil and incite to righteousness.

It will be seen that Paul makes allusion only incidentally to the ordinary object of the law which the Jews recognized. He nowhere dwells upon it at length or treats it as important. This commonly recognized aim of the law has become in his mind wholly subordinate to another, in which it stands more closely related to the work of Christ; that aim is to rouse sin into action as conscious transgression, and thus to show men their helplessness and need of gracious forgiveness through Christ. This idea Paul had evidently developed in connection with his own experience. We must seek its genesis in that conflict which he has portrayed in Rom. vii. 7 *sq.*, — the passage in which he has most fully described this negative and preparatory office of the law. There was a time, he says, when he dwelt in a sense of safety and repose; his conscience was quiet and peaceful, but it was because the sense of sin was inactive and dormant. He was relatively unconscious of evil desires; his mind rested in false security. This was not because

sin was absent, but because it was "dead." The moral stupor in which he was living made him insensible to the powers of evil that slept within him, and which needed only an occasion to exert themselves with unsuspected energy. That occasion came when the law confronted him with its demands. He then saw himself in it as in a mirror. It aroused him to a sense of his real situation; it awakened the sleeping power of sin within him; it disclosed to him his moral impotence. He now became conscious of his sinfulness as he had never been before; and that sin which dwelt within him was excited to new energy of action by the law, which opposed and rebuked it. The result was an increasing conflict between the reason, or moral judgment, which recognized the law's demands as right, and the dominating impulses of evil within him, which perpetually led him into captivity to sin and seemed to cut off all hope of victory for the better desires. What purpose did the law serve in this experience? It did not conduct him to peace; it could do nothing but intensify the power of sin and deepen his sense of it. It could not justify; it could not save. Rather "the commandment which was unto life," which in its ideal purpose was designed to conduct to life, and which in itself was fitted to attain that end, was, in actual fact, in his experience "found to be unto death" (Rom. vii. 10); that is, it pronounced the death-sentence upon him, because it disclosed to him his sinfulness and condemned it, but could afford him no deliverance from the power and guilt of his sin.

Hence Paul concludes that the chief purpose and use of the law, after all, is to show men their sinfulness and thus to drive them to Christ. It was his own experience of dissatisfaction and unrest of soul as a Pharisee which formed the basis of his characteristic doctrine that the law was given to make transgressions abound, in order that men might be led by a consciousness of sin and a sense of their inability to overcome it, to resort to the grace of God in Christ through which alone they could find deliverance. It was the hopelessness of success in the effort to attain peace by deeds of legal obedience, which he had himself experienced, that led Paul to deny that such peace was attainable by the legal method. If, then, it was not thus attainable, and the law had power only to deepen the consciousness of sin and intensify its energy, it became evident to Paul that this was the chief purpose of the law, and that its purpose to secure righteousness was rather to be regarded as its remote aim, which, in actual fact, could be realized only through the gospel. Its first object was to shut men up in ward until the deliverer Christ should set them free, and thus through him the ordinance of the law should be fulfilled in those who live under the power of the Spirit. Thus to Paul the immediate aim of the law is seen in this negative and preparatory office of revealing to men their sins; and its historic and ideal end is attained only when the law has driven men to Christ, and the true righteousness which the law contemplates is secured in the Christian life of

the Spirit. Before proceeding further, it is necessary more precisely to define this characteristic teaching of Paul regarding the relation of the law to sin.

This peculiar doctrine meets us only in the Epistles to the Galatians and the Romans. In addition to the elaboration of it in connection with his experience under the law in Rom. vii. 7 *sq.*, — an exposition which may be called his psychological argument, — he has developed this view in a historical manner by appeal to the case of Abraham. In Rom. iv. and Gal. iii. he shows that Abraham was justified by faith, not by works. He received the gracious covenant of promise before he received the covenant of circumcision (Rom. iv. 10–13). He was justified under the gracious dispensation long before the law came into existence (Gal. iii. 17, 18). It is certain, therefore, that the law was not necessary to secure justification, and could never have been intended to secure it; it must have had another purpose. "It was added because of transgressions [*τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*] till the seed should come," etc. (Gal. iii. 19); that is, its purpose was not to justify from sin, which it never did or could do, but to develop the consciousness of sin, intensify its power in the conscience, make men aware of their condemnation and guilt on account of it, and so to lead them to Christ for gracious forgiveness. The law thus plays the part of a tutor who puts men under severe discipline in preparing them for the freedom which awaits them when they shall enter by faith into relation to Christ (Gal. iii. 24).

So far, then, from the law being a means of justification, it is almost the opposite, since "through the law cometh the knowledge of sin" (Rom. iii. 20); so far from being able to deliver from sin, it rather increases its power and welds its fetters closer upon mankind. It condemns instead of delivering; and its direct purpose was to condemn, that through the sense of guilt the sinner might be guided to Christ for deliverance. Hence "the law came in beside" (that is, beside the *sin* which was working and spreading in the world), "that the trespass might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly" (Rom. v. 20). Thus the apostle draws from the typical case of Abraham's justification, apart from the law-system, the same conclusion to which his experience of the futility of seeking justification by the law had led him; namely, that the law was never intended for that purpose, except so far as by developing the power of sin, it indirectly leads men to Christ, who does for men "what the law could not do" (*τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου*, Rom. viii. 3).

The same conviction is forced upon the apostle's mind from another point of view. The incompatibility of the idea of meritorious salvation by legal obedience and the idea of gracious justification by faith compels a choice between these two principles. In connection with the demonstration from the Old Testament that the law never has justified men, there is added the consideration that such a legal justification, if conceived to be possible, would exclude and

nullify the most characteristic truth of the gospel that salvation is of grace, and has been effected for men by the death of Christ, whose benefits are appropriated by an act of trust. "If there had been a law given which could make alive, verily righteousness would have been of the law" (Gal. iii. 21). There would have been no gospel-system if justification by the law had been possible. The very existence of the gospel, therefore, proves that the law was not intended to justify, but must have had some other object. "If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for naught" (Gal. ii. 21), but the supposition that Christ should die for naught is absurd; hence the law was not intended to secure righteousness to men, but to increase sin.

In what sense did the apostle hold that it was the purpose and effect of the law to increase sin? Was it to increase sin merely in men's consciousness of it, — to increase it subjectively? He certainly teaches this: "Through the law cometh the *knowledge* of sin;" "I had not *known* sin except through the law;" "Apart from the law sin is dead;" "But sin that it might be *shown to be sin* by working death to me through that which is good [the law]; that through the commandment sin *might become exceeding sinful*" (Rom. iii. 20; vii. 7, 8, 13). But does the law also increase sin actually and objectively? To this it must be answered that in Paul's view the law calls out and develops sin into unwonted strength by arousing sinful desires which were before latent in

men, and thus sharpening the opposition between indwelling sin and the law's righteous demands. The ἁμαρτία, which is often latent or "dead," is roused into activity and intensity, and in that sense increased; it is developed into open opposition, and is brought out into actual transgression. "Where there is no law, neither is there transgression [παράβασις]," (Rom. iv. 15); without law there is ἁμαρτία, but not παράβασις. The law does not increase sin, considered as an indwelling principle, but it increases it in its manifestation, in its activity and expression as transgression. Sin (ἁμαρτία) wrought in him, he says, through the operation of the commandment, all manner of coveting (Rom. vii. 8); "when the commandment came, sin revived," awakened into new energy and activity. This actual effect of the law in increasing the expression of sin in transgression, Paul declares to be the very purpose of the system: "The law came in alongside [of the power of ἁμαρτία] that the trespass might abound [ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα]," (Rom. v. 20). The purpose of the law was not that ἁμαρτία as a principle and pervading power might be increased in the world, but that it might be brought out in the character of παράβασις, and its latent and deadly power thus shown; that the παράπτωμα — the open transgression of law — might reveal the depth and danger of the sinful principle of which it was the expression, in order that men might be led to seek deliverance from its power by the grace of Christ. The apostle's view is that the law,

by creating a reaction in the sinful mind against itself, intensifies the power of sin and increases its manifestation both in the consciousness and in actual transgression. If by sin, then, is meant transgression of law in outward act, the law increases sin; but it cannot be shown that Paul considers the law to have had the purpose or effect of adding to the inherent energy of the sinful principle which pervades human nature and is the root of sinful actions.

The next inquiry is: On what ground does he affirm the inability of the law to justify, and why does he feel himself required to find some other purpose of its existence than that of saving men? Neander answers this question by saying that man is incompetent to perform the ἔργα νόμου in their ideal sense and content, and that these works, considered empirically, do not represent a morality adequate to meet the divine requirements, but rather "bear the impress of mere legality in opposition to true piety and morality."[1] There would thus be a double reason why the law cannot justify. The power of sin absolutely precludes a perfect obedience; and even such obedience as is rendered is wanting in moral value, because in the unrenewed man it does not spring from the right motives and disposition. Neander is careful to add, in the same connection, that the law's inability to justify is not due to ethical defects in the law itself considered as a system of morals. "The single commandment of love, which

[1] *Planting and Training*, Bohn ed. i. 419; Am. ed. p. 385.

stands at the head of the νόμος (Rom. xiii. 9), contains in fact everything essential to moral perfection; and whoever fulfilled this would be righteous." It is certainly true that Paul denies to the law as an outward, prescriptive authority the power to give life (2 Cor. iii. 6) or confer the ability to keep its commands. The law is indeed perfect in its own nature and purpose, but these do not include the ability to impart new life or secure righteousness. In the statement of his "empirical" reason for the failure of man to be justified by law, Neander appears to have advanced beyond Paul's point of view. It is no doubt true that man's sinfulness renders imperfect such works of obedience as he may do; but these works, so far as they go, are not thought of by the apostle as morally worthless, but rather as insufficient. In Phil. iii. 6, to which Neander refers, Paul states that he was regarded as "blameless" in legal obedience by his Pharisaic associates rather than that he really was so, and yet as a Christian he afterward saw all his obedience to have been morally valueless. It is certainly the impossibility of an adequate obedience to the law rather than any inherent imperfection of such obedience as is rendered which, to the apostle's mind, makes futile the hope of justification by legal works. Neander's two reasons seem easily reducible to one. Usteri maintains that the Mosaic system represented legality rather than morality, and hence could not justify: "In the express denial that righteousness before God could be attained by the method of legal obedience

lies a denial and renunciation of legal Judaism as a whole, the assertion of its inadequacy and the demand for a higher stage of morality than that which the law represented."[1]

It is important clearly to understand that there is no incompetency on the part of the law to justify, resulting from defects inhering in the law itself as a rule of life. There is therefore no reason, except such as exists in man himself, why he may not be saved by the law. So far from this, Paul distinctly maintains that the law would justify those who should perfectly obey it. "He that doeth them shall live in them" (Gal. iii. 12) is the principle which applies; and the impossibility of success on this principle does not lie in the inadequacy or incompetency of the law, but in the inability of men perfectly to obey it. "Moses writeth that the man that doeth the righteousness which is of the law shall live thereby" (Rom. x. 5). Paul quotes these passages to remind his readers that only "the doers of a law shall be justified" (Rom. ii. 13), in order that they may clearly understand how rigorous are the terms on which justification by merit is to be obtained, and how fruitless will be the effort, since nothing less than a complete obedience will avail. But such an obedience would avail, and therefore there can be no defect in the law which makes it unable to justify; the defect which makes failure certain is solely in man himself. This is made clear by Rom. viii. 3: "For what the

[1] *Paulin. Lehrbegriff*, p. 52.

law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh [ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός], God, sending his own son," etc., accomplished. The "flesh" here is not a name for the weakness of the law itself, but denotes the sinful element in man which, as was shown in chapter vii. 7 *sq.*, prevents the law, which was ideally "unto life," from having the effect to secure life, and occasions the development of sin in man instead. The flesh, which is, strictly speaking, the seat of sin in man, and thus becomes identified with sin, reacts against the law, and renders it powerless to attain the end which it was primarily designed to secure. The attainment of this aim, however, is rendered impracticable merely by human sinfulness, whose universality and power render justification by means of the law, as matter of fact, impossible. It is not correct, therefore, to say that the law is incompetent to justify; the Pauline doctrine is that man is incompetent to fulfil the condition of perfect obedience, and that on this account the way by the law is shut, and that by gracious forgiveness upon condition of faith alone remains open.

It is maintained by some[1] that Paul's doctrine of the law in its relation to sin stands in contradiction with the historic purpose of the system which the Jews universally recognized; namely, to restrain transgression and incite to righteous conduct. It is affirmed that the law itself never recognized the aim, which Paul attributes to it, of multiplying transgressions,

[1] For example, Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 106 *sq.*; Eng. tr. i. 86.

and that the purely negative function which he assigns to the law is without any basis in the Old Testament itself. These propositions are in part incontrovertible. It is certain that Paul has developed a *new* doctrine of the purpose of the law from his now accepted principle that faith in Christ is the only true and effective principle of salvation. It is this new point of view concerning Christ which, in connection with Paul's experience under the law, furnished the occasion for his new definition of the law's purpose. It is a part of the apostle's development of the principles of grace and faith as applied to salvation. Finding the law powerless to save or to give peace, on account of the dominion of sin which the law served to intensify rather than overthrow, and adopting the principle of a gracious, as opposed to a merited, salvation offered through Christ, the problem would be necessarily forced upon his mind, "What purpose, then, does the law serve?" Since it does not justify, it can therefore never have been expected or intended to justify. What, then, is its object? In reply he elaborated the doctrine of its relation to sin which we have traced.

Paul's view of this subject is only an element in his new view of Christ. Since Christ is the "end of the law" (τέλος νόμου, Rom. x. 4), — that is, since he puts an end to its validity and fulfils it in himself, — its purposes must have terminated upon him and have been in some way subordinate to the truths and principles of his gracious salvation. It is a difficult ques-

tion, which conviction took logical precedence in the mind of Paul, — the conviction of the law's inability to justify on account of human sinfulness, or the conviction of Christ's work as the sole ground of justification, from which the other conviction would flow as an inference. Holsten and Pfleiderer have elaborately developed the latter opinion. It may perhaps be a vain attempt to define the relations of the two ideas, which are involved in each other. One point, however, is clear; namely, that the development of Paul's view concerning the law had its primal motive in his personal experience, which he has described in Rom. vii. 7 *sq.*, although it could have been fully wrought out only by reflection upon the idea of an unmerited acceptance that formed the positive counterpart to those convictions of failure and hopelessness which he had developed in his efforts at legal obedience. In the unfolding of the doctrine we have, no doubt, these two co-operating factors, — the experience of the futility of seeking justification on grounds of legal merit, culminating in the despairing exclamation, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me?" and the assured certainty that the law could not justify, which flowed from the conviction, so clear to Paul since his conversion, that in Christ was the only ground of hope, and that the law had its deepest meaning and truest use as a means of leading men to him. I therefore regard Paul's experience under the law as furnishing the starting-point for his view of it, although that experience alone could never

have led him to its full development. It was only when Christ was accepted as a Saviour that the whole problem of the law's purpose grew clear to his mind, and the difficulties and perplexities which he had felt, as a Pharisee, were both understood and relieved. The genesis of his doctrine of the law is accordingly to be explained, not from a single fact or principle, — as, for example, from his doctrine of the cross, — but from that complex and progressive experience which, in connection with reflection, enabled him to develop step by step his whole system of doctrine. His dissatisfaction with himself and his sense of failure as a Pharisee would never of itself have led him to the view which he has elaborated, but it remains the logical starting-point from which his mind takes its departure from the common view; and when once the crisis comes, and Christ is seen as Redeemer, the full development of the law's relation to him is a necessity of reflection for which his life under the law had already prepared the way.

The doctrine thus has its ground both in this experience and in the acceptance of Jesus as a Saviour; that is, in the total spiritual history of the apostle, in the organic development of his moral life, and in the essential relations between his pre-Christian experience and his reflection upon Christian salvation as accepted by him. His opinions cannot be fairly estimated or rightly understood except in the light of those varied, yet related, experiences and reflections which give unity and continuity to his life. Hence

the necessity which we have urged (chap. i.) of finding in his moral career and condition as a Pharisee a point of connection for his Christian teaching, and of avoiding that complete sundering of his life after his conversion from his pre-Christian moral history, — a portion of his career whose experiences must have affected his theology as profoundly as the experience of Augustine before his conversion affected the system which he subsequently developed.[1]

How may we suppose that Paul regarded his peculiar doctrine of the law in its relation to the common view of its aim, which, as we have seen, he himself also incidentally recognizes? He has furnished us no materials for a definite answer to this question. He does not bring the two views of the law into comparison, or in any way consider them in their relations. He betrays no consciousness of contradiction between them, and no sense of any difficulty arising from the affirmation of both. It is possible that Paul did not

[1] The general view here taken is sanctioned by Grafe in his essay already cited, although it is only briefly touched upon in these words (following an allusion to Holsten's opinion that Paul's view of the law is an inference from his doctrine of the cross): "Wie glauben vielmehr, dass auch ein praktischer Grund für den Apostel mitbestimmend gewesen ist, der einerseits ihm seine logischen Schlüsse, die er an den Tod Christi knüpfte, nahe legte, anderseits seine eigenthümliche Lehre von dem Verhältnisse des Gesetzes zur *σάρξ*, wesentlich beeinflusste. Diesen praktischen Grund erblicken wir in der vom Apostel unter schwersten inneren Kämpfen errungenen Erfahrung von der Unmöglichkeit, durch Gesetzeswerke Gerechtigkeit und Frieden mit Gott zu erlangen." *Die paulin. Lehre v. Gesetz*, p. 11.

reflect upon their adjustment, but, in accord with his changed view of the law, defined its aim to be the quickening and intensifying of sin, without considering whether this doctrine could be harmonized with the idea that the purpose of the law was to restrain men from sin, to check transgressions, and thus to aid in securing righteousness of life, — the idea of the law's purpose which was central and controlling in the Old Testament and in Jewish religious thought. But if we consider the tendencies of Paul's mind to systematic thought, the great prominence which his new doctrine of the law assumes, and the fulness with which it is set forth, it is not easy to see how the problem of the relation of those two aims of the law, so evidently different and even apparently inconsistent, could have escaped his attention. How, then, can he have supposed that the statement that the law, if kept, would justify and save, and the proposition that the law was not given to save, but to deepen the knowledge of sin and to intensify its power, could both be maintained or made to agree together? Can they, on Pauline principles, be harmonized with each other?

The problem can only be solved by the recognition of Paul's principle that the gospel — that is, the gracious promise of God implying faith as the condition of its acceptance and fulfilment — antedated and underlay the legal system. The law, in its strict sense, was to Paul but a part of God's ancient dispensation, and not its most essential and enduring part. There was

a gospel before the law, which continued operative during the period over which the legal system held sway. Now while, abstractly considered, complete obedience to the law's requirements would entitle one to salvation, yet, in concrete fact, no person has been or can be saved thus, because of the power of sin in all men. Practically, then, the law cannot save, though this fact results from no fault of its own (Gal. iii. 21; Rom. viii. 3). All, therefore, who have been saved in Old Testament times, as well as since, have been saved by grace, as was Abraham; and the law may be left out of the account in considering the direct, practicable means of salvation. Hence Paul both agrees with the common view regarding the law and differs from it. He agrees with it so far as to impute no moral defect to the law and to maintain the abstract possibility of salvation by it, if perfect obedience is rendered; but he differs radically from the common view on the question of fact, whether such obedience ever is or can be rendered. The radical difference of Paul's from the common Jewish view is not in respect to the law as a perfect standard and rule of life, but in respect to man's capacity to keep it. He differed also, no doubt, in respect to the scope of its requirements. To Paul obedience, in order to avail for salvation, must be complete. His deeper moral nature and more scrupulous conscience enabled him to see that no obedience met the requirement of God which did not extend to the whole scope of the law's demands and fulfil its highest obligations.

His keen perception of the loftiness of these demands, combined with his intense sense of human sinfulness, convinced him that this was in no case possible.

What, then, is the conclusion? The law cannot have been meant to accomplish what it never does and never can do. It could not therefore have been intended to be a means of justification; but this fact in no way precludes its usefulness in warning men against the consequences of sin and in operating as a check against evil actions. But even while it did this, it might at the same time be quickening the consciousness of sin within the man and bringing his real sinfulness to light. The law might intensify sin in one sense, even while restraining it in another. The law's restraining power operates in the sphere of action; its function of increasing sin is exercised in the inner sphere of conscience. The law forbidding adultery may prevent the commission of the overt act, while at the same time it provokes inward opposition to itself and makes sinful desire not only more plainly felt, but in fact more intense. Thus Paul's incidental allusions to the common view of the law as given to check sin belong to a different sphere of reflection and of action from that under contemplation when he depicts the office of the law in arousing the power of sin in the heart and conscience. A part of the answer to our problem is therefore to be found in the real difference between Paul's opinion and the common view respecting the practicability of justification by law.

Another aid to the solution of the question, also connected with his doctrine of the primal gospel of grace and faith, will appear if we raise the inquiry, Does the law, then, which was ordained unto life, and was intended to secure life (ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωήν, Rom. vii. 10), fail to attain this end, because its direct effect was to condemn rather than to save? The answer is that, according to Paul's view, the law secures the end for which it was originally given indirectly or mediately, by shutting men up under sin until they accept a gracious deliverance. Paul found this commandment, which was ordained to secure life, to be unto him a minister of death; but it was, in turn, through this "death" which he incurred through the operation of the law, that the law became instrumental in finally securing life for him. The law put him to death ethically — pronounced upon his proud strivings the merciless death-sentence — that he might see his hopelessness, and resorting to God for needed mercy, be quickened with a new life in Christ. Until the law came to him on this severe mission he was alive (Rom. vii. 9) in proud security and confidence, but the law extinguished this haughty spirit, not of its own action and motion, but by setting into operation the power of indwelling sin (verse 13); he sank under the crushing power of his sin and the law's condemnation of it, until he at length found deliverance and life through Jesus Christ. It is clearly the apostle's view that the only way in which the law is effective toward securing life is in so exhibiting to

men their sinfulness and the peril and hopelessness which it involves that they will be constrained to seek a gracious salvation. Thus the law may be said to conduct to life indirectly, because it is one agency by which men are taught their need of Christ and led to seek his aid.

It thus appears that the Jewish historical view of the law and Paul's conception of its Christological aim would be adjusted, upon Paul's principles, by saying that while both he and they recognize the adequacy of the law as a guide to life and duty, he denies, while they assume, the actual possibility that men should be saved by works of obedience to it; or, stated in other terms, he declares that the power of sin in men is so strong that they are unable to conform their lives completely to the law's requirements, and without such conformity they cannot be saved by obedience. This view does not, however, exclude the usefulness of the law in deterring men from evil actions by its threats of penalty. So far as Paul admits the truth of the common view of the law, — and to the general proposition that it had life for its aim he consents, — the peculiarity of his view is that it attains its end in a way quite different from that commonly supposed. It secures life not immediately and by obedience to itself, — which has been shown to be impossible, — but indirectly by conducting sinful men to Christ. The law leads to life, but it does so through that moral "death" by which self-righteousness is slain and the sinner is brought in helpless-

ness and self-surrender to the feet of the life-giving Christ.

The principles of Paul would necessitate the view that to make transgressions abound has always been the function of the law; that even in Old Testament times it served not to justify, but to convince of sin, and so to turn men to the gracious God, who promised pardon upon repentance. Thus the operation of the correlative principles of debt and works may be considered to have contributed, so far as men proved their futility, to the more eager acceptance of the contrasted principles of grace and faith, which are also correlates, and which constitute for Paul the essentials of the primitive and changeless gospel.

It is not claimed that the apostle has explicitly followed out these lines of thought which we have been tracing. It is maintained, however, that they are applications of his oft-repeated principles which must be made if we will adjust his statements to each other or bring certain parts of his teaching into a rational unity with other parts.

It will thus be seen how great a revolution in Paul's conception of the law must have been wrought in his mind by his changed view of Christ. The whole legal system falls at once into a subordinate place, and assumes a rudimentary and preparatory character. In coming to this opinion Paul was but falling into line with the frequent representations of the prophets, who proclaimed the temporary character of the Jewish system, and whose philosophy of Jewish history was

founded upon the principle that it was to issue in something larger, more universal, and more spiritual, when the Messiah should come and establish his kingdom. Perceiving this, the apostle clearly pointed out that they only were the true devotees of the law who accepted him for whom the law prepared; that the true Jews, the real sons of Abraham, were those who in faith like Abraham's received the revelation which God had made in the fulness of time in his Son. He therefore pays the truest honor to the law who sees it in its relation to Christ. The Mosaic system acquires a greater glory from being a servant and forerunner to Christ than it can have in itself, and greater than that with which they seek to clothe it who maintain its own sufficiency and perpetuity. Its true glory is that it is one of the dispensations of God by which he is training the world for Christ; one method of divine revelation which serves an important though temporary purpose, — a purpose which is at length consummated in him who fulfils the law and puts an end to its existence in respect to the attainment of righteousness for every one who believes on himself (Rom. x. 4).

That the legal system as such is brought to a termination by the gospel is so obvious a corollary to the whole doctrine of Paul which we have been tracing, that we should be obliged to attribute to him this view of the subject even if he had not expressed himself explicitly upon the subject. This, however, he has done, and that in striking harmony with those

sayings of Jesus which are preserved to us in respect to his relation to the Jewish system. He had affirmed that he came to accomplish for the law, not a process of destruction, but one of fulfilment. It was not his intention to break with the legal system, and to establish his truth and kingdom *de novo*. On the contrary, he came to live and teach in the line of the law's true purpose and meaning. He came to complete that which in the law existed in a temporary and in many respects in an imperfect form. He came to develop by an organic process out of the old system its ideal content, so that no part of it should be lost or fail to attain its divinely intended aim (Matt. v. 17–20). He cited examples of this process of fulfilment, showing the way in which he unfolded the essential and unchanging ethical and spiritual principles which — sometimes in the law itself, and yet more frequently in the traditional interpretations of it — were embodied in inadequate forms, adapted only to the condition of a rude age, and containing concessions to the hardness of men's hearts which could not be permanently permitted (Matt. xix. 8). In teaching that he who perceived that love to God and man was more acceptable to God than sacrifices, was not far from the kingdom of God (Mark xii. 33, 34), and that the relation of the Sabbath to man was that of means to end, he unfolded principles which were far-reaching in their scope, and which could not fail to issue in the principle which is fundamental in Paul's thoughts; namely, that in Christianity the essential ethical con-

tent of the law is taken up, embodied, and preserved, while its elements of imperfection and such of its provisions as are, in the nature of the case, temporary, fall away in the process of fulfilment, as the blossom falls away in the development of the fruit. More clearly still did Jesus' teaching that his gospel was no mere amendment of Judaism — no patch to be sewed upon the old garment, but something new and complete in itself — plainly declare the divine purpose that in the gospel the old system as such was to pass away. The new wine of Jesus' teaching demanded new wine-skins, — that is, his gospel could not be held within the forms of the Jewish religion, but must be left free to give expression to its universal truths, principles, and laws in ways adapted to its own nature and spirit (Mark ii. 21, 22; Luke v. 36–39). In this connection Luke reports the striking remark of Jesus that "no man having drunk old wine desireth new; for he saith, The old is good" (verse 39), — an expression which conveys the idea (so abundantly illustrated in the early days of Christianity, and indeed in all Christian history) that men cannot readily adjust their minds to the truth of the newness and completeness of the gospel, but will still cling persistently to some conception which makes it an appendix to the Old Testament system, or at most a mere continuation, rather than a true fulfilment of it.

Whether Paul was familiar with these sayings of Jesus or not, we cannot say. It is in any case certain that he clearly discerned the principles which

underlay them and wrought them into his whole system of thought. His view cannot be fully determined by the citation of individual passages, since it is often assumed rather than expressed, and rather pervades his argument than forms the subject of explicit demonstration. Since the law has its whole purpose in leading up to Christ and in helping to prepare the world for him, it must fall away when it has accomplished that purpose. The law "was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise hath been made." "So that the law hath been our tutor to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith is come, we are no longer under a tutor" (Gal. iii. 19, 24, 25). "For Christ is the end of the law [*τέλος νόμου*] unto righteousness to every one that believeth" (Rom. x. 4). Most interpreters now agree that *τέλος νόμου* here means, not the ideal aim (as Bengel,[1] Lange, Alford), but is to be taken literally, and denotes the completion, the termination of the legal system, and therefore asserts that the purpose and effectiveness of the law as an aid to the attainment of righteousness have come to an end in Christ (so De Wette, Meyer, Godet, Weiss). This statement would then be equivalent, not to an assertion of the law's destruction, but to an affirmation that all its uses as a guide to righteousness are met and fulfilled in Christ; that there is therefore no assistance to be derived from the law for the attainment of righteousness of life

[1] "Τέλος, *finis*, et *πλήρωμα*, *complementum*, sunt synonyma."

which is not more easily and completely secured in Christ.

In the plainest terms, though quite incidentally in the course of his argument, the apostle asserts the abrogation of the legal system. "For if that which passeth away was with glory, much more that which remaineth is in glory" (2 Cor. iii. 11). Here "that which passeth away" is defined in the context as "the letter," "the ministration of death engraven on stones" (verses 6, 7). In his argument against the tenets of the Colossian heretics (who united in their strange doctrines heathen Gnostic elements with the extreme legalism of the Essenes), he urges his readers to maintain their independence of the Jewish observances whose necessity the errorists referred to urged upon the Christians. "Let no man judge you," he says, "in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a feast day or a new moon or a sabbath day," and then adds, in a comprehensive statement, his whole philosophy of the nature of the legal system in its relation to Christ, "which are a shadow of the things to come; but the body is Christ's" (Col. ii. 16, 17). With this passage may be compared Gal. iv. 9–11, where Paul is rebuking the Galatian Christians for their return to the law, — "the weak and beggarly rudiments whereunto they [ye] desire to be in bondage." Then he adds: "Ye observe days, and months, and seasons, and years. I am afraid of you, lest by any means I have bestowed labor upon you in vain." To the apostle this continued adherence to Jewish forms signifies (at least in

the case of Gentile converts) so defective an understanding of the principles of the complete and self-sufficient gospel of Christ, that he is almost ready to despair of those who are led into it.

In Paul's view the full disclosure of God's gracious purpose and way of salvation is found only in Christ. His gospel does not need to be supplemented from the earlier and imperfect stages of revelation. Christianity is lacking in nothing which was of permanent value in the law. He is entirely in accord with the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews in the view that God has taken away the first, that he might establish the second (Heb. x. 9). He has completed the old in the new. The law is indeed worthy of all honor, but its chief glory will ever be that it served to usher in the gospel and to prove to mankind a "tutor unto Christ."

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSON OF CHRIST

THE apostle has not presented in his epistles a systematically developed doctrine concerning the nature and person of the Redeemer. It is wholly improbable that he ever applied his mind to the problem of defining the relation to each other of the divine and human elements in his person. The needs of Paul's time did not demand such an effort. The two great obstacles to the progress of the gospel which confronted the apostle were the Pharisaic theory of salvation by merit, and the general rejection by the Jews of the claims of Jesus to be the Messiah. It was necessary for him to urge upon the men of his time such facts and arguments as would convince them that Jesus was the Messiah, and that salvation is by grace through faith in him; but into any systematic effort to define the nature of his personality this task would not lead him.

We have, however, many incidental references to the person of Christ which are of such a character as to reveal the outlines of that picture of the Lord which must have lain in the apostle's mind. These are presented in connection with statements concern-

ing his love, sufferings, and exaltation, and are most numerous in the third group of his epistles, where they occur in the course of his refutation of the false *gnosis* which made Christianity an esoteric doctrine, and degraded Christ to the rank of created beings. The titles which are applied to him are also important in determining the apostle's idea of his person.

In the first two groups of epistles the references to Christ's person are more incidental than in the third group. In both of these earlier groups the special subjects which are under consideration preclude any direct discussion of this theme. It will be found, however, that the elements of the views which are more fully presented in the Epistles of the Imprisonment are already present in the earlier letters. We shall first consider the titles and allusions which are found in the first two groups, and then trace more in detail the fuller descriptions which are presented in the third.

Paul's personal knowledge of Christ began with the revelation to him of the ascended and glorified Lord. By this beginning his modes of thought and manner of speaking of him would naturally be determined. We should expect to find that the conception of him as the risen Lord, exalted to divine glory and power, would be fundamental and controlling in the apostle's mind. Reference to the lordship of Christ pervades the great doctrinal letters. It is one of the chief marks of his ministry that he preaches Jesus Christ as Lord (κύριος, 2 Cor. iv. 5). The fundamental

fact in the Church's confession is that Jesus is Lord (1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. x. 9); and there is no more common formula in the apostle's writings than "Jesus Christ our Lord," or "our Lord Jesus Christ." By this title Paul uniformly implies a special authority and mastership of Christ over all believers. Christ as the heavenly Lord is the sole mediator of salvation; his commands are decisive for the Church, and before him men must stand in judgment.

But Christ is not merely Lord of the Church, but sovereign of the world (*κύριος πάντων*, Rom. x. 12; *cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 27). Old Testament language which was used of Jehovah is freely applied to him (1 Cor. x. 22; Rom. x. 13), and according to the more probable interpretation of Rom. ix. 5, he is there extolled as the One "who is over all, God blessed forever."[1] The grounds on which this interpretation is preferred to that which places a period after the word "flesh" (*σάρκα*) and renders the remainder of the verse as a doxology to God (see marg. R. V.) are, briefly stated, as follows: (*a*) A doxology to God would seem to

[1] For an elaborate defence of the view that the passage is a doxology, see an essay by Dr. Ezra Abbot in the *Journal of the Society for Biblical Literature and Exegesis* for 1881 (reprinted in Dr. Abbot's *Critical Essays*), and for an equally exhaustive argument for the contrary view, Dr. Timothy Dwight in the same number of the journal just referred to. Among textual critics Lachmann and Tischendorf sanction the former view by their punctuation; *per contra*, Scrivener, and Westcott and Hort. Among well-known interpreters the former view is represented by Baur, Beyschlag, and Meyer; the latter by Ritschl, Godet, and Weiss.

be more abrupt in the connection than an ascription of praise to Christ, which would be occasioned by the mention of him as the crowning glory of Israelitish history. (*b*) As applied to Christ, the words form a natural antithesis to τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. Christ is descended from the fathers of Jewish history on the σάρξ side of his being, but he is God over all in his essential nature. (*c*) The lofty attributes and prerogatives of creation and sovereignty over the world which Paul elsewhere ascribes to Christ (especially in Colossians and Philippians; for example, Col. i. 16; Phil. ii. 6–8) appear to overbear the objection that Paul does not elsewhere designate Christ as θεός. Those who maintain the genuineness of the Epistle to Titus may, however, appeal to ii. 13 as an instance in which, according to the grammatical probabilities of the case, Christ is spoken of as θεός. Grammatical usage certainly favors the application of both appellatives μεγάλου θεοῦ and σωτῆρος, which are connected by καὶ, under a common article, to the same person. These considerations serve, we think, materially to weaken the argument from Paul's common usage. The plenitude of divine attributes (πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος, Col. ii. 9) is ascribed to Christ, and according to the interpretation which is at least as plausible as its opposite, he is directly called θεός in Titus ii. 13.[1]

[1] So Wiesinger, Van Oosterzee, Weiss, Ellicott; *per contra*, Winer, De Wette, Huther. For a concise presentation of the grounds of the interpretation which is adopted in both our Eng-

The exalted Christ is the Son of God in a metaphysical sense, is one in nature with the Father, and shares with him the glory which is the prerogative of Deity. His sonship to God was determined (ὁρισθείς) in the fact that God raised him from the dead (Rom. i. 4). The resurrection was that divine act of power by which he was instated into the dignity of sonship, although he was truly God's Son before, and as such was sent into the world (Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 4). As Son Jesus occupies a unique position in the universe, since all things are subject to him (1 Cor. xv. 28; *cf.* viii. 6), and sustains a unique relation to God, since he is "the image of God" (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ, 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15), and before his coming to earth was "rich" in the glory of the Father (2 Cor. viii. 9). The titles "Lord" and "Son," and the functions and prerogatives which, in connection with them, are ascribed to Christ, are not indeed equivalent to a formal definition of his essence; but in any fair estimate of their meaning, they decisively show that in his essential relation to God, Christ was a wholly unique Being, who before his advent to earth shared the divine nature and glory, and who, in his exaltation after the resurrection, only enters in a formal and demonstrative manner upon a dignity which corresponds to his essence and inherent right.

lish versions, see Ellicott *in loco*. An elaborate article on the other side by Dr. Ezra Abbot may be found in the *Journal of the Society for Biblical Literature and Exegesis* for 1881 (reprinted in *Critical Essays*).

In connection with the exalted dignity and prerogatives of Christ thus presented, Paul teaches a certain subordination on his part to the Father. He is the Executor of the Father's will, the Mediator of the salvation which the Father has resolved upon. His relation to God is likened to that of the wife to the husband (1 Cor. xi. 3). In his exaltation, as in his humiliation, he is the agent who executes the Father's purposes. God has committed to him the work of completing the salvation of mankind, after which he is to resign his sovereign authority to him from whom he received it (1 Cor. xv. 28). It should be noticed that this subjection of himself on Christ's part is affirmed in connection with his delivery over to the Father of the completed kingdom and the resignation of his office as the Mediator of salvation, and that the end contemplated in it is "that God may be all in all." As Christ was exalted by the divine will, after his humiliation, to the throne of sovereignty, so after the completion of his office he will, still in dependence upon the divine will, resign this function, that the divinely completed work of salvation may appear. The subordination affirmed is therefore rather one of office through the resignation of the mediatorial throne, than of nature or essence. He delivers over the completed kingdom, and vacates his office as its administrator because his work is finished, and that the perfect result may appear to the praise of the Father.

It is not surprising that the apostle, in developing his thoughts of Christ from this beginning, should not

refer in detail to the events of his earthly life. But from this fact the conclusion should not be drawn that he was unacquainted with these events, at least with the most important of them.[1] Who can believe that, even if he had been ignorant of the leading facts of Christ's life before, he would not have acquainted himself with them in his associations with the primitive apostles? Could he have passed fifteen days with Peter (Gal. i. 18) and not have inquired about the words and deeds of the Lord whom he now worshipped and served as Master and Saviour? Nor should it be held (with Pfleiderer[2] and others) that Paul would be indifferent to the events of Christ's earthly life because he claimed to have received his gospel, not through human intervention, but by direct revelation. It is a forced interpretation which infers from Paul's determination to know only "Christ, and him crucified" (1 Cor. ii. 2) that he was concerned in his doctrine of Christ only with the fact of his crucifixion, and not with the other events in his career. He will know only Christ crucified, not as a contrast to knowing other facts concerning him, but as a contrast to the speculative wisdom to which the Corinthians were inclined. By an equally misplaced emphasis does Pfleiderer infer from Gal. ii. 6 that Paul would not receive information concerning Christ from the primitive apostles (*per contra*, *cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 3), who,

[1] On Paul's knowledge of Jesus' personal history, *cf.* Hausrath, *Der Apostel Paulus*, pp. 142, 143.

[2] *Der Paulinismus*, p. 112; Eng. tr. i. 124.

he says, "imparted nothing" to him. But the context plainly shows that in this statement he is denying, not the impartation of information concerning Jesus' earthly life, — a matter wholly aside from his purpose, — but the addition of any new or different teaching concerning the principle and method of salvation. So far from imparting anything to him (that is, correcting or supplementing his teaching in regard to the freedom of the Gentiles from the Mosaic enactments, — the real subject in hand), they gave to him and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship, and agreed that each group of apostles should labor in its own field (Gal. ii. 9), — a compact which involved the imposition upon Paul's converts of no requirement in addition to that which he himself had exacted of them.

It is true that the Christ whom Paul had seen (1 Cor. ix. 1; xv. 8) was the risen Christ, and that the conception of him in his glorified character, and not that of him in his historic manifestation, is the one which rules his thoughts and forms the starting-point of his teaching. A few historical facts are, however, incidentally mentioned in connection with doctrinal statements. Christ is descended from the fathers of the Jewish nation (Rom. ix. 5; Gal. iii. 16), and indeed was "born of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. i. 3). He asserts that he received from the testimony of others the all-important facts (ἐν πρώτοις) of Christ's death, burial, resurrection, and appearances, of which he enumerates five

in detail (1 Cor. xv. 3–7). He speaks so often of the crucifixion and sufferings of Christ as to leave no doubt that he had in his mind a clear and vivid picture of the Lord's death. He has also learned the circumstances regarding the betrayal of Jesus, and even the very words in which he instituted his memorial supper (1 Cor. xi. 23–25), — knowledge which he "received from the Lord [*ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου*]," in the sense of having traced the usage which he found prevailing in the Church back to its source in the directions given at the institution of the ordinance.

These are instances in which Paul clearly professes dependence upon the traditions of the Lord's words and deeds, which were the main source of information in his time. It can by no means be inferred from the paucity of these references that the apostle had no information beyond what they contain. We should rather expect to find in any case a comparative silence regarding these facts in the treatment of Christianity by a man of the strongly systematic and doctrinal bent which characterized Paul, especially when he approaches the subject from the side of a great experience which he never ceases to regard as a revelation to him of the person of the glorified Redeemer.

While it is probable that the events of Christ's life, aside from those connected with his death and resurrection, did not strongly affect his doctrinal opinions, which were formed around a different center, the impression of the character of Jesus must have been a

potent factor in the apostle's thinking, although it is never put into the foreground of his teaching. It was an essential element in the doctrine of Christ's vicarious sacrifice for our sins that he was himself without sin (2 Cor. v. 21). Paul once alludes to the "meekness and gentleness of Christ" (2 Cor. x. 1), and several times makes indirect reference to the example of his love and helpfulness (1 Cor. xi. 1; 2 Cor. v. 14; Gal. ii. 20). But it is obvious that the circumstances of Christ's earthly life, and the impression of his pure and holy character as a man, would not be so prominent and vivid in Paul's mind as in those of the primitive apostles who had accompanied Jesus in his labors among men. Paul's thoughts concerning Christ naturally rise into the sphere of eternity. He thinks of him less as he was for a few years on earth than as he now is in the glory of the Father, or as he was before his humiliation. The transactions which occurred on earth have their ground for Paul in a world of eternal principles and truths, and are a revelation of purposes of divine love and condescension which were cherished in the heart of Christ before he came to earth. Hence it is not the "Christ of history," but the Christ of eternity to whom Paul traces back the work of salvation (2 Cor. viii. 9; *cf.* Phil. ii. 5 *sq.*).

It has been held by some[1] that Paul falls into an

[1] See, for example, Holsten, *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, p. 437, and Lüdemann, *Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus*, p. 120 *sq.*

inconsistency regarding the sinlessness of Jesus in representing him as free from the commission of sin (2 Cor. v. 21), and yet as partaking on his human side in the fleshly, sinful nature (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, Rom. viii. 3). He had, it is said, the same sinful flesh (*σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*) as other men, and would therefore be the subject of those sinful desires which are inseparable from it. It will be observed that this interpretation rests upon a close identification of the ideas of "flesh" and "sin." It supposes that Paul regards the flesh as inherently and necessarily sinful, and therefore naturally infers that if Christ possessed a "likeness of sinful flesh," he must have been the subject of the sinful desires which, as a matter of fact, inhere in human flesh. We have seen, however, in a previous chapter that this identification as thus made cannot be maintained.

In the first edition of *Der Paulinismus*, Pfleiderer, carrying out the view that the *σάρξ* is inherently sinful, maintained that *ὁμοίωμα* designates the sameness in principle between Christ's flesh and human flesh generally; that is, its sinfulness.[1] But *ὁμοίωμα* means *likeness*, not *sameness;* it denotes resemblance, and not identity; it signifies that which corresponds to something. The heathen changed

[1] See *Der Paulinismus*, 1 Aufl. p. 153 *sq.;* Eng. tr. i. 152 *sq.* This interpretation, in which he had followed Overbeck and Holsten, is abandoned by Pfleiderer in the second edition (see page 131 *sq.*). Some of his views as expressed in the first edition are given in the text because they are concisely and clearly presented, and because they are still widely held.

the glory of God into a likeness (ὁμοίωμα) expressed in an image of corruptible man (Rom. i. 23); that is, they made and worshipped images which were so shaped as to resemble perishable men. Elsewhere (Rom. v. 14) the apostle speaks of sinning "after the likeness [ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι] of Adam's transgression;" that is, in a similar manner, against an explicit positive command. So here what is said is that Christ, in order to redeem men from the sin which had its seat in the flesh, came into the world in a human form, like that of man's own actually sinful flesh, — "a visible form like human nature, which is subject to sin." [1] If Paul had meant to say that Christ himself assumed the "flesh of sin," he could easily have said so by writing ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας. He clearly introduces a statement of similarity, not of sameness, to guard against just that idea.[2]

It was essential to Paul's purpose in the passage to insert the qualifying word ἁμαρτίας, because he is discussing the deliverance of man from sin by Christ's coming into a form like to that of human sinful flesh. It is true that ὁμοίωμα means "likeness," and not "difference." But things which are alike in some respects may also be different in others equally important. If a writer clearly affirms that two things are alike for the very purpose of avoiding the inference that they are identically the same, then so far forth the difference is as essential and emphatic as

[1] Thayer's *Lexicon*.

[2] *Cf.* Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 78 *c*.

the resemblance. Such is the case in this instance. Christ possessed the *σάρξ*,— not, however, the *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας* of our sinful humanity, but that which was *similar to it;* he had all the essential endowments of the natural man, but without sin. By thus himself coming in the flesh and not partaking in its sinfulness, he was able to dethrone sin, which ruled in its domain, and thus accomplish what the law could not do because of the resistance which it encountered from sin.[1]

Directly connected with the subject of Christ's sinlessness is the question how the apostle could have accounted for this sinless personality who yet stands in the line of descent from the fathers, and so on his human side is a son of Adam, — the head of a universally sinful race. It can neither be maintained, on

[1] In his work *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 219 *sq.* Pfleiderer adopts the opinion that *ὁμοίωμα* may designate a *likeness* in certain respects, though not in all, between Christ's flesh and human flesh generally: "Denn ob das Abbild dem Original, welchem es nachgemacht ist, in jeder Hinsicht gleich oder nur in gewisser Hinsicht (z. B. der Form nach) gleich, in anderer Hinsicht (etwa dem Stoff nach) ungleich und so nur ähnlich sei, darüber besagt das Wort *ὁμοίωμα* lediglich gar nichts." He therefore concludes that although for our thinking the participation of Christ in the *σάρξ* would necessarily involve the taint of sinfulness which inevitably (?) clings to it, yet we cannot assume that this was the case for Paul, especially in the face of his assertion (2 Cor. v. 21) that Christ knew no sin, and also in view of the most probable meaning, as he views it, of *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* in Rom. viii. 3, which is, not the destruction of Christ's personal sin in his flesh, but the destruction of sin in general in his flesh; that is, in his substitutionary life and death in and for humanity.

the one hand, that Paul denies the supernatural conception of Jesus,[1] nor, on the other, that the tradition of his miraculous conception which is embodied in the First and Third Gospels had ever reached him. He declares that Jesus was *κατὰ σάρκα* a descendant of David (Rom. i. 3), — a belief which may have rested upon the supposition of Mary's Davidic descent. If, as many scholars suppose,[2] the genealogy given by Luke is that of Mary, additional plausibility would be lent to this conjecture. It is improbable that Paul was acquainted with the traditions respecting the supernatural conception and miraculous birth of Jesus; but even in that case there is nothing in his language which is inconsistent with them. And when we consider his doctrine of the universal sinfulness of mankind as descended from Adam, in connection with his affirmation of the sinlessness of Jesus, the preternatural origin of his humanity seems to supply the only means of explaining and harmonizing these two facts, both of which he so explicitly asserts. We can only say, then, that although there is no evidence that Paul reflected upon this problem, it is certain that he not only affirms nothing which is inconsistent with the supernatural conception, but that

[1] "Er leugnet sie (die übernatürliche Erzeugung) indirect durch die Betonung des Davidssohnshaft nach dem Fleisch, welche ja die natürliche Vaterschaft des Davididen Joseph voraussetzt," Pfleiderer, *Der Paulinismus*, 1 Aufl. p. 152; Eng. tr. i. 151.

[2] For example, Olshausen, Godet (Commentaries *in loco*); Weiss, *Life of Christ*, i. 216 *sq.*; Andrews, *Life of our Lord*, p. 56 *sq.*

on no other supposition can his statements concerning Christ's sinlessness, on the one hand, and universal human sinfulness, on the other, be so well adjusted and harmonized.

Such in brief outline are the teachings of Paul respecting the person of Christ which find place in his earlier epistles. They are elements of doctrine rather than parts of a developed system. They form the basis of the more elaborate descriptions of Christ's dignity, office, and work which we meet in Colossians, Ephesians, and Philippians, to a brief review of which we will now turn our attention.

In Ephesians Christ is presented as the agent whom God in eternity appointed to the work of salvation, and through whom the elect are foreordained unto adoption as sons (i. 5). Accordingly, when their salvation is effected they are described as "created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God afore prepared that they should walk in them" (ii. 10). The realization in the Church of God's manifold wisdom is in accordance with "the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus" (iii. 11). In one passage the apostle declares that Christ was both the medium and the end of the creation: "In him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him and unto him" (Col. i. 16). As the associate of the Father in creation, the mediator of salvation, and the head of the Church, he is the

possessor of all fulness of divine life and power (Col. i. 19), "in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden" (ii. 3), so that one need not seek elsewhere for the disclosure of the true divine mystery of life and being, as the Colossians were disposed to do. Accordingly there now dwells in Christ in his glorified corporeity (*σωματικῶς*[1]) the plenitude of Deity (*θεότης*) (Col. ii. 9), which enables him, as the possessor of unsearchable riches of power and grace (Eph. iii. 8), to impart the fulness of divine life to believers, and so to occupy the station of pre-eminence in the universe and to be the chief in the kingdom of redemption (Col. i. 18; ii. 10; ii. 19).

The Son of God's love is the "image of the invisible God," — the One who embodies and perfectly expresses the divine nature; the One whose relation as

[1] Some interpreters (as R. Schmidt and Pfleiderer) understand *σωματικῶς* to refer to Christ's incarnate life. In this case the passage would probably mean that Christ was, in his incarnation, the bearer of the divine fulness in historical reality, as opposed to the imaginary beings to whom the Colossian false teachers referred. But the apostle seems to be stating a present and continuous, rather than a historical, fact in *κατοικεῖ*. Considering the subject in hand — the sole sufficiency of Christ as the mediator of salvation — and the apostle's mode of conceiving of Christ rather in his heavenly glory and power than in his human manifestation, the interpretation which refers the expression to his glorified life in heaven is the more probably correct. So Meyer, Commentary *in loco*, and Weiss, *Bib. Theol* § 103 *d*, note 8; Eng. tr. ii. 103, note 9. Others combine both ideas, as De Wette, *Exegetisches Handbuch*, *in loco*.

Son antedates that of every creature (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, Col. i. 15), and who existed before the universe was created (*καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν πρὸ πάντων*, Col. i. 17). Previous to his incarnation he existed in a divine form of being (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*, Phil. ii. 6), which he however surrendered for a servant-form (*μορφὴ δούλου*, ii. 7), since he did not consider the equality with God (*τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*) which he enjoyed something to be grasped and held (*οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο*) in a selfish spirit, but on the contrary, chose to surrender the godlike dignity which was his, by divesting himself of his divine mode of being, thus renouncing for the time his equal dignity with God and taking on the human servant-form. The terms "form of God" and "equality with God" I take to be substantially equivalent here, and regard them as describing the dignity of which Christ is said in his humiliation to have emptied himself. For the various shades of meaning which different interpreters find in this celebrated passage, I must refer to the critical commentaries.[1] The main point to be noted in the interpretation is that the translation in our older English version, "thought it not robbery to be equal with God," — that is, considered it no presumption to claim equality with God, — is incorrect, since it is clearly the disposition of Christ which led him to his humiliation, and not his right to claim divine honors,

[1] I may here specially mention a lucid exposition of the whole passage by Prof. A. B. Bruce in his *Humiliation of Christ*, Lecture I.

which is in point for the apostle's argument. To say that Christ was conscious of the right to equality with God, but humbled himself, makes both an awkward statement and an unnatural antithesis. If this were meant, the apostle would have needed to write: "*Nevertheless* [*οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, *vice ἀλλά*] he emptied himself." There is a perfect appropriateness, however, in the contrast as presented in the other interpretation: so far from eagerly grasping and holding his equality with God, so far from insisting upon the advantages connected with his divine form of being, he voluntarily deprived himself of them.[1]

This self-exinanition of Christ was accomplished by his coming into human form (*ὁμοίωμα ἀνθρώπων*, *σχῆμα ὡς ἄνθρωπος*) and freely subjecting himself to the weaknesses of mortal flesh (Col. i. 22; Eph. ii. 15). Following the *kenosis* as its natural and intended consequence, came the humiliation (*ταπείνωσις*), which was realized in his submission of himself to the shameful death of the cross. It will not escape the notice of the careful reader that the context of the passage makes it evident that it was the willingness of Christ to humble himself to human conditions and limitations which it is Paul's primary purpose to bring out

[1] The R. V. renders, "counted it not a prize," — a rendering which seems to me to be peculiarly ambiguous, and to stand midway between the two interpretations which have been referred to. The revisers add in the margin the rendering explained above, "a thing to be grasped."

as furnishing the supreme illustration and lesson of self-sacrifice.[1]

This picture of the condescension of Christ is succeeded by a description of his exaltation to the heavenly seat of honor and power. In return for the Redeemer's free giving of himself to humiliation and death, God has elevated him to the mediatorial throne and conferred upon him a name which is above all others (the title and dignity expressed in *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, verse 11), to the end that all creatures in heaven, earth, and the under-world should acknowledge his authority and bow in submission to his will (verses 9–11). This exaltation is elsewhere more particularly described as a sitting at the right hand of God (Col. iii. 1; Eph. i. 20–22), the position of honor and favor. There in the regions of heavenly glory and power (*ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*, — the characteristic expression of Ephesians), elevated to supreme headship over the kingdom of redemption and with sovereign authority over all terrestrial

[1] The thoughts of the passage may be analyzed and tabulated thus: —

I. *Description of Christ's pre-incarnate state.*
ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ; τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ.

II. *His disposition not to retain the advantages of that state.*
(τὸ φρονεῖν ὃ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἦν.)
οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ; ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν.

III. *In what his kenosis consisted.*
μορφὴν δούλου λάβων. ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος, καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος.

IV. *The humiliation.*
γενόμενος ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ.

powers, he will continue to fulfil his "ministry of reconciliation" until the purposes of God's redeeming love to man shall be accomplished.

The dignity of Christ's person as the seat of all divine fulness (πλήρωμα) of life and power, in opposition to certain Gnostic speculations concerning angels and other media of revelation which had invaded the "churches of the Lycus," [1] is more emphasized in these epistles than the specific doctrine of his sacrifice. This finds place, however, in such statements as that "Christ loved you, and gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell" (Eph. v. 2). He speaks also of the "afflictions of Christ" as continuing and being completed in his mystical body, the Church (Col. i. 24). In Phil. iii. 10–12, he appears to treat the death and resurrection of Christ in an ethical sense, and to represent the life of holiness under the figure of participation in them. He wishes to attain the perfected spiritual life contemplated in the "high calling of God in Christ Jesus" (verse 14), of which he falls so far short (verses 12–14), by experiencing in his own person the sufferings, death, and resurrection; that is, by attaining the spiritual life which these are able to secure. We thus meet again in this passage the peculiar mystical identification of the procuring

[1] For a full account of the condition of these churches, so far as it is known, and of the nature of the heresy which had gained some currency among them, see Bishop Lightfoot's essay on those subjects in his *Commentary on Colossians*.

causes of salvation with their results, in accordance with which the results are described in terms of the causes.[1] It will be noticed that there is in these epistles no dogmatic development of the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice, but that it is contemplated either as a thank-offering to God, or as the type of that self-giving which is the duty of Christians, and which alone opens the way to perfection of life.

The characteristic form in which the thought of Christ's saving work here appears is that of reconciliation, the restoration of harmony where there had been estrangement. This appears in two applications, — to the relations of the Jewish and Gentile world in Ephesians, and to the relations of man and God in Colossians. The Gentiles, who were at one time "separate from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of the promise" (Eph. ii. 12), are now restored, and placed upon the same plane of privilege with the Jews, by the death of Christ, which was for both alike, and in the benefits of which both equally share (ii. 13). Christ, by appearing in human flesh, has united these two divisions of humanity into one family; he has broken down "the middle wall of partition" which stood between them, — a separation which was occasioned alike by the godlessness of the Gentile world and by the Jews' particularistic interpretation of the divine purpose in their history and the selfish spirit with which they regarded their

[1] *Cf.* the comments on Paul's mysticism in chap. ii. pp. 32–40.

privileges. The mutual enmity which thus existed between Jew and Gentile Christ has abolished by doing away with the Jewish legal system, — "the law of commandments contained in ordinances," — and introducing the universal spiritual law of love, which can never become a means of separation, but must always be a bond of union among men. Thus by his death for all men on the cross, he binds men together in organic unity in the spiritual commonwealth of which he is the founder and head (Eph. ii. 14–16).

He has also by "the blood of his cross" reconciled to God (or, to himself; so R. Schmidt, Weiss[1]) both mankind and the world of angelic beings (Col. i. 20 *sq.*). There are no indications in these epistles as to the way in which Christ's death on the cross accomplished this restoration of the harmony between man and God, which had been broken by sin. This problem did not here demand a direct consideration. It is enough to assert, as against the speculation concerning revelation through angelic powers or orders of being, that Christ, as the head of the spiritual creation, is the agent through whom is accomplished, not only the reconciliation of man to God, but also the bringing of these supermundane orders of creation into their right relation to God.

The thought of Christ's headship over the Church

[1] *Die paulinische Christologie*, p. 184; *Bib. Theol.* § 104 *a*, note 3. *Per contra*, Meyer, Lightfoot, and Ellicott, Commentaries *in loco*.

finds frequent expression in Ephesians and Colossians in opposition to the depreciation of Christ by the false teachers. "He is the head of the body, the Church; who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence" (Col. i. 18; *cf.* Eph. i. 22). In Ephesians (iv. 7–13) Christ is pictured as distributing gifts to believers, and assigning to them the various functions which they are to exercise in the Church. The aim of this bestowment is that the body may be built up into strength and symmetry; that the various members of the spiritual commonwealth may grow up into likeness to him who is its head, that is, Christ (verses 14, 15). This relation is also used to illustrate the nature of marriage, and to enforce the duty of subjection on the part of the wife and of love on the part of the husband (Eph. v. 22–25).

The "cosmical significance of Christ," as the doctrine of his relation to the universe has been called, has already been touched upon in connection with those passages which represent his redeeming work as affecting the relations to God (or to himself) of the world of angelic beings. A characteristic formula, in which are gathered up the various thoughts regarding the pre-eminent station of Christ in the Church and the world, is that of Eph. i. 10, where it is said that God's purpose is "to sum up all things in Christ" (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*), in the ultimate outcome of his gracious work for man; that is, to bring again into unity and harmony (for

himself; note the middle voice) in Christ all things and beings both in heaven and in earth. Christ is thus presented as the bond of unity among the parts of the universe which had been separated by sin,—the One in whom they are to be brought into that harmony which is the goal of the economy of grace.

"The redeeming work of Jesus Christ (*cf.* Col. i. 20) was designed to annul again this divided state in the universe, which had arisen through sin in heaven and upon earth, and to re-establish the unity of the kingdom of God in heaven and on earth; so that this gathering together again should rest *on* and have its foundations *in* Christ as the central point of union and support, without which it could not emerge" (Meyer on Eph. i. 10).[1]

Weiss has truly remarked that in these later letters it is Christ who is represented as the goal of the world, while in the earlier the final issue of redemption is that God becomes "all in all" (*πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, 1 Cor. xv. 28), since all things have been created "for him" (*εἰς αὐτόν*, Rom. xi. 36; 1 Cor. viii. 6).[2] This fact may be noted as illustrating the fuller development of Paul's Christology in his later reflections upon the institute of grace.

We have seen that the idea of Christ's personal

[1] On the question whether this and similar passages, such as Col. i. 20, imply the idea of universal redemption, the final bringing back of all sinful beings to God, see Meyer on Eph. i. 10, Remark 2. This question will meet us again in the study of the Pauline eschatology.

[2] *Bib. Theol.* § 103 *b*.

existence before his coming into the world, and indeed before creation itself, pervades Paul's representations of his person and work. This fact is commonly recognized by candid scholars who do not themselves accept the divinity and pre-existence of Christ, — such as Biedermann, Ritschl, and Pfleiderer. These writers occupy themselves with explanations of the development in the apostle's mind, and in the early Church generally, of these beliefs. For Biedermann the *motif* of the doctrine of pre-existence in Paul's Christology is found in the necessity of making Christ antedate the Old Testament system.[1] In Ritschl's view the idea of Christ's essential Deity is born of the high estimate which the Church put upon the work accomplished by Christ.[2] Pfleiderer explains the doctrine of pre-existence as a reflex of the doctrine of Christ's exaltation, — an inference which Paul's mind must draw in order to hold and justify his conception of the present heavenly glory of Christ. He expresses it in these words: "That which had happened in time through the exaltation, demanded, in order that it might stand fast for the Christian consciousness as an unconditional certainty and necessity, a deeper ground in the timeless existence of the heavenly world, in pre-existence."[3] The motive of the doctrine he explains thus:

[1] *Dogmatik*, p. 236.

[2] *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. §§ 44, 45, *passim*.

[3] *Der Paulinismus*, p. 136, 1 Aufl.; Eng. tr. i. 136.

"And this mode of thought explains itself to us very simply from the source from which the whole pre-existence-idea in general is derived; that is, the reflection thrown back into the past from the picture under which the fantasy of Paul and of the whole Christian community thought of the exalted and glorified Christ as at present living in heaven."[1] It is also a part of this view that, since the idea of the pre-existent Christ is but the reflex image of the exalted Messiah, he must have been conceived of in his pre-existence as man, — "the pneumatic man."[2]

We are here concerned with the exposition of the Pauline Christology, and not with speculations in regard to its origin. But it should be noticed that the theories which have just been referred to, assume that the apostle taught the personal pre-existence of Christ. The manner in which his conception of Christ's person was developed may have corresponded, more or less closely, to that process of reflection which Pfleiderer has sketched in the passages which I have quoted from the first edition of *Der Paulinismus*. Paul's idea of Christ's pre-existence would more naturally originate in his view of him as the Exalted One than in any historic information re-

[1] Ibid. p. 141; Eng. tr. i. 140. In the second edition Pfleiderer has substituted for this explanation the theory that Paul's conception of the person of Christ was a composite of Jewish Messianic ideas and Alexandrian speculation. See pp. 115–123.

[2] Ibid. p. 140; 2 Aufl. p. 118; Eng. tr. i. 139; *per contra, cf.* Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 79 *a*, note 3.

garding the circumstances attending his birth. If the thought of his pre-existence was developed by inference from that of his heavenly glory, it does not follow that the former was a far-fetched conclusion, and secondary in significance. A candid consideration of his language renders it certain that the work of salvation was, in the apostle's view, grounded in the eternal purpose of God and in the willingness of Christ to come to earth to execute that purpose. The conception of his pre-mundane existence is therefore absolutely fundamental in Paul's conception of the person and work of the Redeemer.

These elements of doctrine supply the material for the great problems concerning the person of Christ and the Trinity with which doctrinal theology has to deal. If, on the one hand, these problems are inevitably forced upon theology by the apostle's language, it is, on the other hand, certain that he has himself attempted no solution of them. On both these points most interpreters will concur with Weiss when he says, —

"As the divine eternal existence of Christ in his pre-existence did not forbid his relation to God from being regarded as that of a Son, with the subordination which is naturally involved in it, so the eventual subordination of the Son to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 28) by no means excludes the dignity of the Exalted Christ. For our Christological consideration there now comes in, of course, the problem how we have to conceive of this relation of the Divine Son to the Father in his absolute sovereignty over all, apart

from the Son's position with respect to the work of redemption, as well as previous to the creation of the world and apart from his mediatorial position in that work. But Paul has not considered this problem, and it remains altogether vain to attempt to elicit from him statements regarding an immanent Trinity; in saying which, the question whether the teaching of the Church has with justice advanced to that doctrine is, of course, in no way prejudged."[1]

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 79 *d.*

CHAPTER IX

THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION

THE restoration of man to the favor and fellowship of God, from which he had been separated by sin, is grounded, according to the Pauline theology, in the eternal purpose of God's love. In the death of Christ for sinful men God is commending or confirming (*συνίστησεν*, Rom. v. 8) his love toward them. His gift of Christ is so great a proof of his love that the apostle concludes, arguing from the greater to the less, that he will not withhold anything from those whom he has chosen in him (Rom. viii. 32; *cf.* Eph. i. 4). It is because God is "rich in mercy," and "on account of the great love wherewith he loved" men, that they have been quickened into new life and raised up into fellowship with Christ in his glory (Eph. ii. 4, 5). This redeeming work is "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus" (Eph. iii. 11), in whom believers were chosen before the foundation of the world (i. 4).

Christ is the mediator of this salvation, which he accomplishes primarily by his death. "We were reconciled to God through the death of his Son" (Rom.

v. 10), who "died for all" (2 Cor. v. 15). The instrument of this death is often put by metonymy for the death itself, and salvation is said to be by the cross. "The word of the cross" (1 Cor. i. 18) accordingly forms the substance of Paul's message; he will glory only in the cross (Gal. vi. 14), and will have but one object of knowledge and interest, — "Jesus Christ, and him crucified" (1 Cor. ii. 2). It is this doctrine of Christ's death for sin which is "the power of God" (1 Cor. i. 18), although to the Jew, who looked for salvation through some outward demonstration of divine might, and to the Greek, who sought the way of life in acute speculations concerning God and man, it appeared to be without meaning or value.

Our first inquiry is, What was the genesis of this doctrine which was so contrary to the Jewish modes of thought as to be the great obstacle (Gal. v. 11; vi. 12) in the way of belief on Jesus as the Messiah.[1]

It is certain that Paul could never have accepted the idea that the death of Jesus had a saving significance until he had been convinced by unmistakable evidence of his Messiahship. This assurance, gained in the experience on the way to Damascus, would

[1] In illustration of the repugnance of the Jewish mind to the idea of a suffering Messiah, see Weber, *Die Lehren des Talmud*, cap. xxii., entitled *Die Erlösung Israels durch den Messias*. The substance of this chapter may be found translated and condensed in *The Old Testament Student* for October, 1888.

compel the effort not only to reconcile the death of Christ with the Messianic idea, but to show that it was included in that idea as the very culmination of the Messiah's saving work. When Christ is seen as the true object of faith, it must follow that his death, formerly regarded as the just penalty of a malefactor, bears an essential relation to his mission; death could not have been necessary for the sinless Christ unless it was experienced on others' behalf.

Various considerations would conspire to urge Paul's mind to this conclusion, when once he had accepted the Messiahship of Jesus. His Old Testament education would render him familiar with the idea of the vicarious death of animals offered in sacrifice for sin. The prophecies of the Messiah's sufferings would also shine in a new light for him after his conversion, and would tend to overcome his former repugnance to that interpretation of them which now seemed obvious and necessary. Moreover, he had become familiar with the characteristic tenets of the Christians. The original apostles had taught, as Jesus had done, that his death had a saving power. One of the doctrines which he had received from the primitive oral tradition was that "he died for our sins, according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3). From considerations like these it may be at least partially accounted for that Paul regarded the death of Christ as having a wholly unique meaning and value. The original apostles had been at first dismayed by the death of their Master, and had seen in

it the destruction of all their cherished hopes. It now became the task of Paul, more than of any other man, to show that Christ's death, so far from being an untimely termination of his work, was the culmination of the divine decree of salvation, — the event in which, above all others, his saving mission was accomplished.

Does the apostle conceive of Christ's death, considered as a saving power, apart from other events in his experience and apart from the course of his life in general? It is certain that such a connection of Christ's death with his life and work receives no emphasis. Salvation is ascribed directly to his death as its procuring cause. It is maintained by some that the "one act of righteousness" (ἓν δικαίωμα, Rom. v. 18) by which he procured justification for men may be a collective designation for his entire life of obedience and holiness.[1] But the fact that it is contrasted with the "one trespass" (ἓν παράπτωμα) of Adam makes it more probable that it denotes the one definite act of delivering himself up to death.

In Rom. v. 10 the apostle speaks of salvation as wrought by Christ's life (σωθησόμεθα ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ). The connection, however, renders it clear that he there speaks of Christ's life, not as the procuring cause of salvation, but as the power by which spiritual development, which ensues upon reconciliation, shall be completed in the future world. As we are

[1] So Neander, *Planting and Training*, Bohn. ed. i. 446; Am. ed. p. 409.

"justified by [or in] his blood," so "shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him" (verse 9); that is, we shall be delivered from the penalties of sin in the judgment. The meaning is that, having been reconciled to God by the death of Christ, we shall be saved (in the eschatological sense) by reason of our union of faith and love with him who now lives and reigns in the glory of the Father. Here also the initiation of the work of salvation is directly ascribed to the death of Jesus.

It is impossible, however, to suppose that Paul contemplated the death of Christ altogether apart from his sinless life of obedience and sacrifice. Although he has not commented upon the relation between the saving power of the Lord's death and his life, it would be difficult to combine the elements of the apostle's teaching regarding redemption into a consistent whole, except upon the assumption that there was for him a real and important connection of this kind. He certainly implies that the overthrow of the dominion of sin in the flesh was conditioned upon the sinlessness of the life of Jesus (Rom. viii. 3). In treating of salvation, where its procuring cause is not directly under consideration, the apostle uses language which shows that the power of Christ's life and person is an important factor in the work of delivering man from sin, as in Rom. viii. 2, where freedom from the principle of sin, which leads to death, is ascribed to "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus;" that is, this deliverance is accomplished through the establishment

in the heart of the dominion of the Holy Spirit, who imparts and fosters spiritual life. This new life becomes ours only when we have entered into fellowship with Christ, and in this sense it has that fellowship as its cause and ground. But even here no other efficacious cause of salvation than the death of Christ is brought forward, since the apostle is speaking rather of the power by which salvation, considered as a progressive work, is carried on, than of its initiation.

A whole group of passages, — already considered in their general character in chapter ii., — in which is expressed the thought of an ethical dying with Christ in his crucifixion (for example, Rom. vi. 4, 8; Gal. ii. 20; Col. ii. 20; iii. 3) might be here considered as illustrating a more subjective method of viewing the moral renewal of man than that which obtains in Paul's more dogmatic handling of the subject. It will perhaps be sufficient to consider in detail one passage of this kind by way of illustration: 2 Cor. v. 14 *sq.*, — "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died," etc. The crucial question relates to the meaning of the phrase, "therefore all died" (*ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*). The older English version, in translating, "then were all dead," evidently intended to convey the idea that the death of all in sin was meant. If Christ died for all men, then must all have been dead in sin, else he need not have died for their salvation; thus he shows his love for undeserv-

ing sinners. The aorist tense (*ἀπέθανον*), however, does not naturally yield this sense, but points to a dying of all which was accomplished at a definite past time. When this happened is determined by the context as the time when Christ himself died.[1] The meaning then is, "All died when Christ died." In what sense did all die in and with his death? Two answers are possible: (*a*) All were under sentence of death for their sins, but Christ appeared as their substitute, and making their case his own, died in their stead; so that the deserved death of all may be said to have been suffered by him in his death. Hence all virtually died with their representative, and paid the penalty of sin in his vicarious death (so Weiss and, apparently, De Wette and Pfleiderer). (*b*) All died to sin — that is, in an ethical sense — in and with the death of Christ. The moral renewal of mankind, which in Pauline phraseology is so often represented as a dying to sin, and which had its efficacious cause in Christ's death, is spoken of as accomplished when his death was experienced. It is a mystical identification in time of cause and consequence, resembling that found in Gal. ii. 20: "I have been crucified with Christ," and in Col. iii. 3: "For ye died, and your life is hid with Christ in God" (so Olshausen, Meyer,

[1] "Das Sterben zum Besten aller und das Sterben aller ist daher einfach in das Verhältniss von Grund und Folge gesetzt, und zwar so, dass in beiden Fällen der Aorist diesen Vorgang als einen einmaligen und abgeschlossenen setzt," Heinrici, *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinthier*, p. 282.

Stanley, Heinrici). On this interpretation, which seems to comport with all the requirements of the sense and to accord with Paul's frequent mode of expression in treating the same subject, the passage would mean that the love which Christ has had to us should be a powerful motive to hold us faithful to his service, inasmuch as, since our conversion, we have reached the judgment that in his death on our behalf, our own moral death to the old sinful, selfish life was accomplished, and that the whole meaning and purpose of his death for us, therefore, urge us to live lives of unselfishness and love.

The class of passages to which the one just considered belongs, in which the result of Christ's death is contemplated as an ethical death to sin, and life to righteousness, may be compared and contrasted with those which present the result as a declaration of acquittal before God, on the ground of Christ's substitutionary work on man's behalf. Pfleiderer has designated these two modes, or relations, in which Paul presents the results of Christ's death as the "subjective-anthropological" and the "objective-theological."[1] Simpler designations would be the *ethical* and the *juridical* aspects of Christ's redeeming work.

It will be our next task to study the way in which Paul unfolds his doctrine of salvation by the death or cross of Christ, and to inquire into the grounds on which that death is held to avail for man's salvation. The relation of this more objective, juridical presen-

[1] *Der Paulinismus*, p. 93, 1 Aufl.; Eng. tr. i. 92.

tation of the subject to the more mystical or ethical view may then be considered.

The *locus classicus* for this phase of Pauline teaching is Rom. iii. 24–26; and all other passages bearing upon the subject should be studied in the light of this. Here the apostle asserts that believers are justified freely (δωρεάν); that is, without the payment of any price on their part, through the payment of the ransom-price (ἀπολύτρωσις) which Christ has made (verse 24). The commercial terms of the passage show at once that we are here concerned with an analogy in which the work of Christ in delivering man from sin is figuratively represented as the giving of a purchase-price for their release, as captives in war were often ransomed. The death of Christ is evidently the act which is here thought of as constituting the purchase. Whether the figure can be further pressed into service in reply to the question to whom the ransom was paid, as in the patristic theology, or in the direction of indicating a quantitative equivalence between the sufferings of Christ and the penalty of sin, as in the theory deduced by theologians from Anselm, may become pertinent at a later stage of our inquiries.

The apostle continues by explaining the way in which this deliverance was wrought. God publicly set forth Christ in the shedding of his blood, as a means of reconciliation (ἱλαστήριον) which avails for the individual on condition of faith (verse 25). Interpreters remain divided in respect to the force of

the word ἱλαστήριον in this passage. In the Septuagint τὸ ἱλαστήριον is the name for the *Kapporeth*, or mercy-seat of the ark of the covenant (see Ex. xxv. 17–20), and in the only New Testament passage, besides the one now under consideration, where the word occurs (Heb. ix. 5), it has this signification. Many suppose this to be its force in our passage also.[1] In this case the apostle's meaning would be that God, in subjecting Christ to death, has set him forth before mankind as the antitypical mercy-seat, the One in whom the gracious, saving presence of God is manifested, and who thus fulfils the symbolism of the ark and of the sprinkling of blood upon it (Ex. xxv. 22; Lev. xvi. 13 *sq.*).

On the other hand, it is claimed that no inference can be drawn from the passage in Hebrews as to the meaning here, because, while that epistle moves within the circle of Old Testament ideas, and is strongly influenced by the Septuagint in a characteristic use of Scripture, this is not the case with Paul. If he meant to designate the mercy-seat, moreover, the word should have had the article (as in the LXX. and in Hebrews); besides, the use of such symbolisms is foreign to the Epistle to the Romans, and it is inherently inappropriate to designate Christ as the *Kapporeth*, or lid of the ark, — a conception which does not appear in the New Testament. Influenced by these considerations, many scholars[2] maintain a use of the word

[1] For example, Cremer, Ritschl, Olshausen, Philippi, Delitzsch.

[2] For example, Morison (*Critical Exposition of Romans Third*), Pfleiderer, Weiss, Godet, Thayer's *Lexicon*.

on Paul's part independent of the Septuagint technical meaning, and interpret it in accord with its etymology. "Ιλαος (or ἵλεως) means gracious, or favorable; ἱλάσκεσθαι, to render so, and, in the passive, to become so; ἱλαστήριον, used substantively, would then denote a means of rendering favorable, or propitious, *Sühnemittel*, *Expiatorium*.[1] Upon this interpretation, the word might denote specifically an expiatory sacrifice (*sc.* θῦμα), or remain quite general in signification, — a question in regard to which those who accept the explanation of the word just given are divided.

This explanation in that form of it in which ἱλαστήριον is taken as quite general in signification, seems to me to have the balance of probability in its favor. In that case, Christ's death would be represented as a means of reconciling God and man on condition of faith (διὰ πίστεως) on man's part. Does the operation of this means of reconciliation terminate upon God, or upon man, or upon both? This inquiry leads us on to the consideration of the remainder of the passage and to a comparison of other passages.

After the assertion (verse 25[a]) that God had made Christ by his death a means of reconciliation between himself and man, he adds (verse 25[b]) a statement of the aim which God had in view in so doing and of the reason which impelled him to the action described. The end was "the manifestation of his

[1] Upon the use in the New Testament of ἱλασμός and kindred words, see Westcott on *The Epistles of Saint John*, pp. 85–87.

righteousness" (ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ), and the reason was the "passing over [πάρεσις] of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God." This reconciling work of Christ, then, had the object of exhibiting God's righteousness, and was occasioned or rendered necessary by the fact that God had leniently treated the sins of mankind in pre-Christian times, and had thus exposed his moral government to the charge or suspicion of remissness in the punishment of sin (*cf.* Acts xvii. 30). "God judged it necessary, on account of the impunity so long enjoyed by those myriads of sinners who succeeded one another on the earth, at length to manifest his justice by a striking act," etc.[1] This interpretation of the phrase διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν κ. τ. λ., in which most exegetes are now agreed, has an important bearing upon the force of δικαιοσύνη, which is said to have been exhibited by Christ's death.[2]

The manifestation of God's righteousness is spoken of as occasioned by a certain leniency in his former treatment of sin. If this manifestation will now vindicate the divine majesty against the appearance or charge of slackness in that respect, it must do

[1] Godet, *Commentary on Romans*, p. 156.

[2] Many of the older interpreters, as Luther and Calvin, and some moderns, as Hodge, understood πάρεσις to mean the same as ἄφεσις, — forgiveness, — and, forcing the meaning of the preposition διά (as if it were εἰς), interpreted the phrase to mean "in order to secure the forgiveness of the sins done aforetime." This misinterpretation was adopted in our older English version: "for the remission of sins that are past."

so by demonstrating that God is not really remiss in the treatment of sin. The righteousness which is thus exhibited must therefore be a name for the attitude or temper of God toward sin. It is the law and penalty side of the divine nature which the apostle has prominently in mind in the use of the word "righteousness." His statement means that in Christ's violent death was revealed and vindicated the punitive righteousness of God so as completely to refute the idea that he is lenient in his feeling toward sin, and so that the ends of penalty are met by the sufferings and death of Christ for all who trust in him for salvation. Hence Paul concludes that God is shown in this work of Christ to be just, to retain his holiness inviolate as being essentially hostile to sin, while he is also the justifier of those who accept for themselves the exemption from penalty which another method of vindicating the divine righteousness makes possible.

This interpretation, which alone satisfies the terms of the passage as a whole, and renders all its parts congruous with one another, makes it highly probable that ἱλαστήριον bears here its simple etymological meaning, — a means of rendering favorable. The view that God made Christ a mercy-seat — One in whom he revealed his gracious presence — for the manifestation of his righteousness, could naturally interpret the term "righteousness" only in the sense of goodness or graciousness. But the manifestation of graciousness to men, so far from rescuing the divine action

from the appearance of leniency toward sin, would in itself tend to strengthen the impression of such leniency. This interpretation — which Ritschl has espoused and defended in recent years[1] — breaks down in its application to the terms of the passage as a whole. It will be seen to be equally inconsistent with other passages.

In Gal. iii. 13 Christ is said to have "become a curse for us" (*γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα*); and in 2 Cor. v. 21 it is affirmed that God made him to be "sin on our behalf" (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν*). The first passage is connected with the proof (verses 10–12) that under the law, not a blessing, but a curse, is experienced, because the law must condemn sin, yet cannot deliver man from its guilt and power. This curse which impended over the Jewish people under the legal system, Christ has taken away by himself taking the place of one accursed, and enduring the penal sufferings which must otherwise have fallen upon those who were under the curse which the law pronounced.

The analogy which underlies this representation of Christ's work is a commercial one. He has bought off by ransom (*ἐξηγόρασεν*) those who were under the law's curse. He has paid a price for their deliverance, — the endurance in his sufferings and death of the penal consequences of sin. He has taken on himself the curse with which the law threatened sin, and

[1] *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, ii. 169 *sq.*

has thus illustrated, in his vicarious death on the cross, the Old Testament declaration (Deut. xxi. 23) concerning the ignominy and shame attaching to such as have their bodies hung upon a stake or tree.

But Christ was "made sin for us;" that is, he so far took the sinner's place as to suffer in his stead. He was made, in some sense, the bearer of the sinner's guilt and penalty, in order that the sinner himself might not bear it, but be accounted righteous upon believing in Christ. No clear and definite meaning except this can be attached to the phrases "curse for us," and "sin for us." In confirmation of this position it may be useful to introduce the interpretations of the last passage which are given by representative scholars of various theological opinions. Weiss paraphrases the passage thus, —

"God has made him, who did not know sin, to be sin in our behalf; has looked upon him and treated him as if he were a sinner, in order that we might become the righteousness of God in him, — that is, that on the ground of what happened to him, we could be looked upon and treated as those whom God declares to be righteous."[1]

Pfleiderer, after quoting the verse, adds,—

"That is, God has allowed his sinless Son to enter as the bearer of the guilt and penalty of sin, and by dying to expiate its guilt, in order that we, by virtue of our connection through faith with Christ and by entering into his

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 80 *b.*

relation of sonship to God, may be looked upon as justified from this guilt." [1]

Meyer, commenting on the passage, says, —

"Christ was actually exhibited by God as the *concretum* of ἁμαρτία, as ἁμαρτωλός, in being subjected by him to suffer the punishment of death. . . . The guilt of which Christ, made to be sin and a curse by God, appears as bearer, was not his own [μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν]; and hence the guilt of men, who through his death were justified by God, was transferred to him; consequently the justification of men is imputative. . . . Christ is conceived by the apostle as in reality the bearer of the divine κατάρα, and his death as *mors vicaria* for the benefit [ὑπέρ] of sinful men, to be whose ἱλαστήριον he was accordingly made by God a sinner. As the γίνεσθαι δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ took place for men imputatively, so also did the ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν αὐτόν take place for Christ imputatively." [2]

Heinrici makes this comment, —

"Thus God accomplishes an exchange, in that what belongs to the sinner is imparted to Christ, and conversely, what belongs to the Christ, to the sinner." [3]

It appears, then, that, according to the apostle, there was in Christ's death a revelation of the divine righteousness in its attitude toward sin, — an expression of the divine wrath (ὀργὴ θεοῦ, Rom. i. 18), of which

[1] *Das Urchristenthum*, p. 225.

[2] Commentary *in loco*.

[3] *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinthier*, p. 308.

men are, by reason of their sins, the object.[1] The inference is inevitable that the reconciliation which Christ effected between God and man did not concern merely one, but both of the parties to it. It affected man so as to bring him to God; but it also conditioned the divine procedure and rendered a satisfaction to the demands of law and righteousness which call for the punishment of sin. Two problems, then, press for solution: (*a*) In what sense is Christ's death *for us*, and his sufferings *instead of* our punishment? and (*b*) How does his vicarious work meet the demands of the law, and satisfy the ethical requirements of God's holy nature in respect to sin? Neither of these inquiries is explicitly answered by any statement contained in Paul's letters. The problem is, What view on these points best comports with his affirmations, and with their clear implications?

Can the apostle in teaching that Christ died for our sins, or was made sin for us, mean that he bore the literal penalty of our sins; that is, that his sufferings had the moral quality of punishment for him? Though he appeared in the sinner's place and suffered in his stead, can he be regarded as having been punished? If he was punished, it can only have

[1] It is generally agreed that ἐχθροὶ ὄντες, κ. τ. λ. (Rom. v. 10), is passive, not active, in signification, — "when we were the objects of God's wrath," not "when we were hostile to God." This meaning alone is natural for ἐχθροί as the counterpart of δικαιωθέντες, and is favored by the contrast of ἐχθροί and ἀγαπητοί in Rom. xi. 28. So Meyer, Pfleiderer, Weiss, *vs.* Baur, Ritschl, Weber.

been upon one of two grounds,—either upon that of ill-desert, which would contradict Paul's whole doctrine of Christ's person, or upon the ground of a transfer of penalty. But punishment implies guilt; and guilt attaches to the sin committed and to him who commits it. A punishment of Christ instead of the guilty party would imply the literal transfer of the guilt of man to him; for punishment where there is no guilt would be an injustice. But guilt is the inseparable consequence of the sin done, and cannot attach to an innocent person. There can, then, be no punishment where there is no guilt, and there can be no guilt where there is no ill-desert. To predicate punishment of Christ's sufferings would mean either to predicate guilt of him, which would deny his sinlessness, or to affirm a transfer of others' guilt to him in such a sense that he became the object of God's wrath, which is contrary to the nature of guilt, and confuses all moral distinctions regarding sin, guilt, and penalty. That Paul cannot have intended to affirm that Christ was punished is *a priori* probable from the obvious implications of such a statement. His words have been thought to involve this view; but if they had been so intended, they would surely have been made more explicit. There is no such statement as that Christ died instead of (*ἀντί*) us; he is said to have died on our behalf (*ὑπέρ*), or on behalf of our sins. If the statement that he "became a curse for us" is urged as necessarily meaning that he came under a personal sense of God's displeasure, —

that is, was punished by literally suffering the penal infliction of the curse due to sin, — it must then be said that the kindred phrase "God made him to be sin for us" is to be as rigidly interpreted and cannot mean less than that God made him a sinner, — a meaning which is, however, excluded by the next phrase, "who knew no sin." A method of interpretation cannot be applied in one case which in a kindred instance would be self-contradictory.

If Christ's sufferings cannot have been the quantitative equivalent, nor have had the moral quality, of the punishment due, in the moral order, to sin, in what sense can they have been a substitute for man's punishment? They can have been so only in the sense, that, though not the same in quantity or quality, they answered the essential moral ends of punishment. In place of the punishment of the sinner, there took place a gracious substitution of another method of vindicating and satisfying the moral requirements of law and holiness. The substitution of Christ for us, therefore, does not mean that he stood in our place and took our punishment, as an innocent man might stand beneath the descending weapon which was to avenge a civil crime, — a substitution which would be merely mechanical, and without ethical value as affecting the *guilt* of the offender; nor does it mean that he personally assumed our guilt and suffered its punishment, — a substitution which, if not impossible, would be inherently unjust. Christ's sufferings and death for us mean the substitution of

another course of divine action instead of the infliction of penalty. This method is not a merely lenient treatment, an unconditional forgiveness of sin, instead of a penal procedure against it. It is a course of action which effectually rescues God's action in the treatment of sin from the charge or appearance of laxness, and proves a real *ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ* (Rom. iii. 25, 26).

If Christ's sufferings and death are a substitute for man's punishment, they must, equally with that punishment, reveal, vindicate, and satisfy the divine righteousness by furnishing an effective demonstration of the divine hatred of sin. That only can be a substitute for punishment which meets its moral ends. If the penalty of sin is to be remitted, this can be done only on condition that some other way of procedure is found which shall be consistent with the inviolable holiness of God and which shall manifest and vindicate it. To say, however, that holiness must inevitably punish is either to exclude forgiveness altogether or to declare that Christ was punished. It would be more consonant with Paul's thought to say that the divine holiness, the self-preservative attribute in God, must be manifested against sin; punishment of the sin itself is one such manifestation; in the work of Christ for men, God has chosen and pursued another in its stead, so that the punishment may be remitted without laxness toward the sin and without its endurance by an innocent person.

In this view, Christ becomes a curse for us, not in

the sense of becoming the object of divine wrath, but in the sense that he substituted his suffering for the penalty which threatened man. He was made sin for us, not by having a sinner's experience of punishment, but by taking the place of the sinner in an experience of suffering which, being instead of the sinner's punishment, met the ends for which punishment exists in the moral order of the world. The vicariousness of Christ's work does not consist in the substitution of Christ's punishment for ours, but in the substitution of his sufferings for our punishment.

How those sufferings can be regarded as a moral equivalent for punishment and as answering its ends, is a question for doctrinal theology and the central problem of the atonement. The apostle has nowhere touched directly upon it. It is inseparable, however, in a critical inquiry, from his teaching regarding substitution, and especially does it force itself upon the mind in every attempt to answer the question, What can be meant by the setting forth of Christ as a ἱλαστήριον in the shedding of his blood on the cross? The question, Why do Christ's sufferings avail as a substitute for man's punishment? Paul answers by saying, because they are an adequate demonstration of the divine righteousness. The further inquiry, What is there in these sufferings which renders them a vindication of God's holiness and a satisfaction to his law? is much more difficult to answer by appeal to the apostle's language. The reply, so commonly given, that it was because in them Christ

was enduring the penalty of the world's sin, has the advantage of simplicity and directness, but is exposed to the great difficulties which have been noticed. If in his sufferings and death he did not, in the strict sense, assume man's guilt and penalty, he must, nevertheless, in those experiences have in some way satisfied those demands of holiness which otherwise would have found expression in punishment.

Christ voluntarily humbled himself by taking the servant-form and identifying himself with man. In so doing he must come into participation in the sorrows and sufferings which were inseparable from man's sinful state. He would therefore, though personally sinless and not liable to punishment, come into the most intense and vivid realization of human guilt. He would inevitably suffer its consequences by virtue of his identification with sinful man. His life would be lived throughout under the most painful consciousness of the enormity of sin and of its desert of penalty. His very purity would make his realization of the guilt of sin the more profound, and his suffering under the sense of it the more intense. Yet in order to save man he willingly bears this bitter fruit and consequence of human sinfulness. He suffers as he does because he is a pure being, living under the weight of the world's great sinfulness, the burdening, crushing consciousness of its desert of penalty. This suffering, considered on its physical side, culminates in a violent death, — the experience which represents the utmost that human sinfulness

could inflict, and which, therefore, becomes the symbol for his sufferings generally. These were made necessary by human sin, and were borne by Christ because he had come to man and had entered into his lot.

How can these sufferings be contemplated as a substitute for punishment? Because, being the consequence of sin, they were voluntarily borne by the sinless Christ as a solemn testimony, out of his own bitter experience, to the hatefulness of sin and the justice of God's appointment that misery and suffering shall follow it as its deserved penalty. Christ honored and vindicated this divine appointment by taking upon himself sufferings which belong in God's order to sin, thus upholding the justice of that divine order. Christ had entered through the vicariousness of infinite love into man's case. Man was under the penal consequences of sin. Christ comes under these, both by becoming the object of sinful treatment, and by the intense realization in his own spirit of sin's guilt; and he attests, by the severity of his sufferings, vicariously borne, the righteousness of God's hostility to sin. He thus becomes a curse so far as to realize and vindicate, in his own person and experience, the absolute justice of the curse upon sin, and to taste its bitterness so far as in his incarnation he is one with man. He is made sin for us inasmuch as on our behalf he enters by a sympathetic identification of himself with us into the intense realization of our sin and guilt, and therein fully acknowledges the justice of the sufferings which are

divinely appointed as sin's consequence. He is a ἱλαστήριον — a means of reconciling God and man — not merely in the sense of furnishing motives to man to repent and turn to God; his work affects the relation of man and God on both sides. He does not indeed propitiate God (no such expression appears in the New Testament) in the sense of winning him from an unwillingness of mind to save men, since the whole work of salvation, alike in its plan and execution, originates in the will of God to save men. God is the object of the reconciling work of Christ in so far as Christ fulfils certain conditions of the divine procedure in the remission of man's punishment. God is rendered favorable to man's forgiveness by the work of Christ in the sense that an adequate revelation of his righteousness against sin is made in his sufferings, — a revelation which in some way must find place as the recoil of his holy nature against sin. The reconciliation does not have God's disposition for its object, as if he were thereby made willing to forgive. It has him for its object only in his relation to sin as disapproving it. If this disapproval is not to find expression in punishment, the obstacle which exists to sin's unconditional forgiveness in that essential hostility of God's nature to sin must be removed by the adoption of some other expression of that disapproval. In this sense only does God become reconciled to man in the work of Christ; he thus removes an obstacle to forgiveness by pursuing another course (equally valid to secure the ends of justice) than that

of punishing, and thus fulfils the condition of the operation of his grace.

In further illustration of the general view of Christ's atoning work which is outlined above, the reader may find the following extracts and references of service: —

"From his [Christ's] cross there arose the most perfect homage rendered to the righteousness of God. In this death the sin of mankind was therefore doubly judged, and the righteousness of God doubly manifested, — by the external fact of this painful and ignominious punishment, and by the inward act of Christ's conscience, which ratified this dealing of which sin was the object in his person." [1]

"From the point of view to which the exposition of the apostle brings us, this equivalent [of the penalty of sin] is not intended to *satisfy* divine justice except by *manifesting* it, and by re-establishing the normal relation between God and the guilty creature. His [God's] holiness would protest against every pardon which did not fulfil the double condition of glorifying his outraged majesty and of displaying the condemnation of sin. Now this double end is gained only by the expiatory sacrifice." [2]

"The death of Christ was a propitiation for the sins of men because it was a revelation of the righteousness of God, on the ground of which he can remit the penalties of sin; because it was an act of submission to the justice of those penalties on behalf of mankind, — an act in which our own submission was really and

[1] Godet, *Commentary on Romans, in loco*, iii. 25.

[2] Ib., Excursus on *The Expiation*, p. 160.

virtually included; and because it secured the destruction of sin in those who through faith are restored to union with Christ. It is therefore the supreme and irresistible argument by which we can now sustain our appeal to God's infinite mercy to grant us forgiveness of sin and deliverance from the wrath to come." [1]

Paul's description of the reconciling work of Christ in terms of juridical or commercial analogies is that which has chiefly shaped theological language and thought respecting the atonement. The death of Christ as a ransom; his payment of our debt; his endurance of the penalty which threatened us; his satisfaction to the demands of law, — these have become the current terms of theological language. They have sometimes been extravagantly applied, as when the ransom-price was said to have been paid to the Devil to purchase the release of man from his power, in the patristic theology; or, as when Christ was said to have suffered the combined tor-

[1] Dale, *The Atonement*, p. 434. The student who may desire further to pursue the study of this type of thought regarding the subject of expiation, will find abundant means for so doing in the following literature: three articles by W. F. Gess in the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* for 1857, 1858, and 1859, especially that entitled, *Die Nothwendigkeit des Sühnens Christi;* Lyttelton on the Atonement in *Lux Mundi;* Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, especially Lecture vii.; Jonathan Edwards on *Satisfaction for Sin*, *Works*, i. 582 *sq.;* Fisher, *Faith and Rationalism*, Appendix vi.; and, with important variations in emphasis and conception, Rothe, *Dogmatik;* Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis;* J. McLeod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement;* Bushnell, *Forgiveness and Law.*

tures of all the lost, as by the older Reformed and Lutheran dogmaticians.[1] These extravagances are illustrations of forcing a particular figure to do service as the basis of a whole theory, rather than, as it was intended, to illustrate some phase of the great theme. When the commercial or judicial analogies which the apostle uses to express his thought are followed out into all the inferences which they can be made, by a rigid application, to yield, the extravagant one-sidedness of the result is made clearly to appear. The conclusion is inevitable that these expressions must not be treated like scientifically precise formulæ, but like human forms of thought, — the most useful forms which were available, for the illustration and enforcement of truths and relations which are beyond the full reach of definition by any human analogies. Few, if any, of those systems of thought regarding the atonement which, like those of Anselm or Grotius, have been formed by a strict carrying out of some one particular analogy or thought-form, have proved satisfactory to Christian thinkers generally, as is shown by their constant effort to penetrate beneath the figures of ransom and forensic imputation to the moral and spiritual realities which underlie them.

There need be small difference among interpreters as to what Paul's language, in the class of passages just considered, says and means. The chief differ-

[1] For example, Heidegger, Hollaz, and Quenstedt; see Bruce, *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 439 *sq.*

ence arises over the problem, What is the just use of his expressions in theology? Shall the inferences which certain of his terms suggest be drawn, though he has not himself drawn them? Shall the fact that he designates Christ as a "means of propitiation," be said to imply that his sufferings propitiated God; that is, induced him to be gracious? Shall the statement that he was "made sin for us" be declared clearly to imply that he experienced under God's curse the equivalent of the misery of the lost? Shall the statement that he bought us off by ransom from the law's curse be forced to give answer to the question, To whom was this price paid? If so, the patristic answer must follow.

That the modes of thought here referred to have a large place in Paul's writings no competent interpreter will deny. What are the limits of their legitimate use in theology? is another question. That there are limits, most Christian thinkers will agree, as is shown by the general disfavor into which the theories of equivalence and purchase have fallen. It may serve to point the way to a more judicious view of this question to revert to the more distinctively ethical mode of thought which the apostle has himself applied to this same subject, and which may be regarded as complementary of that just reviewed. In Rom. iv. 25, Christ is said to have been "raised for our justification;" that is, in order to secure for us the divine declaration that we are accepted with God. The apostle thus grounds the attainment of salvation,

not only upon the death of Christ, but upon his resurrection so far as to imply in this passage that the resurrection was the complement of his death. The delivery up to death for our trespasses, the atonement for our sins which was made in his death, could not effect the result of our actual appropriation of salvation unless it had been followed by the resurrection from the dead. While, therefore, no strictly atoning significance is here or elsewhere ascribed to any event except the death of Christ, the resurrection is associated with the completion of salvation in such a way as to be made an essential factor. We may see in this passage a connecting link between the view of Christ's work just considered and that to which we now call attention. The representation that salvation is appropriated through an ethical dying and rising to new life with Christ is based upon the causal connection between those events and the believer's spiritual renewal. And thus we are brought to the subjective side of the work of salvation. In this view, salvation consists in fellowship of life with Christ, the cessation of the old, sinful life and the indwelling of Christ in the heart. The *causa meritoria* of salvation remains the death of Christ; but the language — intensely ethical and even mystical as it is — in which the apostle describes the participation of believers in its benefits, shows how far he is from abiding constantly by the formal figure of transfer and imputation. Salvation is not wrought merely by the acceptance of the cancellation of man's debt which

another has discharged, but by the actual entrance of the soul into life-fellowship with Christ. In the practical application of his doctrine to life, Paul frequently departs from the more formal, legal view of the processes and relations involved, and depicts the work of salvation as eminently an ethical affair.

Some have seen in this twofold manner of presenting the subject a diversity amounting almost to a contradiction. There is no just ground for such a view. Both forms of thought meet and blend in a higher unity. If the terms in which Christ's work is represented as an endurance of our deserts that we might escape them, or a payment of our debt which may be now regarded as discharged, are unduly pressed and treated as if the subject belonged to the sphere of mere commercial or penal law, and not rather to that of ethical principle, a great difficulty may indeed be found in reconciling the judicial and the ethical representations of salvation through Christ. If Christ's satisfaction were merely rendered to law so that its penalty might be withdrawn, as the more extreme governmental views would represent, then the appropriation of the benefits of that satisfaction would naturally bear a legal character also, and salvation would be defined as an acceptance of the fact that Christ had discharged our obligation for us. The apostle, however, defines salvation in terms of life; it is a matter of actual spiritual relations. Must he not also have regarded that work of Christ in which it was grounded as belonging to this realm, as no after-

thought or makeshift to meet the exigencies of government, but as a revelation and vindication of laws of life and being which are supreme and eternal in God? If Christ was the adequate revelation of God in his essential perfections, his work must have been in some way a satisfaction to God's ethical nature, — a perfect expression at once of "the goodness and severity of God." In that case, the appropriation of that work is no mere formal acceptance or assent, but is an entrance into fellowship with those perfections of God which Jesus revealed, honored, and satisfied. If the work of atonement is ethically viewed, the work of salvation may also be. If the mind penetrates to those essential, eternal, moral truths and relations which underlie Paul's treatment of Christ's death, there is no difficulty in passing to those ethical forms of thought in which he often describes the actual participation of the believer in Christ's death and resurrection. If, however, the formal modes of thought are adhered to as containing the essence of their meaning *in their very form*, and not in the moral relations and truths which they, by analogy, represent, a construction of the doctrine of the atonement results which can make small use of the terminology that pictures salvation as a moral process, if indeed it admits of reconciliation with such terminology at all.

The bearing of these more mystical descriptions of salvation upon Paul's theology can best be considered in full in connection with the subject of justification,

where they appear as the counterpart of a more formal mode of thought, — that of the imputation of faith. It is sufficient in this connection to point to them as illustrations of a method of thought on the apostle's part which shows that his mind did not remain imprisoned within the limits of the legal analogies which he used to illustrate and enforce his truth, but apprehended in a comprehensive and vital manner their essential ethical content and value.

CHAPTER X

THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

CLOSELY related to the doctrine of redemption, which deals with the objective provision for man's rescue from sin, stands that of justification, which treats of his personal appropriation of salvation. Although this doctrine is the logical counterpart of the doctrine of the cross, the apostle has not developed them in such close connection with each other as would doubtless have been the case had he not approached the subject of justification by faith with the aim of disproving the opposite view of justification by works. His teaching concerning the attainment of salvation is developed in his most controversial letters under the impetus of his polemic against the Pharisaic idea of merit; and little attention is directly bestowed upon adjusting it to the doctrine of Christ's death. These relations, however, as Paul must have conceived of them, are, in the main, not difficult to trace, although at some points the *nexus* is not easy to discover.

Paul's doctrine of gratuitous justification is no doubt closely connected with his own experience as a Pharisee, and with his conversion. He had felt

and proved in his own struggles after righteousness the inability of all human strivings to bring peace to the conscience. His experience — so clearly reflected in the seventh chapter of Romans — had effectively disproved for him the opinion that salvation was conditioned upon man's merits and achievements, — the view of the subject commonly held by the members of his sect.[1] His polemic against Jewish and Judaizing theories of salvation had, therefore, its starting-point in the experience by which he had been delivered from the bitterness and despair of his life as a Pharisee into the freedom and joy of the Christian believer. The radical defect which Paul sees in the Jewish view is that it derogates from the divine grace by making man earn and deserve his acceptance with God. It results from the inherent absurdity of this view that men are encouraged to attempt an achievement of goodness which, by reason of their sinfulness, they are utterly powerless to accomplish, and whose fruitless pursuit is sure to plunge them into ever-deepening despair. The doctrine of justification has thus an immediately practical aim; and it should not seem strange if certain theological aspects of the doctrine, and certain points of connection with related doctrines, which are of great interest for a

[1] For a full exposition of the popular Jewish view of righteousness and of the conditions of its attainment, see Weber, *Die Lehren des Talmud,* cap. xix., entitled *Die Gerechtigkeit vor Gott und das Verdienst,* especially §§ 60, 61. The substance of this chapter has been reproduced by me in *The Old and New Testament Student* for July, 1889.

systematic treatment of the subject, should not have received the apostle's attention.

A succinct statement of Paul's doctrine on this subject would be that sinful man, upon condition of exercising faith in the Redeemer, who has made a full provision for man's acceptance with God, is declared to be righteous in God's sight, and is received and treated as such. It is too well established to require further discussion, that, in Paul's usage, the word "to justify" (*δικαιοῦν*) denotes primarily a forensic act, the making of a declaration, the pronouncing of a judgment, rather than a moral process of making just through an infusion of righteousness. In like manner *δίκαιος* designates one in whose favor this judgment has been pronounced, and *δικαιοσύνη* the *status* or relation of such a person. The terms are judicial in their use, and the process which they describe is depicted in accordance with legal analogies. The faith which is the condition of the justifying judgment is best understood negatively as the contrast to works (*ἔργα*) in the popular Jewish theology; that is, deeds of meritorious legal observance. It is the opposite of achievement or deserving; it is self-surrender, humility, acceptance. More positively defined, it is, in general, trust in God's grace; in particular, personal trust in Christ, in whom that grace is chiefly revealed and assured to sinful man. "Faith" and "grace" are thus correlative terms and are the pivots of Paul's whole teaching. Grace is the principle in God which initiates and completes the work of salvation; and faith is the act in

which man appropriates it. The corresponding terms in the scheme of thought which Paul opposes are "debt" and "works." If salvation could be attained by works, it would not be a gift of grace on God's part, but, being deserved by man, might be demanded as his right, and so be matter of debt to him (Rom. iv. 4).

Besides the word "to justify" we have, as an equivalent expression, the phrase to "reckon [λογίζεσθαι] righteousness" to one, or to "reckon his faith for righteousness." There are two cases of the occurrence of the former phrase (Rom. iv. 6, 11), and seven where the latter is found (Rom. iv. 3, 5, 9, 22, 23, 24; Gal. iii. 6). It will be seen from the prevalence of the latter expression that Paul's characteristic thought is that of the imputation of faith; and when the two passages in which righteousness is said to be imputed are compared, they are found to present but another expression for the same idea. In the first instance (Rom. iv. 6) the apostle, in allusion to Psalm xxxii. 1, 2, speaks of the blessedness of gracious forgiveness as experienced by the man "unto whom God reckoneth righteousness apart from works," — an expression which, as the quotation which follows it shows, is equivalent to the non-reckoning or forgiveness of sin. In the other (iv. 11) righteousness is spoken of as being reckoned to believers in the same way as to Abraham, the type of all believers. But the reckoning of righteousness to Abraham is identical with the imputation of his faith for righteousness, — a form of expression which occurs six times in this same chapter.

It is obvious, then, that the theological formula, "the imputation of Christ's righteousness," can have no basis in these expressions. If this were not clear from the evident equivalence of the phrases, reckoning righteousness and reckoning faith, it would be made so by the fact that both instances of reckoning righteousness referred to are drawn from the Old Testament sphere, where the reckoning of Christ's merit, in the sense of Christian theology, could not come within the circle of the thought which he is developing.[1] It will be a subsequent inquiry whether this formula has a real ground in the implications of the Pauline system.

The word "righteousness" in connection with Paul's doctrine of justification has a technical meaning which it is not easy concisely to define. It is δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (Rom. iii. 21),—a righteousness which comes from God, as opposed to the idea of its originating in human attainment. Hence it is described as the righteousness which is from God on condition of faith (ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει), in contrast

[1] On this point, considered as a question of exegesis, the opinions of critics are well agreed, and the conclusion is incontrovertible that theological symbols like the *Formula Concordiæ* and the *Westminster Confession* (ch. xi.), in denying the imputation of faith and asserting the imputation of Christ's merit, have proceeded, as Meyer affirms, *ultra quod scriptum est*. *Cf.* Meyer on Rom. iv. 5, note. Weiss says, "The idea that God reckons the righteousness of Christ unto man is not Pauline; it is not contained even in Rom. v. 19." *Bib. Theol.* § 82 *b*, note 3; Eng. tr. i. p. 440, note 2.

with one's own righteousness, which is of the law (*ἐμὴ δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ νόμου*, Phil. iii. 9). The Jews are said to have been ignorant of God's righteousness (*ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη*), and to have sought to establish their own righteousness (*ἡ ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*, Rom. x. 3). Righteousness, then, in these connections, does not mean moral perfection, but a state of gracious acceptance into which the believer, upon condition of his faith, is admitted. It is an acquittal which proceeds from God, whereby the believer is declared forgiven and accepted before him. The righteousness which is of the law would need to be moral perfection in the nature of the case. If one will have righteousness by his own acts, he must fulfil all the obligations which its perfect attainment involves. Should one completely meet these requirements he would be a *δίκαιος*, not by grace, but by debt. Should one by obedience attain perfection, he would be entitled to the recognition of that attainment in the judgment of justification (Gal. iii. 12; Rom. ii. 13). But this righteousness — perfect obedience to the law's demands — man is powerless to achieve. There remains open to him, however, a righteousness which consists in a state of pardon and acceptance before God, which, though unmerited, is accorded him on the ground of the gracious work of Christ in his behalf. This righteousness, so far from being attained by merit, or produced within himself, is conferred upon him, though he does not in himself possess it. It is now his own in so far as the

imputation makes it his privilege and right, but is not his own either in respect to its origin or as inhering in his character. It will be seen how objectively Paul treats of righteousness in the formal development of his doctrine of justification. It is represented as a *status* rather than a character; it bears the stamp of a legal rather than of an ethical conception.[1]

The motive of the apostle in developing this idea in so purely objective a manner is easy to discover. It was to guard his teaching with the utmost care against the Jewish idea of righteousness by man's own merit. His view of righteousness is a corollary of his fundamental doctrine of grace. Righteousness is something which is accorded to man, though he does not possess or deserve it; that is, it is a gift of *grace*. Justification is a treatment of man which is better than he deserves. God reckons to him something which he does not have. The same motive which impelled the apostle to magnify God's grace in salvation as against all human deserving, has commonly secured in theology a very close adherence to the forensic side of Paul's teaching upon this subject, and has even carried theological definition in this direction so far beyond the apostle's statements as almost to make justification a mere *fiat*, and not an

[1] I can refer the reader to no more elaborate and convincing proof of the forensic character of Paul's doctrine of justification than is found in Morison's *Exposition of Romans Third*, pp. 163–200.

ethical affair at all, and actually to deny the imputation of faith and affirm instead the imputation of Christ's righteousness, lest, by allowing that faith was imputed, the view should seem to be favored that faith was itself a "work," and thus salvation, after all, an attainment of man. It should be borne in mind, however, that in expounding his doctrine of justification, Paul was waging an intense polemic (the great conflict of his life) against the Jews' idea of man's deserving salvation, — an idea which naturally sprang out of their conception of their peculiar claims and prerogatives as the supposed favorites of heaven. That he should, in refuting this error, magnify every point which illustrates the gracious view of salvation would be most natural. That in his polemic he should go so far as to seem to separate the work of man's salvation from all ethical processes within himself, and to make it a matter of the divine judgment and efficiency alone, need not be thought strange. If there is, in one set of representations, a certain one-sidedness in Paul's legal conception of righteousness and in his forensic view of justification, it should neither be hastily inferred, on the one hand, that these conceptions should be read out of his epistles by exegetical artifices, or rejected as valueless, nor, on the other hand, that they set the limits to all Paul's thought on the subject, much less to Christian thought in general, and give an inflexible law to theological reflection and definition regarding the dealings of God with man in salvation. It is at

least a justifiable observation that theology need not push Paul's juridical conception beyond the point to which he has himself carried it, since it is reasonable to think that the apostle employed these forensic representations as far as they were serviceable to the truth which he was maintaining. In another instance, where the apostle was waging war upon certain unfounded Jewish assumptions, we saw (chap. v.) that the purposely one-sided *argumentum ad hominem* with which he opposes and humbles their pretensions (Rom. ix.) is afterward so supplemented (chaps. x., xi., esp. x. 21; xi. 20, 22, 23) as to assign to men in the dispensations of God their own measure of responsibility, to relieve the divine action of the arbitrariness which appeared to be asserted of it, and to answer the very natural query (ix. 19) which, in the course of the polemic where it is stated, is treated as presumptuous. May it not be that the court analogies to which by his Jewish education Paul's mind was accustomed, and which served so well his doctrine of a gracious, as opposed to a deserved, justification, do not represent all of Paul's thought upon the subject, and do not give us the only light in which we may view it? It seems desirable to take a more comprehensive view than a mere exegesis of individual passages can yield, and to inquire into the idea of justification in the light of Paul's whole system of ideas. This inquiry is perhaps most naturally started by the question, Why, according to Paul, is faith reckoned for

righteousness? or, What is the real relation between the two which entitles the one to be taken for the other?

In answering this question, theological thought has taken two different directions. One reply is, that the connection between faith and righteousness is solely a matter of divine arrangement. Faith is neither righteousness nor the germ of righteousness. God has declared himself pleased to accept it and to reckon righteousness to man on condition of the exercise of faith, although there is no inherent, vital connection between the two. As our sins were imputed to Christ by a sovereign act of God, so that he bore their penalty, so his righteousness is imputed to us, if we fulfil the condition which God requires. Faith, then, is simply a resting upon the substitutionary work of Christ on our behalf, and cannot be reckoned for righteousness because there is any identity of principle or causal connection between the two, but only because God is graciously pleased to impute Christ's merit to him who in faith rests his hope wholly upon it. Is the man now who is thus accounted "righteous" really so? He is not. He is covered or clothed with Christ's merit, which now avails for him, but personally he is no more righteous than before. The decree of justification pronounces him righteous only in the sense that he is treated as if he possessed the righteousness of Christ. He is imputatively, not ethically, righteous.

The other answer to the question proceeds from the

effort to establish a real, inner connection between faith and righteousness. It is held that faith is reckoned for righteousness because it is the principle or beginning of righteousness; it is that attitude or temper of mind toward God and his gracious salvation which, renouncing self-sufficiency, humbly receives from him what he offers to the soul. Faith is surrender, trust, receptiveness. It is not merely a condition of being pronounced righteous; it is the actual entrance upon the righteous life, because it is the beginning of glad and loyal obedience. Salvation is by faith, because faith is the act of acceptance by the soul, of Christ as its master, and of his spirit as its law. What is accepted is the grace and forgiveness offered in the atonement. It is the acceptance of Christ's righteousness, not through imputation, but by actual participation in it through vital union with him. Christ's righteousness — that is, his life and spirit — is appropriated in faith; and the man whom God, in the sentence of justification, pronounces righteous is really so, not indeed, in the sense of being morally perfect, but in the sense of having begun the life of real righteousness, — the life which is well-pleasing to God.[1]

[1] *Cf.* Pfleiderer's statement of the two contrasted views, *Urchristenthum*, pp. 249, 250. The characteristic idea of one is a "Zurechnung des Verdienstes oder der fremden Gerechtigkeit Christi an den Sünder;" the other regards faith as "sittlich gute Gesinnung oder Tugend." His criticism of both these opinions and his discussion of the elements of truth in each well deserve careful reading.

It will be seen that these two solutions of the problem start out from widely different presuppositions. The former view proceeds in rigid adherence to the judicial conceptions of Paul's argument. The relation between God's action in the treatment of men and the legal processes of a court, which is implied in such words as "justify" and "impute," is strictly carried out, and upon it is built a philosophy of the whole subject. The forensic conception is not treated as embodying an analogy and thus as furnishing an illustration, drawn from human relations, of higher spiritual realities, but is treated as if it were a scientific definition. The thought-form is identified with the absolute truth, and must therefore be preserved consistently throughout in constructing a doctrine of salvation.

The second method of treatment proceeds upon the assumption that the juridical mode of depicting God's relation to men is but one form of conceiving of that relation, — a form which is indeed prevalent with Paul, — and that it is the province of theology to seek and define the essential ethical content of truth which these forms embody; to translate these legal terms as fully as possible into their moral equivalents. Sometimes the effort is made to show that Paul's terms are not so wholly forensic as has been commonly claimed, and to construct by exegesis a more purely ethical view of justification.[1] We have already

[1] See, for example, Lyman Abbott's *Commentary on Romans*, *passim*; Sabatier, *L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 273 *sq.*; Eng. tr. 297 *sq.* The

shown (chap. ii.) that this effort involves exegetical violence, and cannot succeed. The formal structure of the Pauline doctrine of justification stands out in clear, bold relief. The best exegetes are well agreed as to the meaning of its terms; there is small reason why they need disagree, so clear and strong are the marks with which the apostle has struck out the outlines of his doctrine. The problem is to be remanded to another court than that of mere exegesis, and cannot be settled by appeal to one class of passages alone, in which a certain legal mode of thought obviously predominates, as is the case with those which deal directly with the doctrine of justification. The question is whether it is permissible to seek to define the ethical and spiritual counterpart of this formal doctrine; whether it accords with Paul's thought as a whole to suppose that his legal terms were to him really the symbols of living spiritual realities and processes; nay, whether Paul, in connections where he is not building a dogma of justification, but speak-

most exhaustive exegetical argument for the ethical view of justification with which I am familiar is that of Lipsius (*Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre u. s. w.* Leipzig, 1853), who maintains the view that δικαιοσύνη designates not "ausschliesslich ein objectiv gegebenes äusserliches Verhältniss zu Gott, sondern stets zugleich einen wirklichen innern Zustand der Rechtbeschaffenheit," p. 10. It is understood, however, that the author has so far retracted this and kindred positions as to disclaim that they can be established by exegesis. The fact that his able argument, which has convinced so many others, does not now convince the author himself, may be taken as an indication that the theory which it advocates cannot, as a matter of exegesis, be successfully defended.

ing practically of the Christian life, does not so express himself regarding the union of the believer with Christ, and the required and actual character of the true Christian man, as to make it necessary in attempting to reproduce the whole Pauline thought regarding salvation to supplement his formal doctrine by other elements derived from his own letters, — in other words, to find in his teaching concerning the Christian life the *matter* which corresponds to the *form* that we have been considering. I unhesitatingly adopt the view that this is not only allowable, but necessary to a right systematic treatment of the thoughts of Paul concerning salvation.

Let us turn to the Epistle to the Romans. The doctrine of justification is developed in chapter iv. In chapter v. the apostle dwells on the blessed consequences of the justified state, — peace, joy, and the assurance of yet greater blessings from divine grace, since it is more mighty and prevailing than the power of sin. In chapter vi. he enters upon a description of the requirements of the Christian life. He speaks of conversion as a dying to sin (vi. 2); he affirms that the rite by which the beginning of their spiritual life was symbolized signifies the cessation of the old sinful life and the commencement of a process of spiritual renewal (verses 3, 4). The "old man," the former sinful self, died with Christ; that is, the unregenerate nature became inoperative, ceased to be the determining power of the life in the converted man. The very same spiritual process which, in the formal

development of the doctrine, is treated as a judgment or decree of God is now described as an ethical and spiritual transformation figuratively called a "death," in order at once to emphasize the completeness of the change and causally to connect it with Christ's sacrifice (*cf.* chap. ii.). So completely identical are the juridical justification and the ethical death that the apostle can mingle in the same sentence the terms which are descriptive of each, and say: "He that *hath died* is *justified* from sin" (verse 7). Throughout the remainder of the chapter (verses 8–23) he enforces the strenuous demand for holiness which is involved in the very idea of the Christian life, by comparing the complete separation from sin which Christ experienced at his death, with the breaking away from the sinful life which should take place in the case of the one who dies to sin with him (verses 10, 11); also by showing that the life of sin involves a terrible bondage of soul (verses 12–20), and by pointing out the fruitlessness and misery of this life in the end (verses 21–23).

If one traces the main current of the apostle's thought through the next two chapters (vii., viii.), it will be found that he further develops the same intensely ethical conception of the Christian life both in its beginning, its nature, and its demands. In vii. 1–6 he draws the lesson that the Christian life is a service "in newness of the spirit, and not in oldness of the letter" (verse 6); and to enforce this truth, he proceeds to describe (verses 7–25) the bondage and despair to

which the service "in the oldness of the letter" actually leads, — a description which is intensified by his own experience. He then turns again in chapter viii. to the spiritual as contrasted with the legal life, and develops the great thoughts toward which all his previous arguments and illustrations have been tending. This chapter is the summit of the apostle's thought, and should be regarded as the very heart of the epistle. The dogmatic treatment of the letter, disregarding alike its systematic and progressive character and the inner connections of its thoughts, has commonly laid the main emphasis upon the fourth chapter, or perhaps with equal frequency upon the parallel between Adam and Christ, or, more unjustifiably still, upon one member of that comparison, the Adam-side of the parallel. This procedure is quite as unwarranted in the light of a genetic study of Paul's thoughts as is the effort of exegesis to find the ideas of chapter viii. already present and expressed in chapter iv.

Remembering that the last half of chapter v. (verses 12–21) and all of chapter vii. are illustrative in character, we may look upon chapters v. 1–11, vi., and viii. as a connected development of the same truth, — that the saved or justified state involves in its very idea a moral renewal, a spiritual life. The condition of entering this life may be called faith, or it may be called a moral death to sin. If these terms are so nearly identical that they involve one another, as their interchange shows them to be, it cannot be that Paul

regards faith as a mere formal, non-moral requirement, an arbitrary condition of the issue of a decree. If after developing, in opposition to the Pharisaic principle of "works," the doctrine of a gracious justification apart from merit, and on condition of humble acceptance and trust, he proceeds to expound to believers what is involved in this life of faith and what is its whole idea, nature, and demand, it will certainly not be unnatural to take this exposition as expressing his ripest and most essential thoughts on the subject. His polemic against a false view in chapter iv., where he wards off the theory of merit by showing that God treats man, not as he deserves, but better than he deserves, must be supplemented by that exposition of the subject which is addressed distinctively to believers, and which is wholly positive and constructive, rather than defensive, in its purpose and spirit. In chapter iv. he develops the *formal* principle of salvation, which is justification by faith, treated in a forensic manner in accord with prevailing Jewish conceptions; in chapters v., vi., and viii. he unfolds the *real* principle of salvation, which is moral renewal through union with Christ. The first argument is designed to parry a false theory, and meets that theory on its own juristic plane of thought; the second exposition is adapted to the edification and instruction of believers, and mounting up into the spiritual realm, deals with the moral and religious truths, processes, and forces which are involved in justification. Strange that theology should so often have

insisted upon constructing its doctrine upon the formal principle alone. By so doing, the process of salvation is left without definite content; and in order to give it such, the theory is driven to introduce positively un-Pauline elements, such as the imputation of Christ's merit. Let the view of the genetic connection of Paul's thoughts outlined above be tested by fuller reference to the eighth chapter.

In the opening words we meet the conception of the justified state which involves Paul's deepest philosophy of salvation: "There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." Here again are found both elements or types of thought in closest union. The δίκαιος is free from condemnation; no accusation can now be made against him, and why? It would be Pauline to answer: Because upon condition of his relying for pardon upon the sacrificial work of Christ on his behalf, God has pronounced him acquitted before the law. But it is also Pauline to answer that he is secure from condemnation because he is "in Christ Jesus," one with him in life and character through the indwelling of Christ in his spirit (Gal. ii. 20), through the hiding of his life with Christ in God (Col. iii. 3). Such is the apostle's reasoning in this connection, as is seen in his explanation of the phrase, "in Christ Jesus." "For," he says, "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" — the power or principle which is implanted in the soul by the life-giving Holy Spirit, who works in and through our fellowship with Christ — "made me

free from the law of sin and death." Deliverance from sin, freedom from condemnation, is accomplished by a spiritual life-process which fulfils the requirement of the law in us (which the law itself could not effect by reason of the resistance to it of indwelling sin) by enabling us to "walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit" (verses 3, 4). It must not be overlooked that the apostle here asserts a fulfilment of the law's requirement (verse 4) in the case of those who are in life-fellowship with Christ. This requirement or rightful demand of the law (*δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*) means the ethical character, both as respects outward action and inner morality, which is accordant with the law. Christ's work makes possible this result which is actually effected in the believer through life-union with Christ.[1] The old interpretation which understood this *δικαίωμα* to denote the law's demand for punishment which Christ by his sufferings satisfied, and which is therefore fulfilled in the believer by imputation to him of this satisfaction, is contrary to the context, which treats explicitly of the *life* which corresponds to the law's requirements.

It is obvious, then, that according to Paul, the just demand of the law is fulfilled in him who believes; and yet it is equally plain that faith is not regarded as a virtue or as in any way the source of this moral process. In view of this fact, only two positions are logically possible: (1) That the fulfilment of this moral requirement is in no way connected with faith, except

[1] So, substantially, Meyer, Godet, Weiss.

so far as faith is a condition of its taking place. This I understand to be Weiss's opinion. Faith has no moral quality; it is even "the antithesis of *all* fulfilling of the law," and "excludes every disposition demanded by the law."[1] In this view, faith is not the act whereby man enters into life-fellowship with Christ, but only the presupposition of this union, — an attitude of man toward the grace of God in Christ.[2] Faith and justification are acts which precede the life-union with Christ; and only after they have taken place does the communication of a new principle of life, which is a second and separate act, occur. (2) In the other view, faith is an appropriation of Christ, — a bond which unites the believer to him. The act denoted by faith is the entrance upon a new personal relation. Faith is as little a mere "attitude," with no significance for the inner life (as Weiss makes it), as it is a "mere opinion" (as Baur had made it). It is man's part in the constitution of a new and vital personal relation of the soul to Christ. It is indeed a religious act rather than a moral achievement, but it is an act which is in closest connection with the actual increasing attainment of the divine requirements, because it is the act of entering into mystical union with Christ. It will be seen that the first question is, whether the actual righteousness which all recognize as the demand of the Christian life is in any way directly connected with faith,[3] — in other

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 82 *c*. [2] *Ibid.* § 84 *b*.

[3] See Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 87 *a*, note 2.

words, whether faith is a mere naked act of trust, in itself wholly separate from the moral disposition, or whether it is an act of entrance into mystic fellowship with Christ.[1]

In seeking to determine which of these ideas is to be adopted, reference must be made to such passages as Gal. ii. 17 and 2 Cor. v. 21 (*δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ· ἵνα ἡμεῖς γενώμεθα δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ*). *Cf.* Phil. iii. 9. In one view we have here a commingling of the forensic terms (*δικαιωθῆναι, δικαιοσύνη*) with the mystical (*ἐν Χριστῷ, ἐν αὐτῷ*). This, however, is more doubtful, since in both cases the subject of redemption on its objective side is directly under consideration, and the preposition *ἐν* may denote the *ground* of justification.[2] But we think that no just exegesis can deny that these passages adumbrate the mystical union of the believer with Christ which is found clearly expressed in Phil. iii. 9 in the phrase "that I may be found in him" (*ἵνα εὑρεθῶ ἐν αὐτῷ*), which, in turn, is explained and defined as meaning, "not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith" (*ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη*). That to be *ἐν αὐτῷ* is practically equivalent to *ἔχων τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην* is evident, espe-

[1] So, substantially, Pfleiderer, Reuss, Neander, Lechler, Lipsius, *et al.*

[2] So Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* Eng. tr. i. 460 (apparently not, however, in the 5th ed.); Meyer *in loco.* *Per contra*, Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 186, 1 Aufl.; Eng. tr. i. 185, 186.

cially in view of the further explanations that follow from verse 10 to the end of the chapter.

A more decisive passage is Gal. ii. 20, where the apostle is clearly discussing the nature of the spiritual life (*θεῷ ζῆν*, verse 19). The thought here is: "I have been crucified with Christ;" I died to sin when he died on the cross (an intensely mystical conception); "and it is no longer I that live" (*ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ*, *cf.* R. V. margin), "but [so far from my living] Christ liveth in me; and that life which I now live in the flesh [*ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί*] I live in faith, *the faith* which is in the Son of God" (*ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*). The question arises whether the phrases "Christ lives in me" (*ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*), and "I live in faith" (*ἐν πίστει ζῶ*) are practically synonymous. Weiss replies in the negative, and holds that *ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ* marks a *contrast* to *ζῇ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*, thus: Christ lives in me; my new life is simply his life in me, *but* so far as my own personal life continues at all in the flesh, it is wholly in faith; whatever remains as my part of the life I am living, is wholly in trust upon him. On the contrary, it seems far more natural to take *δέ* in the phrase *ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ* as explanatory or continuative, just as the same particle must be taken in the preceding phrase, *ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ*.[1] After the statement, "I have been crucified with Christ," he adds the explanation, "and it is no longer I that live, but

[1] So Meyer *in loco*; similarly, De Wette, Pfleiderer, Olshausen, Lightfoot, Ellicott.

Christ liveth in me;" then further to limit and explain this paradoxical statement, he adds that he does not mean to deny that there is a sense in which he is still living (ζῷ ἐν σαρκί), but that so far as he is so, his life is sustained by faith on the Son of God. When he says that Christ lives in him, he means that Christ is the indwelling power of his life, or in other words, that trust in Christ is his true life-element. In view of the mystical conception which underlies the passage, it appears to be exegetical arbitrariness to sever in meaning the phrases ζῇ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός and ἐν πίστει ζῶ, as is done by Weiss. It seems to me as unjustifiable in exegesis as it is unwarranted in theology, to separate Paul's doctrine of faith from his teaching concerning the mystic union of the believer with Christ. Why does the *believer* alone enjoy such mystic union if there is no close connection between faith and that union?

The true adjustment of the doctrine of faith and of mystic union will be found in a careful definition of the sense in which faith is said to be the opposite of all merit. The apostle is advocating salvation by grace alone as opposed to human deserving. He is concerned with proving that no works of merit on man's part can establish a claim upon God's forgiveness, on the basis of debit and credit. Since, then, man cannot be saved by merit, but may be saved by faith, it must be evident that to Paul's mind it is impossible to regard faith as a "work" founding a claim to salvation. But this position does not deny the ex-

cellence of faith in general, as an act and disposition conformable to God's moral requirement. When Weiss says that in Paul's theology "faith excludes every disposition demanded in the law," it can only be true in the sense that faith renounces every such disposition as a ground of salvation or basis of merit, not that faith is the ethical contrary of those works and dispositions of right doing which the law enjoins. If the statement were meant in this latter sense, it would come into clear conflict with the Pauline teaching that faith works through love (Gal. v. 6), and that the way of justification which is "from faith to faith" (Rom. i. 17) really secures a fulfilment of the just demand of the law (Rom. viii. 4).

In building up his doctrine of justification, Paul's point of departure is the believer's gracious acquittal as opposed to the idea of a meritorious claim entitling to salvation, and his thought moves within the legal sphere. Faith is an acceptance, a renunciation of claim, a confession of unworthiness, and an act of homage to God's grace. It is without merit in the sense in which he is contemplating merit in the development of the doctrine; namely, as a ground of claiming acceptance with God as man's *right*. It involves, in its very nature, an entire disclaimer of any such right. But it is not without merit in the sense that it involves the right attitude of the soul toward God, the temper of humble dependence and thankful receptiveness. In this understanding of the terms it would be correct to say that in Paul's view faith is

without merit, but not without excellence. It is the very opposite of a meritorious claim upon God's mercy; but there is an ethical excellence in the renunciation of such a claim because it is the essence of the obedient and teachable spirit, and brings one into fellowship of life with Christ, and is thus the condition of the increasing fulfilment of the divine will in the Christian and of his increasing likeness to God.[1]

That which may, in accord with Pauline principles, be said of faith in these two aspects of it, might be said of kindred acts and exercises of the Christian life; of prayer, for example. Prayer is no basis of desert before God. If it should be contemplated as a work of merit establishing, by any method of equivalence, a claim to the favor of heaven, its true nature and value would be annulled. It was in this light that the Jews regarded their prayers, sacrifices, and other religious exercises. They even went so far as to suppose that works of supererogation done by others might found claims for those who were entitled to

[1] In drawing out this distinction, Pfleiderer (*Paulinismus*, p. 172; Eng. tr. i. 165) says (*cf.* Lechler, *Das apos. Zeitalter*, p. 364) that faith is "the completest possible fulfilment of the divine will, not of the commanding, legal will, but of the giving, gracious will of God; it is the trustful reception of the gracious gift which God offers." This view merely recognizes in Paul the same essential elements of doctrine which are summed up in the answer of Jesus to the question of the multitudes: "What must we do, that we may work the works of God? . . . This is the *work* of God [τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ], that ye *believe* on him whom he hath sent" (John vi. 28, 29).

their benefit.[1] Paul's doctrine of justification by faith is a polemic against this view, and must be understood in the light of this Pharisaic perversion. In the Jewish view, prayer would be meritorious as a ground of demand for reward. According to Pauline principles it could, in the nature of the case, be nothing of the sort. Its very essence implies confession of dependence and a sense of unworthiness. It presupposes, in any right view of it, appeal to God's grace alone; but all excellence is not therefore denied to it. It is an evidence of real goodness; that is, of trust, obedience, and love to God.

The discrimination which we are making is clearly seen and abundantly justified when we observe that the apostle's arguments which emphasize the entire non-merit of faith are conducted on the legal plane, while the recognition of faith as involving the right attitude and relation of the soul to God, and in that sense as possessing religious value, is found in the ethical and spiritual sphere of thought, where the apostle is not concerned with refuting a false theory.

We believe that in this way — and in this way only — can Paul's views be successfully harmonized in principle with those of James (chap. ii.) in respect to faith and works; but what is more to our present purpose, it is only thus that Paul can be harmonized with himself. Nor does the objection longer remain that he does not wholly escape ascribing a meritori-

[1] See Weber, *Die Lehren des Talmud*, § 61, entitled, *Die Gerechtigkeit aus den guten Werken.*

ous character to faith. He succeeds perfectly in showing that faith is without merit in the legal, *quid pro quo* sense with which he is occupied. He does not show, nor does he hold, that it is without moral excellence and value, and so without a real and vital relation to that true righteousness which consists in the disposition corresponding to the law's requirement.

This method of thought, moreover, is a preventive of the onesidedness which is so abundantly illustrated in theology in its treatment of these two points of view found in the Pauline teaching respecting salvation. One type of thought, ignoring the peculiar standpoint from which Paul's definition of the process of justification starts, and keeping the doctrine absolutely shut up within legal analogies, has ended in a *fiat* righteousness, a faith without real ethical value, and even in a denial that faith was reckoned for righteousness at all. Another type of thought, equally neglecting the motive of the formal doctrine, though for very different reasons, has taken up the ethical side, and treating righteousness rather as a human attainment than as a divine gift, and regarding faith and righteousness as virtually identical, have come perilously near to making faith a meritorious "work," and righteousness a name for man's own actual spiritual attainments. A true synthesis of the truths which are thus apprehended in a onesided manner is found in the position which alone accords with the whole circle of Pauline ideas: that faith, though founding no legal

claim to divine favor, is the soul's disposition of receptiveness and trust toward God, — the right and required attitude of the mind and heart, — and is therefore the morally necessary condition of a man's being what he ought to be; that the judgment of justification, while accepting faith for righteousness, — that is, for more than it actually is, — and declaring the sinner fully acquitted on the ground of Christ's work, is yet no legal fiction. It declares the believer righteous, not in a merely legal manner, for he is not such in the sense of having fulfilled all God's requirements; but in a gracious manner, accepting by anticipation his faith for righteousness, because faith unites him to Christ, and this union is the guaranty of increasing and full final perfection of life. Faith, then, is not righteousness; the two conceptions are generically different. Faith is humility, receptiveness, trust; righteousness is correspondence with a divinely given norm; but they are vitally related because faith is the act by which the soul comes into living union with Christ, — a union which assures increasing growth in Christlikeness.

The Augustinian and Calvinistic theology never successfully accomplished a synthesis of these two elements of Paulinism, and therefore never made a genetic connection between the doctrines of justification and sanctification. This type of thought has treated them apart, and has defined justification in so formal and legal a manner as to give it no essential internal point of connection with the development of

spiritual life. They are certainly not to be identified or confused; but neither are they to be separated and treated as if they were without an inner connection. The processes of spiritual life described in Rom. v., vi., and viii. may be said to belong rather to sanctification than to justification; but upon close examination it is found impossible not to carry back the conceptions here presented, and apply them to the nature and beginnings of salvation as well as to its progressive work. If the life and character which are pictured in Rom. viii. as belonging to the man who is "in Christ" are attained, then the promise and beginning of that life must have been already present when the soul entered into Christ by faith. If the righteousness which actually fulfils the law's demands is more and more realized in the justified man, its power must have already taken hold upon the life when God pronounced his righteousness to be the soul's possession. Faith links us to Christ; in that fact lie its power and its value. It connects us with the Source and Giver of life. It involves no merit in us; yet it is the right attitude and temper of the soul toward God's grace in Christ. Righteousness is right standing before God; in more ethical terms, equally accordant with Paulinism, it is correspondence to what we ought to be. We cannot achieve it, but we can seek and accept it. We can fulfil the conditions of trust and obedience which are necessary to its progressive attainment.

This self-renouncing trust God accepts for the

righteousness after which we long; in other terms, he graciously reckons the true perfection of life as ours already, because in joining our lives to Christ we have entered the way of its increasing realization. In the union of the soul with Christ and the consequent participation in his life lies the guaranty of the completion in the believer's life of the righteousness which is already, by anticipation, accorded him. Thus the real moral value and power of faith are recognized without making it a meritorious "work," or in any sense a ground of salvation; and an ethical content is given to righteousness without making it a human achievement. Thus a real point of contact is seen to exist between faith and righteousness. The former is no mere assent, and the latter no mere legal fiction. Justification is not a mere *fiat* of God, but has as its essence the great reality of a new relation to God, and involves the action of those spiritual forces which work for renewed character, and which are from the very first operative in the religious life.

Some of the older Protestant theologians have apprehended and defined the deepest realities of faith and justification in such a way as to do full justice to the scope of the apostle's thoughts, and none more clearly than Gerhard, who, in commenting on the passages which speak of the imputation of faith, says, —

"The apostle is speaking of faith, not as it is a quality inhering in us (for in that respect it does not justify, since it is obedience to only one commandment, is imperfect, and long already due), but as it apprehends the redemp-

tion of Christ. Scripture not only asserts that faith is accounted to us for righteousness, but also that Christ is our righteousness (1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 21). Since, therefore, Christ and faith are said to be at the same time our righteousness, the consequence is that faith is and is called our righteousness, because it apprehends Christ's righteousness and makes it ours." [1]

It is not necessary, we think, to follow further the course of Paul's thoughts regarding the ethical side of those changed relations to God and Christ which are entered into by faith. These representations will come into view again in considering Paul's doctrine of the Christian life. It is sufficient for our present purpose to have pointed out the bearing which they must have upon any view of justification which not only considers the polemic development of his doctrine on the legal plane, but also seeks to penetrate to the real center of his thoughts and to grasp them in their inner unity and harmony. Weiss has, we think somewhat too guardedly, admitted the possibility of such a union of the ethical and the formal in Paul's doctrine of justification as we have sought to establish, in these words: —

"This fact [that justification is an act of pure grace] by no means excludes the possibility that, as Paul conceives faith, it really involves a restoration in principle of the right religious relation of man to God, a restoration which guarantees a fulfilment of his religious-moral task, and is therefore the deepest germ of the full δικαιοσύνη.

[1] *Loci Theologici*, vii. 262.

But Paul certainly does not reflect upon this; he regards the reckoning of faith as a pure act of grace, etc." [1]

If the assertion that Paul has not reflected upon faith as involving "a restoration in principle of the right religious relation of man to God," means only that he has not explicitly defined the connection of faith with sanctification, it is, beyond question, correct. If it means that this relation is not essentially implied and assumed in Paul's thought, and necessary to be recognized in any systematic development of his doctrines, we should dissent from it. The "possibility" which Weiss regards as not excluded would better be treated as a fact which must be included in any construction of Paulinism which is not a mere piece-meal grouping and exegesis of texts, but a synthetic exhibition of the apostle's thoughts.

A study of Paul's theology which will comprehend in one view the various complementary aspects of his teaching, and combine into unity all the elements of his thought concerning the method of salvation, will conduct the mind, as it seems to me, not merely to the guarded admission of Weiss, but to the position of Neander, who says, —

"The righteousness of faith, in the Pauline sense, includes the essence of a new disposition. Accordingly it [justification] is not an arbitrary act on the part of God, as if he regarded and treated as sinless a man persisting in sin, simply because he believes in Christ; but the

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 82 *b*, note 4; Eng. tr. i. 440, note 3.

objective on the part of God corresponds to the subjective on the part of man, — namely, faith, — and this necessarily includes in itself a release from the state inherited from Adam, from the whole life of sin and the entrance into spiritual fellowship with the Redeemer, the appropriation of his divine life. . . . Thus [in faith] there is an entrance into communion with the Redeemer, and a new principle of life is received which continually penetrates and transforms the old nature. Faith is the spiritual act by virtue of which, in surrendering ourselves to him who died for us, we die to a life of sin, to the world, to ourselves, to all which we were before, and rise again in his fellowship, in the power of his Spirit, to a new life devoted to him and animated by him." [1]

[1] *Planting and Training,* Bohn ed. i. pp. 457–459; Am. ed. pp. 418, 419.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

The doctrine of faith furnishes the starting-point from which Paul's whole view of the nature and demands of the Christian life is developed. It is the principle of salvation by faith which separates his doctrine of religion so widely from the popular Jewish conceptions of his time, and which accounts for the distinctive elements of his theology. The Jewish idea was that salvation was to be won by good deeds, especially by the observance of commandments. The practical result of this theory was the development of a spirit of self-righteousness on the one hand, and of an uncertainty of acceptance with God, on the other. If one had faithfully done the prescribed duties, he would easily fall into self-congratulation, yet could not be sure that he had done enough. The religious consciousness wavered thus perpetually between these two dangers, each of which was fatal to a healthy and stable religious life. By his doctrine of faith the apostle escaped both these pitfalls. Faith was, in its very nature, a disclaimer of merit, and involved a temper of self-abnegation and dependence;

but it led to a confident assurance of salvation, because it reposed its trust solely in the grace of God which had been manifested in Christ. In the very act of renouncing works as a means of attaining divine favor, faith presupposes the willingness of God to accept those who make no claims of personal worthiness and who consent to receive forgiveness as a gift of grace. The very act of self-surrender in which man confesses his unworthiness of Heaven's favor is the act in which he enters into the possession of a full assurance of salvation, because thereby he escapes out of himself, and putting his case beyond the reach of mere human standards of judgment, casts himself upon the promised compassion of God.[1]

We have seen that justification is the formal act by which one is admitted to the Christian life, and that faith is the condition of this admission. The way of life is entered by the gateway of humility. No one in entering can suppose that he is doing so because of any right or claim which is founded on his own achievements, but must recognize the fact that he is received solely because God is gracious and treats him better than he deserves. The spiritual life which now follows his justification is not to be looked upon as a development from faith, considered as the man's own act, but as a divine impartation which faith makes possible and thankfully receives. It would be as con-

[1] *Cf.* Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Christ*, Division II. vol. ii. § 28, entitled, *Life under the Law*; especially page 125.

trary to Pauline principles to describe the spiritual life as flowing from faith as its source as it would be to trace it to legal works of righteousness. Faith is the condition precedent, on man's part, to the spiritual life; or, in other terms, it is the humble acceptance of what God provides and offers to the soul. While we have sought to show, as against views which make justification a mere fiction, that this attitude of trust and self-surrender is the *right* attitude, has an ethical significance and value, and is, so far, a fulfilment of God's moral will, it is equally important for a just view of the spiritual life to remember that it is not the product of faith, but is a gift of God which man by faith receives. It is God's gracious will that man should relinquish his fruitless efforts to merit salvation, and be content in humble dependence to enter by trust in Christ and by the appropriation of undeserved favor upon the way toward the realization of his true mission and destiny. In faith man accepts this offer; in faith he continues to avail himself of its benefits. Thus in the gospel God's righteousness is revealed "from faith to faith" (Rom. i. 17); the appropriation of salvation is throughout a matter of faith. The religious value of faith cannot lie in the act of believing in itself considered, but lies in the new relation which faith involves and which, on man's part, faith constitutes; namely, the relation of fellowship with Christ. Whatever may be the reason why faith is reckoned for righteousness, there can be little doubt that it is the condition of the development of Christian

character because it involves obedience to Christ and fellowship of spirit with him.

The favorite expression by which the apostle designates this personal relation which faith implies, is that of a dwelling of the believer in Christ or of Christ in him. The one who is "in Christ" is a "new creature" (2 Cor. v. 17); those who are "in Christ Jesus" are not subject to condemnation (Rom. viii. 1). The spirits of those in whom Christ dwells are quickened into new life "on account of righteousness" (Rom. viii. 10); that is, because they are now justified.[1] The significance of baptism, the initiatory rite of the Christian Church, is found in the fact that it expresses and ratifies this relation. It is a baptism "into Christ" (εἰς Χριστόν) or "into his death" (Rom. vi. 3); that is, baptism into Christ signifies that entrance into personal fellowship and life-communion with Christ which is denoted by the expression, to die with Christ (Rom. vi. 8), or to die to sin (Rom. vi. 2). As many, therefore, as have been baptized into Christ

[1] This phrase (διὰ δικαιοσύνην) is interpreted by many as denoting righteousness of life (so Hodge, Tholuck, De Wette, Weiss). The last-named scholar maintains this (*Bib. Theol.* § 96 *c*, note 2) on the ground that only *ethical* and never *imputed* righteousness is considered by Paul as proceeding from the indwelling of Christ in the believer by his Spirit. On the other hand, it may be held that here the *life* which the Spirit imparts is considered as proceeding from righteousness: the Spirit becomes the new life-principle in the believer because of righteousness; that is, because of his acceptance in justification. This appears to be the relation of the apostle's thoughts here (so Philippi, Godet, Olshausen, Meyer).

have put on Christ (Gal. iii. 27), have made him the life-element of the soul.

Of those who have been "crucified with Christ" the apostle can affirm that "Christ lives" in them, or, in practically equivalent terms, that they "live in faith which is in the Son of God" (Gal. ii. 20). His meaning is, that the death of Christ is the ground of that moral renewal which, by a mystical identification of the procuring cause with its effect, is called a crucifixion with Christ on his cross, an ethical dying to sin when he died, or, dropping the figure, a cessation of the old sinful life through the appropriation of the benefits of his atoning death. This death to sin is followed by a life to righteousness (Rom. vi. 11). Expressed in terms derived from baptism, the burial into death depicts the cessation of the sinful self, and has its complement in the resurrection to newness of life which ensues (Rom. vi. 4). When this transition into a new *status*, this commitment of the life to a new determining principle, is accomplished, there begins a development in holiness which may be described, on its human side, as a living in faith, or on its divine side, as a living of Christ in the soul (Gal. ii. 20). Here it again appears that there is a life of faith as well as an act of faith. The spirit of surrender and acceptance which is involved in the initial act of trust continues as the characteristic temper of the Christian man, and becomes a fixed mood of conscious dependence and receptiveness. How evident, then, does it become that faith as a condition of acceptance with

God does not stand in isolation from the spiritual life that follows it. It continues to be what it was at the first, — the attitude of humility and trust in which all divine grace is thankfully received. It remains the subjective principle of the new life, the human *conditio sine qua non* of spiritual life and growth, as truly as divine grace is its objective principle, the *fons et origo* of the forces of renewal and sanctification. The sharp separation of justification from sanctification, as if they had no internal and generic connection, but only a relation of sequence, denies to faith the function in the development of spiritual life which the apostle assigned to it, and leaves it standing in isolation at the beginning of the new life, instead of conceiving of it as the entrance into a personal relation which continues constant and unchanged. The type of theological thought which holds forensic justification in rigid separation from the mysticism of faith neglects a most essential element in Paul's theology; namely, that religion is a personal relation. When theology has made deep and wide the gulf between justification and spiritual life, and has restricted faith to the former, it is then powerless to bridge the chasm which it has made, and is compelled to make real religion begin *de novo* after justification.[1]

[1] The exposition of Weiss is as striking an example of this complete dissociation of justification from sanctification as can be found in the older dogmatics. They are, in his view, "two divine saving deeds," without connection in nature or result. The real Christian life is no more begun when a man is merely justified

With Paul the value and power of religion consist in the personal relations of the believer with God. The Christian life is begun, so far as man's part in it is concerned, in the entrance of the soul into a right relation to God, and it is perpetuated in the constancy and increasing closeness of that relation. Man's part in the constitution of this relation is faith, and his part in the continuance and strengthening of it continues to be faith. The Christian life has a strict unity and continuity. In the very nature of faith, as Paul conceives of it, is involved that personal fellowship in which alone the impartation of spiritual life from God can take place. The power and religious value of faith, therefore, are not in the faith itself, considered as an act or exercise, but in the relation of abiding fellowship and life-union which faith constitutes. Faith is not a mere confidence that a work of grace will be done for us, but a consent that a work of grace shall be wrought in us. The power of faith thus resides not in its exercise, as if it were an achievement, but in its object, because it is a personal relation of one who is helpless and dependent to Christ, who is able to save and purify.

This personal conception of religion is absolutely central in all Paul's thinking. Religion is not a holding of things for true; nor is it even merely a trust in a work which has been or is to be wrought for one;

than it was before; this life begins in his baptism when the believer is "put in principle into the state of holiness, and therewith into that of actual righteousness," *Bib. Theol.* § 85 *d.*

it is also, and much more, a glad and loyal obedience proceeding from personal love to Christ,—a life which springs from fellowship with him, and is controlled by the power of his Spirit (Rom. viii. 9). The moral character and spiritual life which must ensue upon justification are strongly depicted in Rom. vi. Can any one infer, asks the apostle, from the truth that "where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly" (Rom. v. 20), that sin was desirable because it called forth the exercise of grace,—on the principle, the more sin the more grace (verse 1)? Against such a conclusion is to be opposed the very nature of the Christian life (verse 2). To be justified implies a new heart; if the beginning of the Christian life is a breaking loose from sin, its continuance must secure a positive attainment of holiness; if we have begun by dying with Christ, we must continue by rising with him into a new spiritual character (verses 5–13). As Christians our lives are ruled by new powers; we have exchanged masters. From the sin to which we were formerly in bondage we are now free, and to the righteousness from which we were once free we are now in bondage (verses 16–20). In other passages the new life is attributed to the work of the Spirit as the determining power in the renewed man. Before justification man is carnal (*σαρκικός*, 1 Cor. iii. 3); he is said to walk according to the flesh (*κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν*, Rom. viii. 4) and to have his thoughts and efforts directed toward the interests of the flesh (*τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονεῖν*, Rom. viii. 5). In becoming a Chris-

tian, he becomes a spiritual man (πνευματικός, 1 Cor. ii. 15; iii. 1), a man whose life is inspired and shaped by the Divine Spirit. The Christian, then, is no longer in the flesh (ἐν σαρκί, Rom. viii. 9) as his life-element, but in the spirit (ἐν πνεύματι). It is true that the dominion of sin is not in fact wholly overcome. Those who are ideally, and even actually "spiritual," are but relatively so. They may also be at the same time relatively carnal (1 Cor. iii. 1), or psychical (ψυχικός, ii. 14), though they may not be supremely and characteristically so, since their Christian life, in its very idea, is directed toward sanctification (εἰς ἁγιασμόν, Rom. vi. 19). All the ideals and hopes of the Christian life appeal to the believer to cleanse himself from every sinful defilement which may cleave to either body or spirit, thus "perfecting holiness [ἁγιωσύνη] in the fear of God" (2 Cor. vii. 1).

It will be evident, then, that Christianity secures not merely a judicial acquittal, but a practical freedom from sin and attainment of righteousness. Those who have received the Spirit by the hearing of faith (Gal. iii. 2) — that is, by receiving the message which proclaimed faith as the first requirement in religion — must also "walk by the Spirit," and in so doing will not "fulfil the lust of the flesh" (Gal. v. 16). The fact that the Spirit is received when faith is exercised shows that justification is not an act separate and apart from spiritual life, and also points out in advance the nature and demands of the growth which is to

follow. "If we live by the Spirit, by the Spirit let us also walk" (Gal. v. 25).

We are enabled in the light of these thoughts to see the connection between Paul's scheme of doctrine and his practical view of the Christian life. In his dogmatic the facts of Christ's death and resurrection are the objective ground of salvation; but according to his view of the Christian life, the actual appropriation of these does not take place without the reception of Christ's Spirit (Rom. viii. 9), the entrance of the believer into life-union with Christ, so that there is a reciprocal indwelling of Christ and the Christian in each other (Gal. ii. 20; iii. 28; Col. iii. 3). Paul's doctrine of the office of the law may also be readily adjusted to his view of the true life in Christ. "Love is the fulfilment of the law [*πλήρωμα νόμου*]," (Rom. xiii. 10); and since love is at once the chief requirement of the Christian life (1 Cor. xii. 31; xiii. 1–3) and the essence of the law's demand, those who possess this all-comprehending virtue do really fulfil the law's just requirement (*τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*, Rom. viii. 4). Christianity contemplates a life of real, positive righteousness; and this goal is actually attained in the proportion in which the believer enters into the possession of Christ's Spirit and the personal appropriation of his life.

It must be evident, then, that the conception of the law as developing the consciousness of sin, upon which, as we saw in chapter viii., Paul has dwelt most fully, does not exhaust his idea of the meaning and use of

the law. That was a special view of the subject which was adapted to his purpose in refuting the doctrine of salvation by obedience to the law. Considered as a means of salvation, the law was utterly powerless. Since men could not obey its commandments, it must point out and condemn their sins and intensify their sense of them; but when the law is contemplated from the point of view of its ideal moral requirements, it is to the apostle the epitome of all morality and goodness (Rom. vii. 12–14). It is natural that Paul should dwell most on the negative aspect of the law because that alone suited the aim of his polemic; when, on the other hand, he turns to that positive life of holiness which Christianity requires and secures, and which fulfils the law, he defines it, not in terms of the law, but in terms drawn from the conceptions of Christlikeness and of the indwelling of his Spirit. There is, therefore, no antinomy between these two conceptions of the law; nor is there anything strange or unnatural in the frequent emphasis of the former in Paul's argument against the Pharisaic doctrine of salvation and the very incidental, though plain, recognition of the fulfilment of the law which is accomplished in the Christian life, since, in presenting this truth, the apostle's thoughts pass out of the legal sphere and center in the perfection of Christ and the appropriation of his Holy Spirit.

The freedom of the Christian is not a mere judicial release from condemnation. One becomes truly free from the law and from its judgment upon sin, not by

any method of evading its demands, but only by fulfilling them. The contrast to the state of bondage under the law is described when Paul says that Christians "became obedient from the heart to that form [or type, τύπος] of teaching whereunto they were delivered" (Rom. vi. 17). Before their conversion they were "bond-servants [δοῦλοι] of sin" and were therefore "free in regard of righteousness" (ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, vi. 20); that is, they were not living in obedience to the divine will. "But now," he adds, "being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end eternal life" (vi. 22). This freedom from sin is a practical and effectual deliverance from the power of sin as a determining principle of life.

The apostle's teaching, in regard to the believer's relation with Christ which we have thus briefly traced, sets forth most forcibly the personal nature of religion and the demands which arise from that relation. For a description of the principle which is most fundamental in this life in Christ, we must turn to his doctrine of love. We have seen how love is the fulfilling of the law. In an eloquent passage he elsewhere (1 Cor. xiii.) accords to love the pre-eminence among the virtues, and shows how valueless are all spiritual endowments and powers without love to inspire and direct them. He had been commenting, in the previous chapter, upon the variety of gifts which the Spirit bestows upon Christians, and had cautioned his readers against jealousy and rivalry in the cultiva-

tion and use of these *charismata*. It appears from chapter xiv. that the Corinthians preferred the gift of tongues, a species of ecstatic utterance in prayer (xiv. 2) which was not readily understood by the people, and which required to be interpreted (verses 27, 28). Paul himself, however, preferred the gift of prophecy or preaching (xiv. 4, 5) on the ground that it could be understood by all and was more useful for the edification of the Church and for impressing the unconverted in the assembly (verses 23, 24).

In chapter xiii. the apostle's first aim is to show that all these endowments, greater and smaller, are morally valueless without love (verses 1–3). If he could rise to the highest ecstatic states which have been granted, not only to men, but to angels, his speech in that condition of exaltation would still be but as empty and meaningless sound without love. The more highly esteemed gift of prophecy is equally valueless without it. "Though I should know the mysteries of redemption in all their extent [*τὰ μυστήρια πάντα*], and possess the knowledge of them in all their depths [*πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν*]; and if to this were added the most heroic faith, the sublime confidence in God which is necessary to the accomplishment of miraculous works, I am still nothing," says the apostle; "I am not thereby brought nearer the true goal of my life, if I am wanting in love." The enthusiasm of highly wrought feeling, the fullest possible possession of truth, the sublimest heroism of faith, and the most self-denying sacrifice, — all are worthless in God's

sight without love. Why? Because love alone can direct them to their true ends; because love is the quality of life which helps and serves and blesses. The attributes and activities of love which are next depicted (verses 4–7), show that love is the one all-comprehending and enduring virtue, and the principle of every form of goodness. Without it enthusiasm becomes an aimless play of feeling; knowledge a mere intellectual apprehension of truth without formative influence upon character; heroism a bold and boastful confidence, and self-denial a purposeless asceticism, placing virtue in mere suffering and serving no rational or moral end.

But to the question, why love is the queen of all the gifts and virtues, the apostle gives a more explicit answer (verses 8–12). She is the enduring virtue. Prophecy, ecstatic utterance, and knowledge (in the limited forms of it which alone are possible to men here) serve but the temporal well-being of the Church, and must therefore pass away. Our present knowledge is like that of childhood, which is lost in the mature mental growth of the man (verse 11); our present apprehension of truth falls as far short of the full reality as the imperfect reflection of an object in a metallic mirror fails to reproduce the exact likeness of the thing itself (verse 12); the forms of thought in which we hold truth resemble dark sayings (*cf.* ἐν αἰνίγματι, verse 12), since they cannot fully and clearly present to the mind the truth with which they deal. This knowledge, then, with its limitations and distortions,

must pass away, but love suffers no change; it continues the same in its nature; it is the virtue which includes all others.

But other graces also abide; faith and hope are as lasting as love. Yet she is greater than these (verse 13). The apostle leaves the reason for her superiority over them to be inferred. This superiority is probably due to the fact that love is the quality which gives their value to both faith and hope. Love is therefore the absolutely fundamental virtue. It forms indeed the essence of all types of excellence; it is the principle of all goodness, the "bond of perfectness" (*σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος*, Col. iii. 14), the virtue which unites and unifies all others. Love is thus seen to be the most comprehensive virtue. Faith and hope designate, in comparison, but single phases of our relation to God and his truth, and therefore represent but partially the significance of the religious life; but love is the principle of moral completeness, embracing in its scope our duties and obligations to God and to man. The idea may perhaps be inferred from the apostle's language — and is certainly correct in itself — that while faith and hope relate more to the religious life of the individual, love embraces the interests of the whole community.[1]

While this demonstration of the activities and preeminence of love is introduced for a practical purpose, it has most important bearings upon the Pauline theology. It shows how wholly inseparable are true

[1] So Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 93 *b*.

faith and love, and that faith is a most fundamental condition of a right religious character. The faith which the apostle mentions in xiii. 2 is a courageous and heroic confidence, not evangelical or saving faith. Such faith, excellent as it is in itself, would be morally valueless without love. The faith, therefore, which is morally valuable must have love as its basis and inspiration. Again, when the apostle says that love believes all things (*πάντα πιστεύει,* verse 7), he implies, as Bishop Ellicott remarks, that love is the sustaining power of faith;[1] and surely in making love greater than faith, though both abide forever together, he shows how far he is from regarding true faith as a formal assent or holding of things for true, or even as a mere passive trust in another's merit. No faith is saving which does not appropriate Christ's Spirit and lead the heart to consecration and obedience and all the powers to action and service. *Faith* is indeed a great word in Paul's teaching; as a contrast to *works* it assumes, however, a relative prominence in the polemic portions of his theology, which is far greater than belongs to it when his teaching is regarded solely in its positive content and is considered apart from the refutation of Judaizing theories. In this view it is not *faith*, but *love* which is the greatest word in Paul's doctrine of the Christian life, — greatest because most fundamental and most inclusive of all that God requires of man.

It is not included in our present purpose to follow

[1] Commentary on 1 Cor., *in loco.*

out in detail the mode of treatment which is applied by the apostle to the various practical subjects with which he deals in his epistles, since we are concerned rather with the formative principles of his system and their rational connection with each other than with his application of them to concrete questions. It may be well, however, to note a few of the leading themes which he has thus treated and to trace the outlines of his views respecting them. One of these is the duty of the Christian to the State (Rom. xiii. 1–7). Paul had as little occasion to consider the merits or defects of the then existing governments as he had to discuss the propriety of slavery, which was an institution of society in his time whose right to exist no one thought of calling in question. The apostle regards the State as of divine origin and authority. It is ordained of God for the reproof and punishment of evil-doers, to whom alone it gives occasion for fear. It has a right to punish (verse 4) ; within what limits the apostle does not consider. It has the right to exact tribute from its citizens (verse 6) ; to resist it is to " withstand the ordinance of God " (verse 2). It is obvious that the apostle has attempted no philosophy of the State in these few verses. The problems of Political Science were not before his mind. He urged upon the attention of his readers only those particular truths which suited his practical purpose. He protests against that lawlessness which was liable to spring from a perversion of his own doctrine of the freedom of the Christian man. He reminds them

that the State is a providential necessity, and that its right to preserve order, punish crimes, and receive loyal support is a divinely given right, and that those who deem themselves at liberty to renounce their allegiance to the regularly constituted civil authorities will justly suffer the penalty of their sin. It is obvious that such topics as the limits of obedience and the right of resistance, under certain conditions, to the State, were not at all the subjects of the apostle's recorded reflections.

One of the most interesting examples of Paul's handling of a perplexing ethical question is seen in his treatment of the "cases of conscience" relating to the eating of various kinds of food. This question arose in churches where there were persons of Jewish education who were affected with scruples in respect to "unclean" meats, as was apparently the case at Rome (see Rom. xiv.). In such instances, the question would be whether those who had no scruples in respect to certain kinds of food should refrain from their use out of regard to the scrupulous. In Rom. xiv. the apostle treats the matter in somewhat general terms, his main principles being, (*a*) that Christians who differ on such points should not harshly judge one another. Since God has accepted both, they should be tolerant of one another's differences in such matters (verses 3, 4). (*b*) Christ is the judge of all; it is not the prerogative of one Christian to judge another (verses 10–12). (*c*) It is the dictate of love diligently to refrain from courses of action which create

moral hindrances for other Christians. To the apostle all meats were clean and might be eaten; but one might seriously harm and hinder a Jewish Christian of different views by always acting upon that principle. Therefore the rights of liberty should sometimes yield to the obligations of love (verses 13–15). (*d*) Above all things, peace is to be sought, and if by concession, even to an unfounded scruple, the Christian life of others can be promoted, it is the part of benevolence to make the concession in such matters as are in themselves morally indifferent (verses 16–21).

But it was in the Church at Corinth that this question confronted the apostle in its most peculiar and perplexing form (see 1 Cor. viii. and x. 23–xi. 1). There it arose, not from Jewish scruples, but from the perplexity in which the Gentile converts found themselves in respect to the right to eat of the meat of animals which had been killed in idol-sacrifice. A Christian could not partake of an idolatrous sacrificial meal without defilement and sin. But this meat was frequently offered for sale in the shops, and might be either wittingly or unwittingly bought and eaten. Was it in such cases to be eaten by those who knew its former associations? The Corinthians had been accustomed before their conversion to regard the gods to whom they offered sacrifice as real beings possessed of superhuman attributes. Under the power of this idea they questioned, after they became Christians, whether the idol-worship, which they now regarded as sacrilegious, did not pollute the meat of animals which

were killed in sacrifice at the idol's altar. Many did not feel at liberty to eat of such meat; others had no hesitation. The problem was how the "strong"—that is, those who had no scruple—ought to act in view of the doubts and fears of the "weak," or scrupulous. It was therefore not so much a question regarding the convictions of a certain class, the "weak brethren," as it was a question how to act in view of their want of positive convictions; how to treat their perplexity so as not to encourage them to do what their consciences were not yet clear that they had a right to do.

Paul's principles in the handling of this subject are: (*a*) that love, rather than knowledge, is the supreme law which must regulate the Christian's action. One may know, as the apostle did, that meat cannot be defiled by connection with idol-worship, and yet, in certain conditions, he may be required by love to refrain from acting upon his abstract right to eat it (1 Cor. viii. 1–3). (*b*) It is obviously absurd to suppose that an idol can defile meat, because the being which it is supposed to represent has no existence, or at any rate no such character and power as the heathen religion ascribed to it (verses 4–6; *cf.* x. 20). (*c*) But all persons cannot rise to this conception. The question arises how their scruples, based upon inherited religious ideas, shall be treated (verse 7). (*d*) The apostle explains that it is not a question of absolute right or wrong, but only of right or wrong so far as one's course might affect the action and conscience of

an uninstructed class (verse 8). (*e*) Always to insist upon the rights of "knowledge" in such cases, might be contrary to love. If a "strong" man should partake of a heathen sacrificial meal, his action might easily lead the "weak" man to do the same. In thus eating, the "weak" man acts in doubt, and thus violates his conscience by doing what he is not clear that he is morally at liberty to do. He thereby suffers a moral injury which may begin the work of destruction (verses 9–11). (*f*) Hence the apostle declares that in such cases it is the part of Christian duty to refrain from the exercise of the abstract rights of Christian liberty (verses 12, 13). In another passage he takes up the case, which might occur in a private house, where there are both "weak" and "strong" persons present. Meat of the kind described may be on the table. The general principle is, Institute no inquiry on grounds of conscience as to the food offered (x. 25–27). But in case some scrupulous person, from conscientious hesitation as to his right to eat of it, calls your attention to its character, then you should refrain for his sake (verses 28, 29),— not, indeed, because he asks or expects such a concession, but because he may follow your example without seeing that he has a clear right to do so, and thus do violence to his conscience and inflict a grave moral injury upon himself.

It should be noticed that the concessions which Paul recommends are to be made from benevolent motives. They are accommodations to an unfortunate weakness which is to be remedied, as soon as possible, by in-

struction. The concessions must, in the nature of the case, be spontaneous on the part of the one who makes them, and unsought by the weak brother. If they were demanded, they would not be due, because in that case the one who should ask them would be no longer "weak" or perplexed, but "strong" and positive. The obligations of Christian charity are for Paul weightier than the rights of Christian liberty. His tender treatment of such scruples of conscience reveal a deep trait in the character of the man who was the bold champion of liberty when concessions were asked in the name of unfounded prejudice, and especially when such concessions in any way compromised the principles of the gospel (see Gal. ii. 3; *cf.* Gal. ii. 11 *sq.*).

The apostle's counsels regarding unity and harmony in the church are most fully given in the First Epistle to the Corinthian Church, which was divided into rival and envious factions. This church had separated into parties according to the preferences of its members for different Christian teachers. Some called themselves after Paul, who had founded the church; others took the name of Apollos, the eloquent and rhetorical Alexandrian (Acts xviii. 24–xix. 1), whose philosophical mode of presenting Christian truth had doubtless captivated many; others, knowing the eminence of Peter among the primitive apostles, made his name their party watchword; and still others, disavowing allegiance to any and all of these merely human teachers, — but with a no less factious spirit, — declared, "We are Christ's" (1 Cor. i. 12).

At the mention of these divisions, the apostle seems to fasten his attention chiefly upon the characteristic differences between his own preaching and that of Apollos, and without in the least condoning the folly of those who had used his name as a party-sign, enters upon an explanation of the true Christian teaching and the right method of presenting it. Christianity, with its central doctrine of the cross, — salvation through sacrifice and suffering, — runs counter to the ethical "wisdom" of the Greek schools; and its truths are not to be presented in the rhetorical and speculative methods of those schools. Thus Paul's mind is led on from the consideration of this practical difficulty at Corinth until it mounts up to some of his greatest thoughts regarding the nature and appropriation of salvation (1 Cor. i. 18–ii. 16).

After these striking generalizations, the apostle turns again to the state of the Corinthian Church, and shows them that in their party rivalries they are behaving like carnal men in whom the Spirit has not yet obtained control (iii. 1–3), and reminds them that since all workers in God's kingdom are alike powerless in themselves to effect results, which can be accomplished only by the one Lord whom they all serve, they cannot be rivals, and must not be followed in a spirit of rivalry (verses 4–9). Then by the figure of a building, composed, indeed, of various materials, but harmonious in plan and structure, he pictures at once the true unity of the Church and emphasizes the variety of the elements of strength and beauty which

each teacher may by his instruction contribute to it (verses 10–15); and again, by the figure of a temple, he depicts the sacredness of the Church, to mar whose harmony is sacrilege (verses 16, 17). In a final paragraph he points out the wicked folly and self-deception of those who in a false conceit of wisdom foster this party-spirit (verses 18–20), and then, turning to the benefits to be derived from cherishing the opposite temper, the thought of the Christian's right to all the help which the various teachers can afford him, seizes his mind and carries his imagination up to the great idea of the Christian's possession of all things, — the world, because Christ gives the key to its right meaning and true use; life, which the Christian spirit fills with new sweetness and inspiration; death, because Christ is its conqueror, and has made it but the gateway into his eternal joy; things present and things to come, which open to the soul a limitless sphere for growth and for service (verses 21–23).

We have traced the main thread of thought in these chapters, not only because they illustrate important conceptions as to what the Church's life should be, but because they show from what a lofty point of view Paul regarded practical questions. In the factious temper which was rife at Corinth, the apostle saw a radically defective appreciation of the very nature of the gospel. The cure for such disorders was to be found in a true appreciation of what religion is. He will reprove their quarrelsome temper by taking them to the loftiest heights of Christian

contemplation, where they may see those greatest truths, — salvation by sacrifice, true happiness attainable only by an inner spiritual development, and the possible possession of all things for one who has a knowledge of their right meaning and use, and who can make them subserve the true ends of his being.

One further subject may be touched upon which illustrates the apostle's method of handling practical subjects, and reveals certain peculiarities of view which are connected with the conditions of his time. He treats of marriage and divorce (1 Cor. vii.) with a certain diffidence, alleging more than once in the course of the discussion that he is rather speaking in the way of concession or advice than giving authoritative commands (1 Cor. vii. 6, 12, 25, 26, 40). Paul himself prefers and recommends the unmarried state (vii. 1, 7, 8). The principal ground for this preference is the "impending distress" (*ἡ ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη*, vii. 26) which is to precede the parousia, and which will bring special sufferings to the married. Connected with this reason is the present and increasing demand for peculiar labors and hardships in the cause of Christ, which can be better met by the unmarried by reason of their comparative freedom from care (vii. 32, 33). This advice is thus seen to be based upon reasons of Christian expediency as the apostle saw them, and not upon any inherent objections to the married state or any superior holiness in celibacy. He clearly implies that one does not sin who disregards this advice (*cf.* vii. 28, 36, 38). It is

his opinion that in view of the nearness of the consummation, changes in such relations as those of family and social life should not be made (vii. 20–23, 27).

It follows from this position, as well as from his knowledge of the teaching of Christ on the subject (*cf.* vii. 12), that Paul was opposed to divorce (vii. 10, 11). But there was one situation (no doubt an actual one in some instances at Corinth) in which he would concede its advisability. That situation was, where one of the partners, being a heathen, refused to live on peaceably with the Christian party (vii. 15). If, in cases of such differences in religion, the parties can agree to dwell together, they should by all means do so (vii. 12–14), but where the non-Christian partner departs and so morally sunders the marriage-bond, the Christian member may acquiesce in his departure. Whether in such cases the Christian party would be regarded by Paul as free to marry again is not wholly clear. His general preference, for the reasons given, that Christians should not enter upon new relations, most naturally suggests a negative answer to this question. Moreover, in a purely legal view of the matter, the right of re-marriage in such cases would probably be excluded so long as the other party lived (vii. 39), and even then religious considerations would dictate the rule that Christians should not intermarry with the heathen (vii. 39), while expediency, as Paul interprets it, would favor remaining single (vii. 40).

The point of chief interest in Paul's handling of the

subject is found in the combination of considerations drawn from the peculiar conditions of his time, and especially from his parousia-expectation, with the universal principles which are applicable to the subject in hand. If the argument shows the apostle's limitations of knowledge and his imperfect interpretation of expediency, it also shows that he was conscious of his limitations and clearly distinguished between his opinions on such subjects and the essential truths and principles of the gospel, which he taught with the full confidence of their divine authority. If, on the one hand, his limitations of view show him to have been a genuine man of his time, it is equally certain that, on the other, his consciousness of them and his refusal to place his personal counsels touching such practical subjects as marriage and divorce upon a level with the essential truths of the gospel which he had received, lift him again immeasurably above his age, and remain among the most conspicuous marks of his real greatness.

CHAPTER XII

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH

THE phrase, the kingdom of God, so constantly used by the Founder of Christianity as a designation of the community of believers, is not frequently employed by the apostle Paul. The two meanings of the expression which are commonest in Paul's writings are: (*a*) that in which it stands as a name for the principles or truths of Jesus' teaching, as in Rom. xiv. 17, "The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (*cf.* 1 Cor. iv. 20); (*b*) the reign of God in the perfected society of the future world, — the prevailing meaning with Paul, and most frequently associated with the word "inherit," as in 1 Cor. vi. 9, "The unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (*cf.* xv. 50; Gal. v. 21; 2 Thess. i. 5). It is unquestionable that Paul commonly uses the term in an eschatological sense, and that we must seek his teaching regarding the organization and characteristics of Christian society as it exists in the present age, in connection with other terms. The most important of these is the word "church" (*ἐκκλησία*), which occurs

more than sixty times in his epistles, and in a considerable variety of meanings.

Paul most frequently means by "church" an assembly of believers who meet in a particular place for Christian worship, as in 1 Cor. xi. 18, "When ye come together in the church [or congregation]," and in 1 Cor. xvi. 19, "the church that is in their house" (*ἡ κατ' οἶκον ἐκκλησία*), *cf.* Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15. Ordinarily this assembly includes the Christians of any given town or city, as "the church which is at Corinth," 1 Cor. i. 2, "the church of the Thessalonians," 1 Thess. i. 1, etc. But in many passages the term has a wider meaning, and denotes the whole community of believers, as in 1 Cor. xii. 28, "And God hath set some in the church, first apostles," etc. *cf.* x. 32; xv. 9; Gal. i. 13, — the use of the term which is most important for our present purpose.

It appears, then, that in Paul's use of words, the Church, in its broadest meaning, is the present collective community of Christians, and that the Kingdom of God is the society of believers as it shall be in the coming age of Messianic blessedness. The Church and the Kingdom of God are separated by the parousia and its attendant events, which mark the close of the present world-period (*αἰὼν οὗτος, ὁ νῦν αἰών*, Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 18; Titus ii. 12) and introduce the Messianic age (*αἰὼν μέλλων*, Eph. i. 21, *cf.* Heb. vi. 5). There is, therefore, in the language of Paul no basis for such a distinction as that between the Church militant and the Church triumphant, since the Church

designates an organization or collection of organizations, which exist only in this pre-Messianic period, and which do not survive the transition from this age to the coming one. At the second advent the Kingdom of God will be ushered in, and the Church as such will pass away, because its ideal will have been attained. It would not, therefore, be un-Pauline to say that the Church is the organization of Christians which here and now imperfectly represents the Kingdom of God on earth. Their relation is like that of the respective ages (*αἰῶνες*) to which they belong. The Church exists in an evil age (Gal. i. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 3 *sq.*) and must therefore partake of human imperfection and sin; the Kingdom of God will be the reign of the divine law of love which Christ shall institute at his coming, — the perfected theocracy. Their relation is analogous to that of the Old Testament civil polity to the spiritual commonwealth of Jesus. From the definition of their relation it is seen that the conception of the Kingdom of God belongs to the sphere of eschatology; that of the Church, the present society and fellowship of Christians, is a distinct subject, and demands separate treatment.

The Church is a unit under the lordship of Christ. This thought is most fully developed in First Corinthians, where the apostle sets it in contrast with the party-spirit which prevailed at Corinth, and in Ephesians, where it is introduced as a corollary of the supreme headship of Christ over the Church. The unity and harmony of all Christians in the Church are

illustrated by various figures. One of the most common is that of the members as constituting one body: "We, who are many, are one body in Christ, and severally members one of another" (Rom. xii. 5); "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ" (1 Cor. xii. 12); that is, "just as the case stands with the body, that its many members make up its unity, so also does it stand in like manner with Christ, whose many members likewise constitute the unity of his body" (Meyer *in loco*). In Ephesians the headship of Christ over the Church as his body is yet more explicitly asserted in contrast to modes of thought which degraded Christ from his pre-eminent position, and which had become rife in the churches in Asia Minor, although the apostle does not here draw out the practical lessons regarding the function of each member of the body which are so fully developed in 1 Cor. xii. 12–31. Here it is a doctrinal interest regarding the nature and dignity of Christ's person, while there it was a practical concern for the harmony and peace of the Corinthian Church, which determined the course of his thought. It is the divine purpose "to sum up all things in Christ;" that is, to unite all things under one head (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*), in union with Christ (Eph. i. 10). Christ is the unifying bond of all saving powers and processes. God "hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body" (i. 22). It results from Christ's position and work

that mankind, who were before divided into Jews and Gentiles, are now united into one body by the reconciliation which Christ has accomplished by his death (ii. 16). It follows that it is the duty of the Christian man to fulfil the function of a member of Christ, and so to promote the strong and healthy growth of the body (iv. 16; Col. ii. 19), or, disregarding the figure, to grow in likeness to Christ, to approach ever nearer to the standard of his perfectness (Eph. iv. 13, 15).

Another favorite representation of the symmetry and unity of the Church compares it to a temple or other building. Christians together constitute a sacred sanctuary of God (*ναός*), whose defilement by jealousy and strife is a grievous sin (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17). This figure is used to emphasize the guilt of all conformity to heathen customs, and of marriage with unbelievers. Such conduct is like the association of God's temple with idol-shrines (2 Cor. vi. 14–18). Again, Christians constitute God's building (*οἰκοδομή*), of which Christ is the foundation (1 Cor. iii. 9), or "chief corner-stone" (Eph. ii. 20), and whose several parts being adjusted, each to its own place and use, grow into a temple hallowed by the indwelling of the Lord, — a house wherein God may dwell by the presence of his Spirit (Eph. ii. 21, 22). The Church is also represented as God's tilled field (*θεοῦ γεώργιον*, 1 Cor. iii. 9), in which different laborers should cultivate and irrigate the soil without disparagement or jealousy of one another, remembering that it is not they but God who produces the harvest (iii. 6–9).

The various offices which belong to the Church at large the apostle has enumerated in two passages. They are "first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers" (1 Cor. xii. 28), or, according to the fuller list in Eph. iv. 11, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers. This enumeration is not made for the purpose of defining or emphasizing the various functions thus represented, but for the practical purpose of illustrating the diversities of gift and office which meet and harmonize in the essential unity of the Church. That the list represents, not so much different church offices as various functions and endowments, is shown by the way in which the list is continued in 1 Cor. xii. 28, "then miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues." In the local churches there were in Paul's time two well-defined offices, — that of bishops or presbyters, and that of deacons (Phil. i. 1), — although it seems clear that not all the Pauline churches were thus officered from the first. There is no trace, for example, of official leaders in either the Galatian or the Corinthian churches; the fact that none are in any way held responsible for the disorders of these churches, as well as the very nature of some of the disorders, such as those that occurred at the Lord's Supper (see, for example, 1 Cor. xi. 20, 21, 33) would indicate a lack of organization in the case of these communities.[1] In the Church at large, however, there were no offices, in the common meaning of that term.

[1] *Cf.* Weiss, *Bib. Theol.* § 92 *d.*

The apostles were men especially commissioned by Christ to found and foster churches, and they left no successors. The terms "prophets, teachers, and evangelists" do not imply functions which can be absolutely separated from one another. The "prophet" was an instructed and divinely enlightened teacher who interpreted spiritual truth to the churches. The evangelists were preachers who went from place to place, and might be officers in some local church, as in the case of Philip the deacon (Acts xxi. 8). The prophet and the evangelist were also teachers, although these terms ordinarily denoted persons who, in an individual church by reason of special fitness, gave instruction in Christian truth, and who would generally, if not always, belong to the college of elders or pastors who were chosen out of the congregation to be its official representatives in instruction and government (*cf.* Meyer on Eph. iv. 11).

The various spiritual powers with which the Apostolic Church was endowed are more distinctly described, although this description is given, not for purposes of definition, but as a basis of exhortation to unity of spirit. The most prominent of these *charismata* are the gift of tongues and of their interpretation, the gift of miracle-working, of discerning spirits, and of prophecy (1 Cor. xii. 10, 30). The first of these was an ecstatic mode of speech which was unintelligible to the hearers (xiv. 2), and which, therefore, needed to be interpreted either by the

speaker or by another (xiv. 5, 13, 27, 28). "Workings of miracles" designate effects which proceed from acts of power (*cf.* δυνάμεις, xii. 29), and which presuppose for their performance special faith, — such an unshaken confidence as is referred to in 1 Cor. xiii. 2, "If I have all faith, so as to remove mountains." By the "discernings of spirits" is meant judgments as to the source from which that which is said in the assembly proceeds, whether from the Holy Spirit or from human or even demoniac spirits (*cf.* 1 Tim. iv. 1; 1 John iv. 1). Prophecy or preaching, the gift of clear, luminous exposition of Christian truth under the influence of the Holy Spirit, was the endowment which Paul most highly prized, and deemed most serviceable to the Church (1 Cor. xiv. 1–5, 24, 25). Other *charismata* are more incidentally alluded to, such as "the word of wisdom" (λόγος σοφίας) and "the word of knowledge" (λόγος γνώσεως, 1 Cor. xii. 8), — terms which are not easily defined and distinguished, but which refer, no doubt, to the enunciation and apprehension of those deep truths and mysteries, such as the sacrifice of Christ (1 Cor. i. 22–24), that constitute the true Christian wisdom which may be taught to those of spiritual maturity (1 Cor. ii. 6), but which the worldly and carnal mind cannot receive (ii. 14). Paul mentions also "helps" (ἀντιλήψεις), which most naturally refers to the duties of the diaconate, and "governments" (κυβερνήσεις, 1 Cor. xii. 28), which is best understood as the counterpart of "helps," and would

therefore designate the functions of government which are exercised in the local church by the elders or bishops.

When we turn from the organization of the Church and the diversity of gifts represented in it, to consider its relation to society, we must remember that the expectation of the speedy return of Christ to judgment, which was universal in the Apostolic Age,[1] operated as a powerful motive to discourage changes in the social order. We have seen how Paul applied this motive to the subject of marriage (1 Cor. vii. 26–31). The trials and sufferings which will precede the approaching parousia make it desirable that no change of social conditions or relations be made, but that "each abide in that calling wherein he was called" (1 Cor. vii. 20); that is, continue in the condition in which the call of God found him. If he was a Jew when converted, let him not seek to efface the marks of his Judaism; if a Gentile, let him not become a Jew (vii. 18); if one was a bond-servant when called, let him be content to remain such (vii. 21), for bond and free are on the same level before Christ; both are Christ's freemen as those whom he has delivered from their sins, and both are his bondmen as being obligated to his service (vii. 22); that is, in Christ's service the true bondage to truth and duty is coincident with the highest freedom.

[1] *Cf.* Prof. G. P. Fisher on "The New Testament Writings on the Time of the Second Advent" in *The Nature and Method of Revelation*, p. 221 *sq.*

It is obvious from these considerations that even if there had been in that age any occasion to raise the question as to the justice and continuance of slavery, no such upheaval of society as would have been involved in its abolition would have seemed justified to the apostle's mind. The conditions of the time, however, were not such as to give rise to this question. Slavery was an institution of both Jewish and Gentile society in which all acquiesced, and whose ultimate discontinuance could only be the result of a prolonged social development. A proclamation against it by the apostles would have been as premature and futile as it would have been unnatural. The immediate and practical duty of the Christian teacher was to counsel faithful fulfilment of the duties involved in social relations as then existing (Eph. vi. 5–9). To have done otherwise would have been to recommend a revolution which would, in fact, have been unsuccessful, and which, had it succeeded, would have been disastrous in its effect upon society. A recent writer, treating of "Paul and Social Gradations," raises the question, what would have been the result if Christianity had proclaimed in Paul's time the emancipation of all slaves, and answers thus: —

"Doubtless it would have instantaneously added to the numerical strength of Christianity; the kingdom of heaven would immediately have been taken by violence. And so would the kingdoms of earth. It is impossible to conceive a more perfect picture of anarchy than would have been created by a sudden and successful insurrec-

tion of the slave population. The numerical proportion of the bound to the unbound in the Roman empire is a matter of dispute; probably the bound outnumbered the free. Figure anything approaching to such a proportion, and then to the quantity add the quality. Consider that the slave population represented at its worst that state which we designate by the name of Paganism, — a name which embraces as its leading characteristic the predominance of the sensuous over the spiritual. It was Paganism without its restraints and without its refinements. What would have been the effect of the emancipation of these millions, — the emancipation of an un-Christianized, un-humanized horde, impelled by the fanaticism of a new watchword, accomplished in a moment of time, and achieved by a stroke of violence? Could it have any other result than one, — the transformation of order into anarchy, the uprooting of that line of civilization on which Christianity itself had begun to move?" [1]

In regard to the relation of the sexes we may observe, in addition to what has been said regarding marriage and divorce, that the apostle considers the distinction of sex to be annulled in Christ in so far as both male and female are alike dependent upon him (Gal. iii. 28). In respect of religious equality there is no dependence of woman upon man. Even in the natural relations there is a certain reciprocal dependence, since it is not only true that woman was made from man, but that man is born of woman (1 Cor. xi. 11, 12). But neither this religious equal-

[1] Matheson, *Spiritual Development of Saint Paul*, pp. 291, 292.

ity nor this natural derivation of each sex from the other, annuls the social difference and the dependence of woman upon man as her "head," — a relation analogous to the dependence of the Church upon Christ as her "head" (Eph. v. 23; *cf.* 1 Cor. xi. 3).

The woman is to be veiled in public assemblies as a sign of this dependence (1 Cor. xi. 5). For the same reason she should wear her hair long, because Nature has given it to her as a kind of natural veil (xi. 15). It is therefore a violation of natural modesty and decorum for a woman to appear in public without these signs of her natural dependence upon man (xi. 6). These proprieties are based upon the divine order of creation (Gen. ii. 18–22), according to which the apostle considers that a certain precedence is accorded man in the direct impartation to him of lordly authority, while the glory which God imparted to mankind in creation appears only indirectly and, as it were, by reflection, in woman, who was not created directly by God, but mediately from man. In 1 Tim. ii. 14, the secondary place of woman is ascribed not alone to her later and mediate creation, but to her earlier yielding to temptation (Gen. iii. 6). It is noticeable that the apostle's view regarding the dependent position of woman in her relation to man rests upon a literal interpretation of the narratives of the creation and fall in Genesis, and upon the separate and far-reaching significance of its various details.

From this general view of woman's dependence the

apostle draws certain practical conclusions respecting her place and conduct in the Church. He particularly forbids her speaking or teaching in the public assemblies of the Church (1 Cor. xiv. 34; 1 Tim. ii. 12). This prohibition he grounds upon a natural propriety which has its basis in the later creation, the earlier transgression, and the divinely appointed dependence of woman (1 Cor. xiv. 35; 1 Tim. ii. 12). Not only is she precluded from public teaching in the assembly; she may not even speak in the way of asking questions. If she wishes instruction in regard to the subjects which are considered in the Church, she must ask her husband at home (1 Cor. xiv. 35), instead of propounding her questions in public. In speaking of the impropriety of women praying or prophesying in the congregation without a veil (1 Cor. xi. 5, 13), the apostle cannot have intended to indicate that they might do so if veiled, since he is not dealing with the proper way of woman's appearing in public, but with the obvious impropriety of the mode of appearance described. The requirement to appear in the assembly with veiled head would, probably, in itself preclude, by its very significance, the public speaking in question; but, in any case, the apostle's attitude toward it is made unmistakably clear by his direct and emphatic prohibition of it in a later chapter (xiv. 34, 35).

The ordinances of the Apostolic Church were baptism and the Lord's Supper. The former was the symbol of the believer's entrance into union with

Christ; the latter the memorial of his sacrificial death and the sign and pledge of the believer's participation in his life. The Christian is baptized into the name of Christ (*cf.* 1 Cor. i. 13–16); that is, enters into that personal relation to Christ which is denoted by taking upon him Christ's name, so that he may be said to have put on Christ (Gal. iii. 27) as a garment. Baptism into Christ (εἰς Χριστόν) thus denotes the entrance into spiritual relation to Christ, a mystic union with him in which he becomes the life-element of the soul. It is involved in this conception that baptism denotes the renunciation of the former sinful life. Continuance in sin is inconsistent with the very idea of baptism, since it symbolizes an ethical death to sin and life to righteousness (Rom. vi. 1–7). Here we meet the peculiar Pauline representation by which baptism is treated as a moral death and burial to sin, analogous to, or rather mystically identical with, Christ's death and burial. This form of thought is discussed at length in another chapter (pp. 34–36), to which I refer the reader. It is probable that the immersion of the body in water suggested to the apostle's mind the analogy between the moral significance of the rite and those saving acts of Christ — death, burial, and resurrection — which were the ground of that ethical transformation which baptism symbolized. The object of the apostle in the passage is not to teach anything concerning the mystical significance of the form of baptism, but to urge that the very idea of baptism — as denoting participation

in the saving work of Christ and life-union with him — implies and demands a life of righteousness as opposed to continuance in sin. Baptism betokens a moral death to sin and a moral renewal in righteousness, — a process which has its ground in the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is not the form of baptism which is said to typify Christ's death, but it is the process of moral renewal (proclaimed in baptism) which is so represented. Baptism is nowhere said to typify or picture forth Christ's death, burial, and resurrection. It typifies that moral renewal of the believer which is figuratively called a death and resurrection (Rom. vi. 4; Col. ii. 12), and which Paul mystically identifies with Christ's death and resurrection, its cause and ground. But, it may be said, if baptism typifies spiritual renewal, and this renewal is identified with Christ's death, does it not therefore typify Christ's death? The answer is that the identification spoken of is a *mystical* identification of events widely separated in time, and that while one may carry out Paul's mysticism to this extent, he has not himself done so. That Paul attached special significance to submersion as typifying Christ's burial, is an inference which disregards the peculiar mysticism by which the significance of baptism is associated with Christ's death and burial, and overlooks the fact that the relation of baptism to regeneration (ethical "death") is wholly different from that of regeneration to Christ's death. It is the fallacy of the argument, A = B, and B = C; therefore A = C, when

A does not equal B *in the same sense* as B equals C. Baptism *typifies* moral renewal, and moral renewal *is grounded in* Christ's death; it does not follow that baptism typifies Christ's death.[1]

It is not probable that the baptism of infant children was practised in Paul's time, or that the subject of its grounds or propriety was ever considered by him. In the early years of the Church's life there would be no occasion to raise the question whether the children of believers were also proper subjects of baptism, since Christianity of course addressed itself to adults. In the absence of explicit instruction on the subject, the Church could only raise this question — as it could only raise the question of exclusive Sunday observance — at a later stage of religious thought and life. It has been too confidently assumed that the references to the baptism of households (Acts xvi. 15; 1 Cor. i. 16) imply the baptism of young children, since there is no intimation that those families contained infants. The statement in 1 Cor. vii. 14 that the children of parents one of whom is a Christian are "holy" has been thought to imply their right to baptism; but it is certain that the apostle could not

[1] Rom. vi. 3, where Paul speaks of baptism *into Christ's death*, is no exception to this statement. The context shows that his meaning is, Our baptism expresses our new moral relation to Christ's death; its whole significance is that we ethically participate in its benefits, which implies the cessation of the sinful life. Paul is emphasizing the *moral significance* of the believer's initiation into the Christian community as implying that inner renewal of life which is the effect of Christ's death.

have thought of such a bearing of his statement, since in the immediate connection he affirms that "the unbelieving husband is *sanctified* in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is *sanctified* in the brother." The believing partner "sanctifies" not only the children of the union, but the unbelieving partner also. Moreover, the fact that Paul designates children as "holy," not in consequence of a sacred rite, but solely by virtue of their Christian parentage, indirectly testifies against the existence of infant baptism in his time. It determines nothing, however, as to the bearing upon the subject of his underlying idea of the family.

The oldest tradition concerning the institution and significance of the Lord's Supper (*κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*) is that which Paul has preserved to us (1 Cor. xi. 23–25). It represents the Lord as taking bread, and giving thanks, and saying, "This is my body, which is for you," and, in like manner, taking the cup of wine, and saying, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." That the bread and wine were thought of in the language of institution as symbols of Christ's body and blood is evident from the fact that he was bodily present with those to whom he spoke the words, and any other sense of the words would have been absolutely unintelligible.[1] The idea that the language implies a miraculous transformation of the elements of bread and wine into Christ's veritable body and blood, or

[1] *Cf.* Meyer *in loco;* Neander, *Planting and Training,* Bohn ed. i. 497; Am. ed. p. 454.

the equally miraculous presence in these elements of two substances, is a development of sacramentarian theology, whose rise was due, not to the passages which it learned to interpret with unnatural literalness, but to a certain method of religious thought.

The symbolism of the ordinance which points primarily to the sacrificial death of Christ, as well as the explanation of its purpose which the apostle appends in verse 26, shows that the supper was to him a perpetual sign and confession of the benefits conferred by the Lord's redemptive work. The institution was to be a memorial of the Saviour, and more especially of his sufferings and death, until he should personally return to consummate his communion with his disciples by his immediate presence. But the observance is not only regarded as an act of remembrance, but also as an act of communion (*κοινωνία*). Partaking of the bread and wine involves participation with the body and blood of Christ (1 Cor. x. 16); that is, with the remembrance of Christ's sufferings for the participant is joined the consciousness of communion with him and of being the recipient of the saving benefits of his death. That this "communion" with Christ's body and blood is thought of, not as material, but as realized in the consciousness of the believer's fellowship with Christ, is evident from the considerations mentioned above in connection with xi. 23 *sq.*

The apostle also regards the supper as a sign of the spiritual unity of all believers in Christ. "We who are many are one bread, one body," or, as the verse

may (I think more properly) be translated, "Because there is one bread, we, the many, are one body; for we all partake of the one bread"[1] (1 Cor. x. 17). The common symbol of which all partake suggests the common participation of all in those gracious benefits which are symbolized, and thus designates the unity of the participants.

Among the Corinthians, to whom Paul wrote on this subject, great abuses of the sacred feast had arisen. The memorial supper was observed, as universally in the Apostolic Church, in connection with the *agape*, or love-feast, — a common meal to which the various members of the community contributed. But on coming together, the richer members of the congregation proceeded at once to devour what they had brought, and left those who had brought little or no supply with an insufficient meal. The result was that some remained hungry, while the well-supplied partook to excess, especially of the wine which they had brought (xi. 21). He reminds them that under such conditions there can be no proper observance of the Lord's Supper (xi. 20), and having rehearsed the circumstances of its origin, in order to show them how incongruous was their conduct with its whole idea and purpose, he warns them against a desecration of the sacred festival by reminding them that whoever participates in it unworthily — that is, without an

[1] So Meyer, Heinrici. Others render in the form of a comparison, "As the bread is one, so we, the many, are one body," etc. So Conybeare and Howson, De Wette, Neander.

appreciation of its sacred character and use — is guilty of sacrilegious treatment of the Lord's body and blood (xi. 27). In view of the danger of this great sin to which his readers were so peculiarly liable, he advises them to put themselves to the test, whether they are partaking with serious thoughts and in accord with the sacred purpose of the institution, and urges them to partake in the consciousness of the fact that by this test it is determined whether their partaking is a source of blessing or an act of sin (verse 28). According to this criterion he that eats and drinks (*ἀναξίως* in verse 29 is certainly spurious) draws down a divine judgment upon himself if, in so doing, he does not "discern the body;" that is, if he is not conscious of the sacredness of the symbols of which he partakes, — if with a profane or thoughtless disposition he takes the memorials of Christ's sacrifice (verse 29). To this profanation of the ordinance the apostle traces the sickness and death of many in the Corinthian congregation (verse 30). He warns them to submit their moral condition to the test proposed (verse 28) when they approach the sacred meal, and to refrain from those excesses from which their unworthy participation has resulted, by waiting for one another at the *agape*, or by eating in advance at home, that they may not further expose themselves by such impiety to the divine displeasure (verses 31–34).

CHAPTER XIII

THE PAULINE ESCHATOLOGY

No part of the apostle's teaching is developed with so little of systematic fulness as the doctrine of the future life. Upon the subject of the resurrection he wrote at some length (1 Cor. xv.), in order to remove the objections and difficulties which existed in the Greek mind in regard to it. He has expressed himself somewhat fully, especially in his earlier epistles, upon the hope of the Lord's return to earth, but in the later letters this theme recedes into the background. Upon no other topics of eschatology has he dwelt at length. His statements are rather incidental, but are not on that account less important as a guide to his general conception of the nature and progress of the kingdom of God and of the consummation of human history.

Salvation is to Paul both a present and a future fact. At justification there commences a new life which continues to grow and strengthen under the power of the Spirit; but in this life the blessed realization of salvation is but begun. With the experience of God's redeeming mercy there always mingles

a large element of hope. The full fruition of redemption will be enjoyed only in the immediate presence of Christ.

Redemption has two sides or relations, — that which looks toward the former sinful state, and which is represented by such words as salvation (*σωτηρία*) and forgiveness (*ἄφεσις*), and that which looks forward to the future, and is best represented by the term *life* (*ζωή*). The formal, juridical side of Paul's theology is more immediately connected with this negative aspect of salvation; his doctrine of the life of faith and love illustrates more its positive side. The doctrine of justification answers the question, How can man be delivered from the burden of his sins and become the object of the divine favor? The doctrine of the Christian life answers the question, How can man more and more attain that Christlikeness of character whose complete possession is the goal of his existence? The Pauline eschatology is, in the main, a following out of this question. But this teaching has also its negative side. It treats of the deliverance of the spiritual element of the personality from the corruptible flesh; but the main stress is laid upon the positive completion of salvation in the bestowment of glorified bodies suited to the new conditions which shall surround the soul in the future life, and in the glorification and perfection of the whole personality after the image of Christ.

The great transformation which Paul's views of the future life underwent in his passing from Pharisaism

to Christianity is apparent when we contrast the Jewish view of death as the greatest of misfortunes, with Paul's conception of it as a departure to be with Christ, which is better than continued life (Phil. i. 23); or when we compare the Jews' belief in Sheol — a gloomy realm of shadows and forgetfulness — with Paul's hope of a bright, happy, conscious life, ensuing directly upon death (2 Cor. v. 6–8). On the ground of the narrative of the Fall in Genesis (iii. 3 *sq.*), Paul regards physical death as the penalty of sin. He cannot, indeed, have supposed that, had sin never entered the world, there would have been no change corresponding to what is called death, — that is, a dissolution of the material body, — since it is a fundamental principle with him that fleshly bodies cannot enter the future spiritual kingdom (1 Cor. xv. 50). We are led to suppose that, but for sin, there would have been some transformation of men's fleshly bodies, without those accompaniments of sickness and pain which are always associated with "death," by which they would have been delivered from their perishable, corruptible elements, and made fit to "inherit the kingdom of God." Death, therefore, considered as the penalty of sin, is not merely the dissolution of the earthly body as such, but carries with it those associations of weakness, disease, and corruption which have always invested with terrors the name of death. How, now, does the work of redemption affect this bitter consequence of sin? It does not abolish it; the reign of death continues. Nor does it rob it of

those accompaniments to which we have referred, and make it what it would have been if sin had never entered the world. Despite the work of Christ, death remains with all its train of physical evils, even for the subjects of salvation. The natural consequences of sin are not averted by redemption.

In what sense, then, can Paul hold that Christ has "abolished death" (2 Tim. i. 10)? He has done so by securing to the believer the certainty that death shall have no further dominion over him after his experience of it here. It shall not hold him under its power in the world to come, where he shall forthwith enter into life. The sting of death, which is sin (1 Cor. xv. 56), is taken away, because sin cannot pursue the believer into the future world, there to inflict upon him death and its attendant evils. Christ is victor over death because at last the soul in his immediate presence is delivered from the power of sin and is placed beyond the reach of death, — sin's consequence.

In accord with this conception of death as powerless to hold or harm the soul after its separation from this body, the apostle is fond of speaking of death as a sleep. Christ is the "firstfruits" (the pledge and promise of resurrection), "of them that are asleep" (1 Cor. xv. 20); "for if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which are fallen asleep in Jesus will God bring with him" (1 Thess. iv. 14; *cf.* 1 Cor. vii. 39; xi. 30; xv. 6, 18, 51). To understand this expression literally as designating an

actual sleep of the soul, a state of unconsciousness between death and the resurrection, is clearly inconsistent with several passages where Paul presupposes an immediate entrance at death upon a conscious, joyous communion with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 8; Phil. i. 23).[1] The expression must be understood as an euphemism for death, and as denoting the blessed rest in fellowship with Jesus into which his followers enter at death. The realization of the completed salvation for the individual is thus described as the disarming of death of its terrors by the assured certainty of an entrance into a blessed life with Christ, and of being provided with a spiritual embodiment for the soul which shall never experience death or corruption.

Greater difficulties arise when it is sought to define Paul's conception of the consummation of the kingdom of redemption as a whole, and to trace the order of events by which it is to be accomplished, and the relation of the individual thereto. The second coming

[1] Usteri (*Paulinischer Lehrbegriff*, p. 349) supposes that Paul's earlier thought was that the dead in Christ slept between death and the parousia, but that as this event receded into a more uncertain distance, he developed the hope of their immediate participation at death in conscious fellowship with Christ. This opinion involves the supposition of a very radical transformation of his ideas on the subject in the few months intervening between the writing of 1 and 2 Corinthians (*cf.* 1 Cor. xv. 6, 18, 20, etc., with 2 Cor. v. 8),— an assumption wholly destitute of proof and in itself quite unnatural. Sabatier (*L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 155 *sq.*; Eng. tr. p. 179 *sq.*) draws a fanciful picture of this supposed transformation in the apostle's view of the future.

of Christ furnishes the starting-point for this phase of his teaching. It is necessary to consider his views upon three subjects, — the parousia, the resurrection, and the judgment of the world, — in order to define the further problems to which these views give rise, and to trace the limits of the apostle's affirmations regarding the last things.

In common with the whole Church in the Apostolic Age, Paul regarded the return of Christ to raise the dead and judge the world as near at hand, and confidently hoped for its occurrence in his own lifetime. This expectation seems to have been occasioned largely by the disappointment of the hopes of the first disciples of Jesus — hopes which were universal in the later Judaism — that the Messiah would establish a great world-empire and throw from off the nation the yoke of Roman dominion. Since Jesus had not done this, but had merely proclaimed and founded a spiritual empire, his disciples most naturally turned their thoughts toward his return as the occasion when their disappointed hopes would be fulfilled. His own teaching respecting this event and respecting other future crises in his kingdom, they had understood in the light of their own conception of the nature and establishment of this kingdom. Their inherited ideas colored their understanding of his teaching on these themes and influenced the form of the tradition of his words from the first. This influence is clearly discernible in our Synoptic Gospels, where he is frequently represented as teaching that his second advent

would occur speedily, and even in one instance as declaring that it would ensue immediately upon the capture of Jerusalem by the Romans (Matt. xxiv. 29).[1] The non-fulfilment of these definite predictions which were attributed to Christ, did not destroy, though it must have tempered, the hope of his early return. Even those who no longer cherished the Jewish conception of the Messianic kingdom as a great theocracy with Jerusalem as its center, still clung to its associated idea of the impending return of the Lord. Paul was no exception. Naturally this hope appears most prominently in his earlier epistles (1 and 2 Thess.), which are, in effect, specimens of his missionary teaching prior to the time when the great Jewish-Christian controversy convulsed his churches. At Thessalonica the Christians, ardent in their hope of the Lord's speedy coming as the result of Paul's preaching among them, were perplexed in regard to those of their number who had died. Would they not be at a disadvantage at the advent as compared with those who should be then living? Paul replies that they will in no respect fail of participation in that glorious event; for at the Lord's coming those believers who have died shall be raised, and shall at once fully share in the exaltation to heaven and the perpetual communion with Christ into which his followers will enter (1 Thess. iv. 13–18). The way in which the apostle

[1] *Cf.* Fisher, on "The New Testament Writings on the Time of the Second Advent," in *The Nature and Method of Revelation*, p. 221 *sq.*

speaks of those who shall be living at the parousia ("*We* that are alive, that are left unto the coming of the Lord," verses 15, 17) clearly shows that he expected to be of that number, and that he regarded those who should have "fallen asleep in Jesus" (verse 14) as constituting a minority of the church.

Paul soon found that from this hope had been drawn unwarranted and dangerous inferences. Many at Thessalonica had ceased from their regular employments and from self-support, in expectation of the speedy consummation (2 Thess. iii. 6–12). In his second letter to them he seeks to correct this extravagant and fanatical temper. A letter had been circulated among them, purporting to emanate from Paul, which had stated that the day of the Lord was on the very point of dawning (*ἐνέστηκεν*, ii. 2). Paul denies all responsibility for such definite and confident prediction of the immediate nearness of the advent, and, in order to turn their minds, in a measure, to other thoughts, tells them that certain events which must precede the parousia may more wisely be made the object of their present expectation. These events are connected with "the apostasy" (*ἡ ἀποστασία*, ii. 3), which shall culminate in a great development of evil, which Paul conceives of as being represented by a false Messiah who is called "the man of sin," "the son of perdition." This manifestation of evil is to be within the sphere of anti-Christian Judaism, and is at present held in check by the Roman power. These

evil forces are gathering themselves for an outbreak which will occur as soon as the restrainer (ὁ κατέχων, verse 7; *cf.* τὸ κατέχον, verse 6) is taken out of the way.

From this whole passage (ii. 1–12) — well named "the Pauline Apocalypse" — it is evident that Paul shared, in some measure, the Jewish idea of the *dolores Messiæ* (*cf.* 1 Cor. vii. 26), the dread sufferings and portents which were to precede and accompany the advent.[1] The passage under review throws no doubt whatever upon Paul's expectation of the nearness of the advent. While he had not taught that the day was so near that its dawn was on the point of breaking, and while he asserts that other events are to be first expected, he clearly regards these events as harbingers of the approaching advent, and contemplates them all as near at hand and as likely to occur within his own lifetime.

In his later epistles other great problems and interests absorb his attention, and the subject of the advent assumes quite a secondary place. The hope of a personal experience of it continues, however, to find occasional expression almost to the very end of his career. There is no just ground for the assertion that Paul underwent a change of view regarding this subject. There is in his teaching a change of emphasis in regard to it, but no change of opinion. It is referred to in the second group of let-

[1] *Cf.* Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, ii. 433, 434.

ters (1 Cor. i. 7, 8; iv. 5; xvi. 22) and in the third (Col. iii. 4; Phil. iv. 5).

The apostle's doctrine of the resurrection is presented in a compact form in order to answer the objections to it which were rife at Corinth (1 Cor. xv.). The certainty of resurrection in general is based upon the fact of Christ's resurrection. These two truths are involved in each other, and stand or fall together (verses 12–19). But it is a fact that Christ has risen and become "the firstfruits [ἀπαρχή] of them that are asleep" (verse 20); he has begun the great resurrection-process, and in his resurrection that of his followers who have died, is assured. It is only the certainty of this fact which can lend significance to the custom of receiving vicarious baptism for those who have died (verse 29), or justify the apostles in subjecting themselves to constant perils and labors for the gospel (verses 30–32). But for the hope founded upon Christ's resurrection, we should easily fall into moral indifference and carnality of life (verses 32–34).

The question then arises as to the mode of the resurrection. The apostle replies that it may be thought of after the analogy of natural processes. As the seed-grain which is sown in the earth decays, but rises again in the nobler product of the new stalk, so the perishable body may have within itself some germ or potency which becomes the formative principle of the resurrection-body (verses 36–38). This analogy is intended to relieve the difficulty which

was felt in regard to the relation between the present and the future embodiment. To the Greek mind the difficulty would be: When the disembodied soul comes forth from Hades and enters a body, whence and of what materials shall that body be? Paul's analogy meets the problem only in two points: (1) the new body shall not be identical with the present one, — the buried body resuscitated, — but (2) it shall be organically connected with the present body; the continuity of the personality on its corporeal side shall not be broken.

He next adduces an analogy to show the reasonableness of the idea that in the future life men should have bodies suited to their condition (verse 39). Various orders of being — men, beasts, fishes — have bodies suited to their conditions and needs. Why should not men receive such bodies as befit a higher state of being? That there should be various kinds of embodiments for differing stages of existence accords with the fact that in the universe God has made a difference in the glory of the material spheres (verses 40, 41). As he has made the heavenly bodies of various degrees of splendor, so he may create bodies which vary in their qualities according to the purpose which they are to serve.

From these points of view he develops his doctrine of the "spiritual body" (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*), which the soul will possess in the spiritual world, as contrasted with the "psychical body" (*σῶμα ψυχικόν*), which it inhabits here (verse 44). The latter is ani-

mated by the sensuous and perishable life (ψυχή) as its determining element; the former will be animated by the supersensuous and imperishable life (ζωή) which the Spirit imparts and sustains. The perishable body of Adam is the type of the present natural bodies of all men; the glorified body of the risen and ascended Saviour is the type of the pneumatic bodies which await the dead in Christ (verse 49). It is doubtful whether the glory (δόξα) which Paul ascribes to the resurrection-body in contrast to the "dishonor" (ἀτιμία) of the buried body (verse 43), can be understood as intended to define the material of that body as a "heavenly light-substance," as Weiss holds.[1] This term appears to be co-ordinate with "incorruption" and "power," — which, taken together, denote qualities of the spiritual body as opposed to the "corruption," "dishonor," and "weakness," which characterize the psychical body, — rather than to describe its material or composition (*cf.* verse 40).

The judgment of the world Paul closely associates with the parousia. The "day" of the Lord's coming is the "day" of judgment (1 Cor. i. 8; 2 Cor. i. 14; Phil. i. 6, 10; ii. 16). The order of events evidently is, — the advent, the resurrection, the judgment. Many hold that according to Paul there are to be two resurrections, — the first that of believers, and the second that of the rest of mankind.[2] This view is supported by appeal to two passages, 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17, "The

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 97 *b*.

[2] So Bengel and Meyer on 1 Cor. xv. 24.

Lord himself shall descend from heaven, etc., and the dead in Christ shall rise *first* [ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον]: *then* [ἔπειτα] we that are alive shall be caught up," etc. It is obvious, however, that the word "first" here is correlative to the word "then" in the next verse, and that the rising of the dead in Christ as a *first* event is said to be followed as *next* in order, not by a second resurrection, but by the translation to the skies of believers who shall be living at the time. It is clear, then, that Paul does not here speak of a *first* resurrection as opposed to a *second*. The passage is, however, in no way inconsistent with the idea of a second resurrection, and in the view of many critics naturally gives rise to the inference that his mention of the resurrection of the dead in Christ, as an act by itself, implies his belief in the resurrection of non-Christians as a distinct and separate event (so Olshausen, De Wette). The question which arises regarding the separate mention of the resurrection of the dead in Christ would, no doubt, disappear if the view that Paul does not believe in the resurrection of non-Christians at all could be established (so Weiss). The question may also be answered by saying that he mentions Christians only because he was comforting the Thessalonian Church concerning their departed friends, and had no occasion to take into view any except believers (so Calvin). This appears to me to be the most natural explanation of the mention of the resurrection of believers as a distinct event, and as preceding the transporting of the living to heaven,

whatever view be taken of the resurrection of non-Christians, or a twofold resurrection, on the ground of other passages. The Thessalonians feared that their departed friends would be anticipated by the living at the advent; that the living would earlier and more fully enjoy its glory than the dead. Paul replies, No, your departed friends shall rise *first;* that is, before the living enter into the joy of perpetual presence with the Lord. They shall be at no disadvantage as compared with you who are alive at the time, for *before* you enter the glory of the consummation which shall begin at the parousia, they shall be raised from the dead. There is therefore no occasion here to think or speak of any except believers; there is, at any rate, no reference here to *two* resurrections, as Meyer (who, on other grounds, holds the view of a double resurrection to be Pauline) fully acknowledges.[1]

The principal passage to which appeal is made in support of the opinion that Paul believes in two resurrections is 1 Cor. xv. 23, 24, "Each man [shall be raised] in his own order [that is, group, or division]: Christ the firstfruits [the first typical case of resurrection, and so the guaranty and pledge of the resurrection of believers; *cf.* verse 20]; then they that are Christ's, at his coming. Then cometh the end," etc. "The end" (τὸ τέλος) is understood to mean the end of the resurrection (so Bengel, Meyer). In this view there would be three divisions of those who are raised, — first, Christ himself, conceived no

[1] Commentary on 1 Thess. iv. 16.

doubt as a leader (although designated here "first-fruits," in accordance with a figure previously employed); then the believers; and finally the non-Christians. If, however, the end of the resurrection had been meant by τὸ τέλος here, it seems highly probable that it would have been more particularly defined. It is true that Meyer's interpretation has the advantage of giving a more extended program of the resurrection, which seems to be contemplated by the apostle in such a beginning of his description as, "*Each man* in *his own* division." We naturally expect a somewhat numerous series of the τάγματα of which he seems to be thinking; but several instances occur elsewhere in which Paul does not carry out enumerations which his language seemed to promise (Rom. i. 8; iii. 2). But the apostle's conception of "the end" here appears to be clearly implied in what follows the expression: "Then cometh the end, when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God," etc. "The end" refers to the time when Christ shall consummate his kingdom, and put into subjection all hostile powers (see verse 28). If this consummation can be shown to include the resurrection of non-Christians, the passage will indeed admit of adjustment to the doctrine of two resurrections. But I regard it as quite certain that the passage cannot be made directly to support that opinion. "The end" must be taken in the absolute sense as denoting the end of the present world-period, the goal of human history (so Godet, Heinrici, Weiss, Edwards). Since no other passages

appear to support the Jewish idea of a twofold resurrection, we may conclude either that Paul had abandoned it in favor of the idea of a general resurrection of all mankind, or that he supposed there was to be no resurrection for unbelievers.

If Paul knew nothing of two resurrections, it follows that he could not have held the idea of a reign of Christ upon earth either for a thousand years (*cf.* Rev. xx. 1–7), or for any less definite period. Paul was not a chiliast; and the Jewish doctrine of two resurrections, with the added conception of an intermediate reign of Christ upon earth, finds absolutely no support in the New Testament outside of the Apocalypse.

In regard to the question whether Paul believed in a resurrection of the godless, the following points must be remembered, — (*a*) that he nowhere speaks in his epistles (*cf.*, however, Acts xxiv. 15) of a general resurrection of all mankind; (*b*) that he twice (1 Thess. iv. 16; 1 Cor. xv. 23) speaks explicitly of a resurrection of Christians, as if he thought of it as a distinct event; (*c*) that his whole argument for the fact of a resurrection is based upon Christ's resurrection as its ground and guaranty; and (*d*) that the application of this argument is made to Christians alone. It is certain that Paul has said nothing — even in the most casual or indirect way — of a resurrection of non-believers. Whether he held to such a resurrection notwithstanding the fact that he has not alluded to it, or whether he has not alluded to it because he did not

hold it, is a matter for conjecture. It cannot fairly be denied that the facts just mentioned make no ordinary case of an *argumentum e silentio*. Why, in 1 Cor. xv. 23, does he make no allusion to the resurrection of others than Christians when, in what seems to start out as a general description of the process, he explicitly mentions that of those who are Christ's? Would the argument of 1 Cor. xv. avail to establish, or even to render probable, a resurrection of all men? It is certainly used by Paul only to prove the resurrection of Christians. Can the last Adam be considered, according to the presuppositions of the argument, as becoming the life-giving spirit of resurrection (xv. 45) to any except to those who are joined to him by faith? Can the "all" who, it is said, will be made alive (xv. 22), — that is, raised from the dead, — be understood absolutely; that is, without respect to their union with Christ through faith? As against most interpreters (Hofmann, Heinrici, Edwards, Beet, Godet), Meyer holds that it should be so understood. If so, the conclusion must follow that it is not life-union with Christ, but a natural relation of Christ to all men, which secures resurrection, — a view which would not only be at variance with Rom. viii. 11, where the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ is declared to be both the condition and the means of the quickening of the mortal body, but would, in my opinion, logically lead to the conclusion which Olshausen, De Wette, and others have drawn from it, — the final restoration of all men. Moreover, the de-

scription of the resurrection-body is such as to show that believers only were thought of. It is a pneumatic body; that is, one animated by the life-giving Divine Spirit, and suited to a holy and glorious sphere of existence. If evil men are regarded as subjects of resurrection, what conception of their bodies is to be entertained? Paul furnishes no hint in answer.

But there is one consideration which is regarded as decisive (see Meyer on 1 Cor. xv. 24) for the view that Paul believed in the resurrection of all men: All men are to be *judged* (1 Cor. vi. 2; xi. 32), and the judgment presupposes resurrection. There is no question that the resurrection (whatever be its scope) precedes the judgment; there is also none that the world is to be the subject of judgment, although this representation is quite incidental and infrequent with Paul; but without further evidence it cannot be proven that these positions necessarily involve the universality of the resurrection. The considerations adduced may create a certain presumption in its favor, but they do not conclusively prove a positive opinion on Paul's part.

We are led to the conclusion that Paul teaches nothing concerning the resurrection of unbelievers. This statement does not mean that his teaching is absolutely inconsistent with the fact of such a resurrection, or that his language shows him to have had a positive opinion against it. The subject is wholly outside the scope of his doctrine. His arguments are not directed toward it, nor would they be applicable

to it. It must also be admitted that if the considerations which Paul has adduced to support the fact of the resurrection of the dead are the only ones which are available, a strong presumption must arise against the resurrection of non-Christians, since such a resurrection cannot rest upon the grounds which Paul has alleged. With reference to Paul's doctrine of the resurrection, then, I regard two negative conclusions as well established by exegesis, — (1) that he does not teach the Jewish doctrine of two resurrections, and (2) that he does not affirm or clearly imply any view as to the fact or manner of a resurrection for non-believers.[1]

A further question arises, From what are men conceived of as rising in the resurrection? Paul speaks either of the resurrection of the dead (*ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, 1 Cor. xv. 12, 13, 21, *et al.*), or of resurrection from (among) the dead (*ἐκ νεκρῶν*, Rom. vi. 4; vii. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 12, *et al.*). The latter expression he couples only with Christ's resurrection; the former he regularly employs of the resurrection in general. The conception in the expression, resurrection *ἐκ νεκρῶν*, is evidently that of a rising up out of the underworld, Sheol, — resurrection from the realm of the dead. How the apostle conceived of the person,

[1] If we could assume with confidence that the report of Paul's speech before Felix accurately reproduced his language in detail, the apostle's belief in "a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust" (Acts xxiv. 15) would be securely established; but in view of the silence of his epistles this assumption becomes a precarious one.

or spirit, of Christ, as related to his body during the period between his death and resurrection, he has in no way intimated. The Jewish conception of Sheol, which there is no reason to suppose that Paul had, in its general idea, abandoned, in connection with the two expressions already referred to, requires us to suppose that he conceived of the dead persons as rising from the underworld, or realm of disembodied spirits, and being clothed with bodies suited to the life upon which they then enter.

Did Paul, then, believe in an intermediate state? He has certainly developed no doctrine concerning it, and it is a perplexing question as to what his statements most naturally imply. His expectation of the nearness of the parousia naturally accounts for his entire neglect of this subject. Even if his principles required the assumption of a middle state, the conception of such a state would remain comparatively unimportant for him in view of the speedy culmination of human history in the resurrection and judgment. His expressions regarding the believer's entrance at death into the immediate presence of Christ (2 Cor. v. 6–8; Phil. i. 23) seem unfavorable to the idea of an intermediate state, and certainly reflect a widely different conception of the condition of the soul between death and judgment from that which was connected with the Jewish notion of Sheol. On the other hand, it is certain that with Paul the resurrection and judgment are definite future events which ensue upon the Lord's return. What, then, is the state of the dead in

the interval between their death and the day of their resurrection? The apostle has given no answer, beyond expressing the confident hope that the believer enters at death into fellowship with Christ. In what state or sphere this fellowship will be realized previous to the bestowal of the resurrection-body, and to the final award of the judgment day, we are left to conjecture. We thus see that Paul has expressed the Christian hope of immediate entrance into fellowship with Christ at death, without in any way adjusting this hope to his doctrine of the resurrection from the realm of the dead at the second advent. His doctrine of the resurrection and the judgment seem clearly to presuppose some sort of preliminary state between death and the completion of personal life in the resurrection; but the hope of being at once with Christ, together with the expectation of the Lord's speedy return, has deterred the apostle's mind from developing any doctrine of the middle state which his principles so obviously require.

Whatever view is taken of the implications of Paul's doctrine regarding the resurrection of non-Christians, it is certain that he regards all men as amenable to the final judgment (Rom. ii. 5–9; xiv. 10–12). This subject, also, he often treats in its relation to believers. Their work will then be tested, and will be either approved or rejected (1 Cor. iii. 14, 15). The principal problem to which his language gives rise is, How is his teaching that men are to be judged in strict accordance with the deeds done in the body to

be reconciled with his doctrine of grace according to which the believer is not treated in accordance with his works, but in a gracious manner and better than he deserves? His conception of the judgment, in this aspect of it, is thus described: "For we must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ; that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done [*τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν*], whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. v. 10; *cf.* xi. 15; 1 Thess. ii. 19, 20). Here Paul seems to affirm for all men a merely legal judgment, whose awards shall be in precise equivalence to their deeds, instead of taking account of faith in Christ as divinely accepted for righteousness, and entitling the believer to a gracious treatment. Who, then, can be saved if none have sufficient works of merit to constitute a claim to acceptance, and the awards of the judgment are nevertheless to be in strict proportion to what men have done?

Various solutions of this problem have been proposed. Baur maintained that the contrast between justification by faith and justification by works was an abstract and theoretic contrast which designated respectively the characteristics of Christianity and Judaism. In concrete application to the individual Christian, both these ideas meet and blend. "Works and faith, or outer and inner, are in the life of the individual not so separated that where the one is, something of the other would not also be always present; only both together, in their relation to each

other, constitute the essence of piety, the disposition, the moral quality, without which man cannot be justified before God."[1] Pfleiderer holds that Paul's doctrine of a day of judgment and of the equivalence between awards and deeds, is a fragment of Jewish theology which is not consonant with his Christian principle of grace, — a survival in his thought of a conception which is not assimilated to his system.[2] Ritschl remarks that "Paul does not reflect upon the imperfection of the moral actions of believers, in order to seek their complement in justification through Christ."[3] Reuss says that this doctrine of the judgment according to good actions is purely Jewish, and has no point of connection with Paul's evangelical doctrine of faith as the condition of the Christian's acceptance with God, or with his doctrine of resurrection as guaranteed by union with Christ. He adds that the Church should not seek to combine into one system these incompatible conceptions.[4]

To these opinions of the problem, I will only add the ingenious solution of Weiss: "This equivalent (the exact correspondence of reward to the deeds done) is not to be regarded in the rigid judicial sense as an external balancing of wages and service, but as the natural correspondence of harvest and seed-time" (Gal. vi. 7, 8). He explains the

[1] *Vorlesungen über Neutestamentl. Theol.* p. 181.
[2] *Paulinismus*, pp. 281, 282; Eng. tr. i. 266.
[3] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, ii. 365.
[4] *Théol. Chrét. au Siècle Apos.* ii. 221, 222.

"deeds done" as denoting, in the case of the Christian, his whole activity as determined by the Spirit, and the award as not being legally due, but as following by a natural necessity.[1] The principle of equivalence, then, as applied in the doctrine of the judgment, is not to be interpreted in a narrow legal spirit, but in accord with Paul's Christian standpoint.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the apostle has retained, in regard to the judgment, Jewish phraseology which belongs to the scheme of debt and works that he so energetically rejected and opposed; in other words, he did not extend the application of the terminology of his doctrine of grace and faith to that subject. The principles of his system obviously require a distinction to be made between the basis of judgment for such as refuse God's grace and insist upon standing upon the plane of law and works, and for those who renounce all claims to merit and accept the gracious offer of salvation through faith. The principle of equivalence can apply only to the former class, because they adhere to the sphere of law, and make their claim upon the work-and-wages principle. But Paul teaches that on this basis there can be no acceptance with God, because no one can furnish proof of the requisite obedience to the divine requirements. Salvation is attainable only on the principle of a gracious concession on God's part toward sinful men. This is the ground of their acceptance in justification, and must equally be the basis of their final

[1] *Bib. Theol.* § 98 *d.*

acceptance in the judgment. Yet Paul has retained, in describing the judgment, the formula used by the Jews which comports with the idea of a merely legal, and not with that of a gracious or Christian, judgment.

While we are thus bound to recognize the fact that Paul has not carried out his principle of grace in application to the judgment, it is not reasonable to assume that this Jewish formula descriptive of the judgment was understood by him in the same narrow sense in which he had understood it as a Pharisee. It is impossible that his intensely ethical and personal conceptions of religion should not have broadened the terms of this formula of equivalence. While it is certain, on the one hand, that his theology of grace did not replace the terms of the Pharisaic theory of salvation regarding the method of the judgment, it is a just and tenable view that this theology elevated and broadened those terms in accord with its own spirit, so that the "deeds done in the body" comprehended, in the case of the Christian, all the activities of a life of faith which works by love. The reward, in such a case, Paul could not have regarded as legally due on the ground of personal merit, but as morally due according to that gracious system of divine action which has made faith, obedience, love, and service the conditions of receiving, not of achieving, final salvation.

It remains to review Paul's statements regarding the final consummation of the Messianic kingdom.

When the end of the present world-period arrives, Christ will deliver over to God his mediatorial kingdom, but not until he shall have subdued all enemies, of which death is the last to be overcome. Death, however, shall be subdued in the resurrection and the glorification of believers. When Christ has thus accomplished the object of his reign, he shall also himself become subject to the Father, that God may be all in all (1 Cor. xv. 24–28). It appears from the fact that the work of Christ in his kingdom is under consideration, that the "subjection" of the Son spoken of denotes an official surrender of the function of Mediator, whose work is now complete, so that, in contrast to the mediatorial rule of Christ, God may be the immediate ruler in all the subjects of the kingdom (*cf.* verse 22; Phil. ii. 10, 11; Rom. xi. 32; Col. i. 20).

In these passages the final triumph of Christ over opposing powers is plainly asserted. Do they involve the idea of the final conversion of all to Christ, and of their restoration to divine favor? If the language of these verses might be taken by itself, it would most naturally suggest this conception. Its terms are the broadest and most positive which could be employed to assert the absolute submission of all evil powers to Christ. Neander regards them as presenting a "magnificent prospect of the final triumph of the work of redemption."[1] Pfleiderer affirms that this subjection of all things under Christ, this bowing of

[1] *Planting and Training*, Bohn ed. i. 531; Am. ed. p. 487.

all knees to him, which Paul describes, can be conceived as realized only by the annihilation of the wicked or by their conversion.[1] Julius Müller does not regard these passages as in themselves decisive apart from considerations drawn from other sources.[2]

It appears to me unwarranted to explain these expressions without reference to the principles of Paul's system as a whole. When it is said that "in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22), — whether *ζωοποιηθήσονται* refer to resurrection (as is probable), or to spiritual life, — it cannot be maintained, on Pauline principles, that this *making alive* occurs apart from union with Christ; that is, apart from the personal appropriation of the benefits of Christ's work by faith. In like manner, when in verse 28 God is said to be "all in all," — whether *ἐν πᾶσιν* is taken as masculine (Godet, Meyer, Weiss) or neuter (Edwards, Lechler, Heinrici), — it does not follow, on the former supposition, that *ἐν πᾶσιν* is more comprehensive than the "all things" which have before been mentioned as ruled over by the Son; nor, on the latter, that all evil world-powers are willingly subjected to God's rule. It cannot be concluded from the statement that all men and powers are subdued to divine rule, and are rendered subject to Christ's kingdom, that all are thus subject in the same sense, unless the principles of the system authorize such a supposition.

[1] *Paulinismus*, pp. 288, 289; Eng. tr. i. 275.

[2] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii. 426, 427.

It can hardly be doubted that these expressions, taken absolutely and by themselves, would most naturally be understood to point to the restoration of all men. This interpretation of them, however, cannot be adjusted either to Paul's doctrine of man, of salvation, or of the judgment. But two courses seem open to the interpreter, — either to hold the terms of these passages subject, in concrete application, to those modifications which are required by the conditions of salvation that the apostle elsewhere regards as not fulfilled in all; or to assert, with Pfleiderer, an insoluble contradiction between that harmonious outcome of human history which accords with Paul's "religious speculation" respecting the principle of grace, and the dualism which corresponds to his legal standpoint of "moral reflection."[1]

The impression made by an impartial examination of the salient points in Paul's eschatological teaching is, that he has expressed the content of Christian hope without close reflection upon the relation of the various elements of his doctrine to one another. The reserve of his teaching respecting the future is evident when one seeks for replies to many of the questions regarding the resurrection, the intermediate state, and the judgment, with which theology is required to deal. His statements are assertions of general principles rather than parts of a coherent system. He was confident of being with Christ at once after death, and of being clothed upon with

[1] *Paulinismus*, pp. 272, 273, 1 Aufl.; Eng. tr. i. 276.

the heavenly house (2 Cor. v. 1, 2), — the spiritual body; he was sure that God would judge all men in righteousness, and that Christ would triumph over every foe. But his language must be forced and supplemented with many conjectures before it can be made to yield any detailed eschatological program, or to afford an answer to the numerous inquiries to which speculative thought gives rise in connection with his affirmations. It was wholly aside from his purpose to write in respect to this, or in respect to any other subject, a systematically reasoned argument which should answer the demands of scientific thought. He wrote for a more practical, and, in relation to his time and purpose, a more important end, — to foster and strengthen the Christian life. Of this fact we find an illustration in the way in which he closes the chapter on the resurrection, with which our attention has been so much occupied: "Wherefore, my beloved brethren, be ye stedfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord" (1 Cor. xv. 58).

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